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 This study examines figures that modify the meta-language that 
defines, rationalizes and constrains them. Reflexive figures interrupt 
meaning—and incorporate that interruption as meaning. They index power 
(rather than figuring it), setting up the self-reference of tropological 
language as a central problem in the poetry of William Wordsworth and 
William Blake, inherited by John Ashbery and A.R. Ammons. For these 
poets, reflexive figures stage an encounter of figural imagination (or 
language) with power, conceived as external to language, or alternatively, as 
the creativity of language itself. Such figures situate the renewal, 
regeneration or renovation of language and imagination, and in late 20th 
century literary theory, they have become integral to notions of the linguistic 
turn, and the irrational signature of power produced when language folds 
onto itself.  
 The study reads key passages of Blake’s major and minor prophecies, 
along with his shorter poems, major sections of Wordsworth’s Prelude and 
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poetry spanning the careers of Ashbery and Ammons. I conclude by 
examining the abstract algebra of Wordsworth’s friend, the seminal 
nineteenth century scientist William Rowan Hamilton, and its implications 
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         CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 What does figural imagination encounter when it encounters itself?  Is it 
antithetical creativity? God? Linguistic power? Is it an apocalyptic dimension of 
metaphor, repressed by the everyday sense in which we “use” a metaphor? This 
study examines imagination’s capacity to signify its own power, in its alterity, and 
aestheticize it—or figure it as the ground of possible meaning. I take reflexive 
imagination to be a special case of a reflexive trope: a structure that emerges as a 
central concern of Wordsworth and Blake, inherited by A.R. Ammons and John 
Ashbery. 
 Post linguistic turn, reflexive imagination gives way to the reflexivity of 
language. Language folds onto itself to index its own power conceived in two 
ways: either as a “real” of language that is external to language, or as the irrational 
principle of linguistic creativity. Rather than taking reflexivity as a property of 
language or imagination, I define reflexivity as a property of figures. A reflexive 
figure (as defined in Chapter 2 of this study), is an abstract conceit, not tied to any 
particular story about language or power—“power” takes many forms in this study, 
but remains a structural placeholder, thematizing the discontinuity posed by 
reflexive tropes.  
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I juxtapose poets and critics with very different notions of imagination 
and/or language, noticing that they employ reflexive figures to invoke power—and 
do so necessarily. Four poets make us unusually aware of this fact. Wordsworth, 
Blake, Ashbery and Ammons figure the renewal of imagination or language; the 
“renovating virtue” of Wordsworth’s spots of time, the Blakean Moment that 
“renovates every Moment of the Day if rightly placed,” the return of language to 
the “non-verbal” (Ammons) and the “new weather” or “climate” invoked by 
Ashbery are all conceits of renewal situated by reflexive figures. In each case, the 
“re” of renewal turns out to be a complicated problem that I highlight in its formal 
dimension.  
Proceeding inductively in this study, I abstract the form of reflexive figures 
across a wide range of examples. As I define them in Chapter 2, reflexive tropes 
modify their own meta-language, manifesting an irrational blind-spot of reflexive 
form. Even as figural imagination can equivocate between figural and literal 
agency to produce incongruously embodied metaphors, it can blur or entangle any 
meta-figural dichotomy to signify its power. Such oppositions might include the 
distinction between tenor and vehicle, use and mention, and the difference between 
difference and sameness—a meta-difference, allowing the rhetor to talk about the 
nature of figurality, either as a reconciler of opposites or a generator of difference. 
Thus, reflexive figures operate on their own definitions and formal constraints at 
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ever-higher levels, modifying dichotomies that rationalize the theory of tropes, or 
tropological imagination. 
In his famous description of Mt. Atlas, for example, Virgil’s writing is not in 
an overtly mythical mode, and his personification of the mountain pushes the limits 
of classical decorum by incongruously literalizing it as a man-mountain (at one 
point, Virgil calls the mountain “senex” or “old man”).  Summarizing these 
responses, J. H. W. Morwood notes that “the Atlas picture has been the target 
of…adverse criticism on the ground that Virgil should have made up his mind 
whether he was describing a mountain or man” (8). Yet this blurring is what reifies 
or stonifies Atlas. Flying past the mountain, Hermes provides the point of view in 
Dryden’s translation: 
Now sees the tops of Atlas, as he flies, 
Whose brawny back supports the starry skies; 
Atlas, whose head, with piny forests crown’d, 
Is beaten by the winds, with foggy vapors bound. 
Snows hide his shoulders; from beneath his chin 
The founts of rolling streams their race begin; 
A beard of ice on his large breast depends… (463) 
 
With barba horrida (horrible beard) Virgil’s details begin applying more to a man 
than a mountain, and the personification threatens to become embodied as an 
incongruous yoking of opposites. As myth, the passage describes a yoking of 
animate and inanimate, suffered by a fallen titan whose punishment is precisely 
that he is caught between opposites, but as personification, the description 
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threatens to “go over the top,” and violate decorum. This borderline excess is not 
the threat of pathetic fallacy or fallacy of reification, but a formal effect: 
descriptive personification bleeding into myth. In Blake’s more extreme versions 
of this reification-effect, the fallen Titan suffers tropological transformation as 
metamorphosis: a turning of tropes into bodily symptoms—signaling a repressed, 
or materialized form of imagination. 
 The above figure draws attention to a peculiar point where descriptive 
personification and myth blur. The sense that we are approaching that border is the 
sense that the poet has emblematized power—or perhaps, unpleasantly shocked the 
reader’s sensibilities. The reflexive figure is not just a figure of figure; rather, 
figurality has indexed itself, or pointed to itself. Perhaps it does so through an 
interruption (or threatened interruption) of meaning that forces us “outside” of its 
form. On the other hand, we could take the equivocation of myth and 
personification as a signature of the incommensurability of power and meaning.  
John Ashbery writes “The dirt/Is mounting like a sea. And we say 
goodbye/Shaking hands in front of the crashing of the waves” (The Tennis Court 
Oath, p. 26). The vehicle of this simile becomes concrete—signaling a moment of 
reflexive figurality, and its attendant disruption. Such moments recur in Ashbery’s 
poetry, for example, through a collapse of allegory into concrete particulars. 
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Conversely, the gap between emblem and idea re-opens, and this opening and 
closing creates a temporality, or a time of reading that Ashbery calls “other times.”  
In Ashbery’s poetry, figures often seem like objects or entities. Romantic 
versions of such entities are the subject of Chapter 1 of my study, where I 
juxtapose Blake’s Urizen with the speaker from Wordsworth’s “Resolution and 
Independence.” I consider a scene from The Four Zoas, in which Blake’s Urizen 
encounters his children, caught between animacy and inanimacy as gloomy 
wonders of nature. I juxtapose it with the scene of Wordsworth’s speaker 
encountering the Leech Gatherer—who is “not all alive nor dead.” Like Urizen’s 
children, the Leech Gatherer incarnates the equivocal “logic” of a figure as an 
ontological state, indexing imagination as a rupture in cognition. Both poets swap 
the standpoint of an observer language (meta-language)—from which metaphor is 
defined as contradiction—for that of an observer for whom metaphor is embodied 
contradiction. Wordsworth and Blake frame an imagination that is outside of itself 
(or encountering itself as “other”); a sublime self-reference, in Wordsworth’s case, 
whereas for Blake, it is a disaster. Drawing on Steven Knapp’s notion of the self-
referential sublime, I argue that Urizen, along with Wordsworth’s narrator, 
encounter the poetic agency that mediates—and drives—their own “thoughts.”  
Vincent de Luca has noted that "Because Blake's poems are non-mimetic, 
there is a blurred distinction between rhetorical figures and scenic dramatizations, 
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where tropes (already by definitions ‘turns’) palpably turn into metamorphic 
beings." Elsewhere, de Luca himself blurs metaphor and metamorphosis to index a 
disorienting kind of power: “Troping is always a becoming, a representation of 
metamorphosis enacted on the level of style—and conversely, things that change 
their form in time are natural tropes” (75-76). In Chapter 1, I analyze Blake’s 
blurring of tropological transformations and metamorphosis.  Myth blurs into 
allegory, and personifications become “three-dimensional” (or collapse into 
flatness again). A gap opens up between power and rational meaning that “rouzes 
the faculties to act”: reflexive figures anticipate apocalyptic modes of metaphorical 
identification. At other times, such figures signal a contraction of vision. Blake 
attempts to frame vision by asserting meta-visionary dichotomies such as contrary 
vs. negation, center vs. circumference and prolific vs. devourer. Yet, reflexive, or 
self-limiting turns of power modify these oppositions, or blur them. This is the case 
in Beulah, a place of repose from the “Wars of Eternity,” where “Contrarieties are 
equally True” rather than dynamically and productively opposed (128).   
In Chapter 2, I model reflexive tropological language by generalizing its 
structure across very different examples, considering studies of reflexive imagery 
by W. K. Wimsatt, William Empson, and William Keach. I read Wordsworth’s 
poem “There was a boy…” from several angles—in comparison with little-read 
late poems. In considering Paul de Man’s reading of “There was a boy…” I note 
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his distinction between metaphor and pseudo-metaphor, setting up the latter as an 
illegitimate substitution of the living speaker and the dead boy: a “leap outside 
thematic reality into the rhetorical fiction of the sign (10)” and a signature of 
power. De Man situates the reflexivity of the poem by saying that “the poem does 
not reflect on death but on the rhetorical power of language that can make it seem 
as if we could anticipate the unimaginable” (10). In juxtaposition, I consider 
examples of catachresis in Blake’s poetry, in which the entanglement of myth and 
metaphor begin to complicate distinctions between analogical and non-analogical 
substitution, posing discontinuities intended to rouze the faculties.  
I also compare and contrast Ashbery and Wordsworth. In the Prelude, 
Wordsworth emphasizes the importance of “chance collisions and quaint accidents” 
in the childhood development of imagination. As I read this doctrine, however, 
imagination is entangled with accidents of nature, to signal a power that is 
disruptive from the beginning. In Wordsworth’s later poetry, mutability is a theme. 
Nature is a balm upon time’s destruction, but also “recalls” the shocks of time 
through its aestheticized and “lenient touch.” In Wordsworth’s sonnet “Mutability,” 
dissolution enters time along a scale of awful notes, whose “concord” is the 
discordant shock of a tower collapsing. The poem sets up an irreconcilable tension 
between the flowing, spatialized dimension of music as pattern or “scale” (a 
temporalitiy of anticipation)—and discrete shocks of tumbling ruin that Dyer 
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figured as “the voice of time.” Imagination entangles these oppositions to figure 
the “unimaginable touch of time”—and signifies its own temporality through this 
entanglement. 
For Ashbery, the mutability of language produces fragments that index a 
foundational “climate” of language, figured as “beginning.” Wordsworth stages a 
different version of self-indexing power through his spots of time, which I 
juxtapose with Ashbery’s charged poetic fragments in Chapter 2. The index of 
power, while thematized very differently in Ashbery and Wordsworth, exhibits 
structural homologies, readable in the following lines from The Prelude: 
…and I would stand, 
If the night blackened with a coming storm, 
Beneath some rock, listening to notes that are 
The ghostly language of the ancient earth,  
Or make their dim abode in distant winds. 
Thence did I drink the visionary power; 
And deem not profitless those fleeting moods 
Of shadowy exultation: not for this, 
That they are kindred to our purer mind, 
And intellectual life; but that the soul, 
Remembering how she felt, but what she felt 
Remembering not, retains an obscure sense 
Of possible sublimity… (165) 
 
In analyzing the passage above, Thomas Weiskel invokes the “liminal sublime,” 
noting that “the mood of shadowy exultation…is here not quite integrated into the 
order of symbolic sound” (173). Weiskel notes that “The signifier precedes the 
signified, which may indeed never arrive; or in terms closer to Wordsworth’s, the 
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subject is initiated into the how of the discourse, but not the what” (174). 
Ashbery’s poetry is also, at times a ghostly language: we remember how we felt 
when we read it, but we are hard put to explain what we felt, by invoking context, 
reference or ideas. Here, the common ground between Wordsworth and Ashbery is 
not theme, but a structure in which salience, potential meaning, and higher-order 
meaning override particular meaning. Modifying the semiotic model of Weiskel, 
we might say that figural imagination “hears” its own power to suspend the 
distinction between signifier and signified—the latter begins to slide under the 
former (borrowing a formulation of Lacan), to produce “ghostly language.”  
When Ashbery’s poetry blurs metaphors into obscurely charged objects, 
there is a formal analogy to the “liminal” sublime of Weiskel: imagination blocks 
entry into the symbolic order. The result is that “symbolicity,” per se, draws 
attention to itself—a reflexive figure—and a theoretical conceit. Language points 
to “the very fact of structure…independent of its actual organization” (Weiskel, 
175). Interpreting otherwise, imagination, in failing to imagine itself, indexes itself 
with an inscrutable—yet salient—emblem of its power. Ashbery emphasizes a 
“forgetting” that is not reducible to the erosion of memory—a decontextualization 
that produces fragments. 
Whereas Wordsworth and John Ashbery affirm the self-reference of an 
imagination that grasps itself as alien, Blake and A.R. Ammons affirm the self-
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devouring (creative-destruction) of visionary form—a form of desire not based on 
lack in language, but attained by annihilating the physical “self” (Ammons) or the 
“selfhood” (Blake).1 This kind of self-reference is performative: in the case of 
Ammons, energies of metaphorical identification collapse into energies of nature, 
or intersect with a void of Being. Chapter 3 presents the poetry of A.R. Ammons, 
for whom humanity is recycled by nature, by analogy to the recycling of dead 
language. Yet Ammons also acknowledges a resistance to such apocalyptic 
identifications—a desire to stay with the dead and hang onto a trauma that keeps 
them alive (the trauma of losing his brother, for example). This impulse ties 
Ammons to Wordsworth—and halts him before paradoxes of flow that maintain 
the living and dead alike in a liminal zone, as segments of flow. 
Chapter 4 presents a reading of Ashbery’s self-reference. Figurality draws 
attention to its own form, in the way that an abstract painting plays with 
conventions of representation, or draws attention to the materiality of its paint. Yet 
Ashbery also says that the poem turns inward on itself in autonomous meaning—
even (and especially) when no one reads or understands it. In his Charles Norton 
lecture on Laura Riding Jackson, Ashbery figures this limit through the lines: 
“Then open the small secret doors,/When none’s there to read awrong,/Out runs 
happiness in a crowd…”  (qtd. in Other Traditions 114-115).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!We find Harold Bloom asserting a Blakean version of this dynamical self-reference—against 
the selfhood and the “quest of the Freudian eros, moving always in a tragic rhythm out from and 
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Citing Ashbery’s “articulate flatness, goal, barrier and climate”—his note at 
the end of The Double Dream of Spring regarding “choosing at random” (DDS 95), 
Richard Howard notes that “The accent is on both processes equally, the operation 
of chance, the operartion of choice. The poem is already there…  The poems are 
not about anything, they are something, they are their own creation” (38). Yet, an 
Ashbery poem is also outside of its autonomously self-referential meaning, and 
trying to investigate its own power in flickers of awareness and oblivion (a 
different kind of reflexive figure). The poem becomes like a detective—or like a 
film noir movie, that turns from its subject matter and genre conventions to focus 
on something dark beyond the frame. Ashbery presents just such a scenario in 
“Detective Flick” (a poem that I read in the conclusion of this study). In moving 
between self-identity and self-investigation, the personified poem experiences 
patterns of “attention and oblivion”—a phrase deployed by Steven Knapp to 
describe the aphasia experienced by the speaker of “Resolution and Independence,” 
when encountering the poetic agency that mediates his own thoughts. 
In concluding, I examine reflexive figures that challenge or illuminate the 
model of self-indexing power examined in this study. Implicit in the “archetypes” 
that Wordsworth invokes in The Prelude is the notion of force, charactered on the 
mind as an impression. As I read it, The Prelude modifies this doctrine by 
deferring the depth of a mark. Referring to Derrida’s reading of Freud’s “Project 
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for a Scientific Psychology,” I analyze the deconstruction of “depth” as a reflexive 
figure of deferred “power,” troubling Wordsworth’s doctrine of originary 
impressions on the mind. In revisiting Blakean reflexivity, I examine Beulah as the 
figure of an imagination that is “outside” of itself. I also consider Blake’s counter-
figure: that of an imagination that turns the outside world inside, through 
metaphorical identification, and outside again, through a turn to referential 
language. Ashbery and Ammons, in contrast, present a figural imagination that is 
fundamentally “outside” of itself: its power intersects with an inhuman void.  
In closing this study, I examine a special kind of reflexive figure that interrupts 
meaning—and re-incorporates the interruption as meaning. The square root of 
negative one is a contradiction, and interpreted as a “quantity,” it has no apparent 
referent in the real world. Yet, is named as the number “i” and used to solve 
mathematical equations. In naively examining the aesthetics of imaginary numbers, 
I focus on William Rowan Hamilton, a 19th-century mathematician who invented 
new imaginary numbers that violated laws of arithmetic, inaugurating the abstract 
turn of algebra. Hamilton claimed that his leaps of abstraction were the work of a 
plastic, mathematical imagination that molded the laws of arithmetic—the 
mathematics of mathematics, recently highlighted in Leon Chai’s study of Galois, 
in Romantic Theory: Forms of Reflexivity in the Romantic Era.  For Hamilton, the 
mathematics of mathematics makes abstract leaps that reveal the laws of the laws 
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of nature, at every deeper levels. Moreover, his abstract turn anticipates the modern 
notion of the language of language—and from standpoint of a history of ideas, 
informs it.  
Imaginary numbers are a reflexive figure—the emblem of an imagination 
whose ground was mysterious to Hamilton, especially given his (correct) 
conviction that his work would find applications in physics. Hamilton impressed 
upon his good friend William Wordsworth the creativity of a deductive 
mathematical science—and its sympathy with nature. Both men spent long hours 
on walks, imagining the nature of poetic and scientific imagination. 
Lewis Carroll is one of the few readers of Romanticism to have brought 
Wordsworth and Hamilton together. Carroll mocked the symbolical school of 
algebra and its validation of meaningless symbols (Pycior 149-51). He probably 
satirized Hamilton’s mathematics in the episode of the Mad Hatter’s tea party 
(Bayley 11). More famously, he parodied Wordsworth’s “Resolution and 
Independence” by depicting a speaker possessed by nonsensical schemes—
interrupted by the rambling of an aged, aged man; a subject who drifts in and 
outside of the poetic agency that mediates her own thought.2   
As a final note in the introduction of this study, I want to qualify references 
to the “inside” or “outside” of imagination. As I note in my conclusion, to use or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 This self-reference should remind us of the sublime self-reference read by Steven Knapp in 
“Resolution and Independence” (Knapp 129). 
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mention the word “Boston” is not the same as using or mentioning a metaphor. The 
latter can call flat, or we might imagine that we are carried by its transport. By 
loose analogy to locating a statement “inside” of an object language, we might 
imagine (as poets and critics sometimes do), that there is a formal standpoint 
located “inside” of the language of imagination, the language of the dream and so 
forth. Formally speaking, this theoretical inside is most characteristically indexed 
by disruptions in logical form—and it is here that theory sets up a reflexive turn of 
trope.  
Autonomous form means that metaphor is contradiction, litotes produce 
non-eliminating negation, paranomasia disrupts the standard of univocal language 
and so forth. Pathologies of logic point to the “inside” of imagination from the 
outside—although I will argue in Chapter 2 that collapses of use and mention are a 
kind of illogic that is uncertainly claimed as any form of understanding, classically 
logical or otherwise. Tropes that modify their own meta-language introduce a 
discontinuity that poet and critic must interpret, each in her own way. The 
emphasis here, as elsewhere in my study, is on the distinction between an “index” 
of power and a figure of power: reflexive figures do not intelligibly figure their 
power—they point to it through discontinuity. Whether or not imagination is a 
form of understanding and desire is a theoretical question, but when the poet 
indexes that form (or narrates an account from “inside” of apocalyptic imagiantion), 
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introduces a formal problem of fictive standpoints (“inside” and “outside”), and 
how they entangle. 
In a very different mode, we find Paul de Man saying that “act and 
interpretation are connected in a…complex and often contradictory manner,” and 
that “For Wordsworth, there is no historical eschatology, but rather, only a never-
ending reflection upon an eschatological moment that has failed through the excess 
of its interiority” [my italics] (59).  “Inside” here is the realm of an “act” and 
“outside” is the realm of interpretation—but they do not coincide as 
“consciousness.” The passage of “imagination” from “active to…interpretive stage” 
is an index of positional power—situated by de Man in reading the crossing-the-







      URIZEN’S CHILDREN AND THE LEECH GATHERER 
1. Self-Reference 
This chapter examines Romantic imagination as a self-referential power that 
puts a hole in cognition, coming across as something other than a form of desire, 
thought or experience.  In its self-referential aspect, imagination points to itself 
through incomprehensible entities, such as Wordsworth’s Leech Gatherer in 
“Resolution and Independence,” or Urizen’s ruined children in Blake’s The Four 
Zoas.   Imagination collapses literal and figural levels, precipitating an entity that 
incarnates the “logic” of a figure as its ontological state.   The Leech Gatherer, for 
example, is “not all alive, nor dead,” and Urizen’s children are caught, suffering, 
between humanity and inhuman Nature—in both cases, reifying visionary power as 
an uncanny or incomprehensible spectacle.    
In Personification and the Sublime, Steven Knapp notes: 
Wordsworth’s partially allegorized agents draw attention to 
 the imagination’s impulse to allegorize; more exactly, the  
 impulse to allegorize is made noticeable by its curious  
 inappropriateness to the agents to which it is applied.   
 Precisely the discrepancy between the agent’s natural 
 status and its sudden acquisition of quasi-allegorical  
 resonance thus becomes, for Wordsworth, a formal index 
 of imaginative power. [my italics]  (106) 
 
As a “real” being of the same order of reality as the narrator or poet, the Leech 
Gatherer resists allegorical meaning—and this all the more highlights an impulse 
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to read him allegorically. The personifying impulse puts the old man, as a figural 
agent, in representational space with the speaker of the poem, who is ostensibly 
real. This “impulse” to collapse literal and figural levels is unassimilable to a 
personal faculty of the mind. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a host of 
entities incongruously concretize figurality, staging a linguistic turn through which 
language encounters its own power in negative form. Such entities include Blake’s 
Adam (in his painting, The Elohim Creating Adam), Urizen’s children and 
Wordsworth’s borderers; the visionary ruin of Wordsworth’s London in its vast 
and indecorous cacophony; peculiar monsters of metaphysics, such as the 
Cartesian vortex that Blake parodied in The Four Zoas; and those mathematical 
objects, such as infinitesimals and imaginary numbers, that had no referent in 
empirical reality, and seemed to incarnate pathologies of reason.   
What do the Leech Gatherer, Urizen’s children and imaginary numbers have 
in common? These entities incarnate the antithetical logic of figures as their 
ontological state or their “meaning.” Coleridge’s imagination reconciles opposites 
(and by implication, contradiction), but Wordsworth’s Leech Gatherer exists 
between life and death—“out there” in the landscape where the narrator encounters 
him.  From the narrator’s standpoint, the “logic” of metaphor—translated as “not 
all alive nor dead”—is now the ontological state of a thing. 
2.  Reflection vs. Self-Reference 
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 Inasmuch as imagination mirrors its power back to us comprehensibly, the 
mind reflects on it, and “reflexivity” is reflexio (“bending back”). In the above 
example, however, language folds on itself in self-reference, pointing to its own 
power in a way that interrupts reflection. In contrast, we can consider Akenside’s 
version of Genesis from Pleasures of the Imagination, in which God’s creativity is 
the very form of His thought and desire. Akenside’s God views uncreated images 
akin to Platonic forms, “deep retired/In his unfathomed essence,” and then his 
“vital smile” unfolds them into being: 
...Ere the radiant sun 
Sprung from the East, or ‘mid the vault of night   
  The moon suspended her serener lamp; 
  Ere mountains, woods, or streams adorned the globe, 
  Or Wisdom taught the sons of men her lore; 
  Then lived the Eternal one: then, deep retired  
  In his unfathomed essence, viewed at large 
  The uncreated images of things;  
  The radiant sun, the moon’s nocturnal lamp, 
  The mountains, woods, and streams, the rolling globe, 
  And Wisdom’s form celestial.  From the first   
  Of days on them his divine love he fixed, 
  His admiration; till in time complete, 
  What he admired and loved, his vital smile 
  Unfolded into being.  Hence the breath 
  Of life informing each organic frame...  (93)     
     
Akenside’s description elides the moment of performative logos—which would be 
a self-referential moment because the fiat (“Let there be light”) does what it 
decrees. He bypasses the disruptive sublimity of autonomous creative power for 
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the beauty of reflection and sympathetic imagination. His version of Genesis 
differs from the Bible, where: “God saw everything that he had made, /and behold, 
it was very good.”  Akenside’s God saw that it was good before the creation 
unfolded, by first reflecting on his own ideas. The creation is a self-reinforcing 
image from the beginning, so much so that God could never have created the world 
and flinched backward from it-- seeing “that it was bad.” God is in harmony with 
his creation, and Akenside will extend this harmony to the relation between 
humanity and Nature through the metaphor of Memnon’s stone harp--the basis of 
the Romantic Aeolian harp. This harmony between humanity and Nature mirrors 
the harmony of God with His creation: Akenside’s God smiles his creation into 
being. In Blake’s poem, “The Tyger,” by contrast, the voice of Experience 
wonders: “did he smile his work to see?” 
 In “The Elohim Creating Adam,” William Blake depicts a seemingly 
stunned deity, hovering over an Adam who is suffocated by the serpent coils of 
historical and natural cycles—cycles that parody the exhaustion and renewal of 
visionary creativity. In his stricken facial expression, Adam reflects the Elohim, 
but in the darkened mirror of creation, the creator seems unable to read Adam as an 
entity made in his own image. Akenside says of God creating nature: “What he 
admired and loved, his vital smile/Unfolded into being.” Instead, the Elohim stares 
intently but blankly out of frame, sensing the insistence of his own power in alien 
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form. We might imagine that this parodic creation obstructs authentic power, 
which shoots sinister rays in the background of the picture, mimicked by the raised 
hair of the Elohim. Power englobes into a sun or circle behind the Elohim—a 
sinister contraction in Blake’s myth. The sun encompasses the Elohim with its 
outline, as a circle encloses the creator in Blake’s painting the Ancient of Days.   
In this scene, there is no representation of authentic power, only a gnostic 
“contraction” of it, or a defense against it. From our limited perspective as 
spectators, there was already defense against power from the beginning, before 
there was anything to defend against--defense is the only “creation” we see. The 
clay that the Elohim gathers in his left hand catachrestically yokes spirit and flesh, 
and Adam, splayed backward in a crucifixion pose, suffers this identification 
literally, as a physical symptom. Adam is a thing with the contradictory “logic” of 
a figure, yoking opposites through his fallen state rather than through imaginative 
or figural agency. The power that created Adam is not assimilable to the Elohim’s 
conscious will: it is a power of materialization that surprises the Elohim, much as 
Urizen is “suprized” by the Tree of Mystery that sparks beneath his heel, roofing 
him over with branches in The Four Zoas.   
 In “Resolution and Independence,” William Wordsworth fashioned an image 
that we can juxtapose with Blake’s. Wordsworth’s narrator “espies” an old Leech 
Gatherer bent over a brackish pond, stirring the water to disturb leeches. As in the 
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case of the Elohim, the old man looks past his reflection to read something, and 
“fixedly did look”: 
At length, himself unsettling, he the pond 
Stirred with his staff, and fixedly did look 
Upon the muddy water, which he conned, 
        As if he had been reading in a book:  (85-88, N 399) 
 
What the old man tries to con, according to Steven Knapp, is a “miniaturized” 
image of himself in the form of wriggling leeches. This disconnection between self 
and self-image (man and leech) signals imagination, both in the case of Leech 
Gatherer reading his image, and in the case of the narrator trying to read the Leech 
Gatherer as an emblem of resolution and independence. Wordsworth’s old man 
stirs the water, and in so doing, disturbs his reflection—“himself unsettling.” 
Reading unsettles the old man, suggesting an allegory of the narrator’s own 
difficulties; the Leech Gatherer is not easily interpreted because he is not so much 
a figure as an entity with the logic and agency of a figure—as though figurality had 
turned inside out. 
Figurality seems to fold on itself, trying to grasp its agency through 
literalized or ruined figures, which are “ruined” in the double sense of being 
literalized metaphors or catachrestically yoked opposites on one hand, and ruined 
human shapes on the other hand, shattered into uncanny and incomprehensible 
modes of agency—“dishumanizd men” as William Blake puts it in Night Six of 
The Four Zoas. This is a reflexive turn in which the mind encounters imagination 
  
22 
as negatively sublime—a “turning round as with the might of waters” in 
Wordsworth’s formulation, that precipitates bent and abstracted figures, charged 
with a power of admonishment. In taking such shapes, human ruins signify a 
power of the imagination that resists meaning.     
We might imagine that a “ruined figure” collapses two meanings: that of a 
ruined figurality, readable as literalized or even “bad” metaphoricity, and a ruined 
humanity, “dehumanized” or deprived of the figural unity that would otherwise 
coalesce it. The conceit here is that literalization would be borne as a ruined 
state—in the mode of Blake’s Adam for example, who yokes matter and spirit, but 
also, in the manner of Wordsworth’s old man, who incarnates a suspension of life 
and death. To achieve this conceit, Wordsworth employs a famous simile: 
As a huge Stone is sometimes seen to lie 
Couch’d on the bald top of an eminence; 
Wonder to all who do the same espy 
By what means it could thither come and whence; 
So that it seems a thing endued with sense: 
Like a Sea-beast crawl’d forth, which on a shelf 
Of rock or sand reposeth, there to sun itself. 
 
Such seem’d this Man, not all alive nor dead (N, 399)   
In his 1815 preface to Poems, Wordsworth invokes the imaginative “assimilation” 
of stone and sea beast, and the subsequent “coalescence” or “unity” of this 
“intermediate image” with the Leech Gatherer. The epic simile “coalesces” stone 
and sea beast—but the speaker of “Resolution and Independence” does not 
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encounter a simile when walking through the landscape, he encounters the Leech 
Gatherer. In his preface, Wordsworth invokes an agency (“coalescence,” “unity,” 
“assimilation”) that can reconcile opposites, and the reader ostensibly experiences 
that. Within the poem’s narrative there is there is disorientation and mystery 
surrounding this agency, reified “out there” in the landscape—and the narrator 
experiences this.   The poem turns the imagination inside out by incarnating its 
amphibious hovering—an event that happens in the blank space of the stanza break 
between lines 70-71, where the coalescing power of the simile hangs, reifying 
itself as the old man’s state—“not all alive nor dead.”    
 In encountering the old man, the narrator encounters the poetic agency that 
mediates his own narrative reflection; i.e., he encounters the drive of meter and 
metaphor. This is a more formal narrator than the one conflated with the historical 
Wordsworth, but there is precedent for reading him this way. Steven Knapp sees 
the narrator struggling to understand the momentum of the Spenserian stanza, the 
medium of his own lyric reflection, now faced from the “outside” through the 
rhythms of the old Leech Gatherer’s speech. Both the impulse of meter and the 
impulse to allegorize insist as negative powers, so that “the imagination itself, as it 
operates on a figure like the Leech-Gatherer, is not so much a faculty of the 
individual mind as it is a recurrent pattern of attention and oblivion…produced by 
the agency of poetic form” (121). 
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3.  Urizen’s Children 
“Attention and oblivion” refers to the narrator’s famously distracted 
questioning of the Leech Gatherer, but it could also describe the mode of repeated 
questions in Shelley’s “The Triumph of Life” (“But what is life?”) or Blake’s 
prophecies—patterns that might be taken, in one way or another, as produced by an 
“agency of poetic form” impinging on a lyric subject, fictive self or Blakean 
selfhood as a hole in cognition. In the The Four Zoas, Urizen interrogates suffering 
and terrible agencies of nature which return his own “obstructed powers” in 
traumatic form.  His repeated questions and inability to get an answer result from 
the fact that he has “forgotten” a power of sympathetic imagination that would 
ground his apostrophe to the inanimate world. The fact that he partially retains his 
powers accounts for his ability to corral inanimate objects at all—and thus, there is 
wavering between “attention and oblivion” here too:      
Then he beheld the forms of tygers & of Lions dishumanized men 
Many in serpents & in worms stretchd out enormous length 
Over the sullen mould & slimy tracks obstruct his way 
Drawn out from deep to deep woven by ribbed 
And scaled monsters or armd in iron shell or shell of brass 
Or gold a glittering torment shining & hissing in eternal pain 
Some columns of fire or of water sometimes stretchd out in heighth 
Sometimes in length sometimes englobing wandering in vain seeking for 
ease 
His voice to them was but an inarticulate thunder for their Ears 
Were heavy & dull & their eyes and nostrils closd up 
Oft he stood by a howling victim Questioning in words 
Soothing or Furious no one answered every one wrapd up 
In his own sorrow howld regardless of his words, nor voice 
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Of sweet response could he obtain tho oft assayd with tears 
He knew they were his Children ruind in his ruind world 
Oft would he stand and question a fierce scorpion glowing with gold 
In vain the terror heard not.  then a lion he would Sieze  
By the fierce mane staying his howling course in vain the voice 
Of Urizen in vain the Eloquent tongue.  A Rock a Cloud a Mountain 
Were now not Vocal as in Climes of happy Eternity 
Where the lamb replies to the infant voice & the lion to the man of years 
Giving them sweet instructions  Where the Cloud the River & the Field 
Talk with the husbandman & shepherd  But these attacked him sore
 Siezing upon his feet & rending the Sinews that in Caves  
He hid to recure his obstructed powers with rest & oblivion  (70:31-45, 71: 
1-10, E 340-41)          
   
Urizen’s repeated questioning of his children recalls the speaker in Wordsworth’s 
“Resolution and Independence,” questioning the old Leech Gatherer: 
  -His voice to them was but an inarticulate thunder…  
 
  -Oft he stood by a howling victim Questioning…  
 
-Oft would he stand and question… 
   
Through the old Leech Gatherer, Wordsworth’s speaker encounters the poetic 
medium of his own narration as a stream of sound that he cannot understand. A 
self-referential impasse also afflicts Urizen: he faces his wayward desire in facing 
his wayward children--or at least the visionary form of his desire-- as speech and 
images that exceed sense.   
Bracketing, for the moment, the many reasons to keep Blake and 
Wordsworth apart, here is common ground: Urizen’s children are Blakean analogs 
of Wordsworth’s “borderers,” who incarnate the “amphibious” logic of figural 
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imagination by appearing to suspend life and death. Urizen’s children externalize 
visionary energy in perversely reified form; i.e., they externalize tropological 
transformations as metamorphoses, or incarnate the “motions” of figurality as 
strange physical motions. For example, what would an incarnated synechdoche 
look like?   Maybe a synechdoche would “move” like a cloud that “moveth all 
together if it move at all,” as Wordsworth’s narrator describes the Leech Gatherer. 
Urizen beholds his children from a similarly strange angle: 
Some columns of fire or of water sometimes stretchd out in heighth 
Sometimes in length sometimes englobing wandering in vain seeking 
for ease  (70:36-37, E 340)    
 
Urizen’s children suffer metaphoricity as “englobing,” and their “shining & 
hissing” substantializes “glittering torment”— as though we, along with Urizen, 
were passively viewing the agency of metaphor as an external and monstrously 
reified phenomenon.  Alternately, they embody sublime effects, as Vincent de 
Luca has noted in Night Six of The Four Zoas: “The “dishumanized” 
men…undergo (as serpents) the experience of incorporating the infinite within the 
self (“stretched out enormous length”), or they attain “heighth”” (E, 30-31).    
 Urizen’s children stage an encounter with visionary power through images 
that smite the eye.  In return, Urizen signals the awesomeness of his power through 
an opacity of speech: “his voice to them was like inarticulate thunder.”  The Leech 
Gatherer also manifests visionary power through images and speech that exceed 
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understanding, and in this sense, power signals itself through the subject’s failure 
to picture or comprehend—it is negatively sublime. This kind of power hints at a 
dimension of imagination beyond the human—terribly divine, or externalized like 
“The law of things which lie/Beyond the reach of human will or power,/The life of 
nature…” (11.97-99, 1805, W 470).  For Blake however, the negative dimension of 
power (negative in the sense of incurring “oblivion”) is an effect of the mind 
grasping its own power in rational terms that deform it. The speaker blames the fall 
of language on Urizen’s “obstructed powers,” but “obstruction” is also production, 
rolling out the zodiac whose glowing scorpion Urizen interrogates in vain. The 
self-reference is explicit: when Urizen struggles with his children he cannot prevail 
because “himself was Subject”: 
  He saw them cursed beyond his Curse his soul melted with fear 
  He could not take their fetters off for they grew from the soul 
  Nor could he quench the fires for they flamd out from the heart 
  Nor could he calm the elements for himself was Subject  (70 (second 
  portion): 47, 71 (second portion): 48-50, E 341)  
 
The Urizenic-Lockean subject is subject to his own fetters: when he tries to purify 
an objective standpoint, the entanglement of subject-object resists, and reifies itself 
as an external resistance.  Urizen reifies the externality that he struggles to control 
by struggling to control it.  Blake’s narrator describes “fetters” to be taken off, fires 
to be quenched, or warring elements to be calmed, and these figures are exactly 
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what Urizen materializes by his very struggles—the narrator’s metaphorical 
description slides into mythical description, staging an incongruous reification.    
In the above lines from The Four Zoas, the narrative description can 
be taken figurally—or as literal description of metamorphosis. I will examine this 
formal effect more closely in the conclusion of this chapter and in Chapter 2, but 
here it is worth noting that there is not, in Blake’s myth, a total collapse of the 
figural and literal distinction, as Steven Knapp has claimed (6).  Rather, there is a 
“discrepancy” or “disparity” that signals the sublime—between rhetorical figures 
and descriptions of dire changes. In Blake’s description of Urizen’s children, 
figures are subtly, but discretely, slipping into metaphorphic images (and vice 
versa).  Alternately, figures of change blur into descriptions of change, or as 
Vincent de Luca has suggested, tropes turn into metamorphic beings (in a double-
sense of tropological turning and “turning into” (75)).  Inasmuch as this “turning” 
registers as an effect, it signifies a strange and incomprehensible power.   
The gloomy wonder of the fall is that visionary power, as a form of desire 
and experience, keeps turning “outside” as the spectacle of an illegible and exterior 
nature whose parodic creativity is a perversion of energy (Tharmas) and 
imagination (Los)—or a veiling of power (Vala). Visionary power “contracts” to 
precipitate the spectacle of amphibious images, and their effect is different than 
those of Wordsworth. As we will see when we examine Wordsworth’s famous 
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simile of stone and sea beast, he worked hard to effect a figural “reconciliation” of 
animacy and inanimacy in the Leech Gatherer. Blake’s “borderers” give no hint of 
reconciliation. Instead, they convey incarnated contradiction: they echo the 
chimeras and freaks of Milton’s chaos and the “similes unlike” of Pope. Urizen’s 
children are caught howling between animate and inanimate—“their outward 
forms were in the abyss.” There is, however, sublimity in their “glittering 
torment,” and Blake’s catalog feeds on it.  
We can read Urizen’s encounter with his children as a specular encounter 
with visionary power—or what the present study would consider more narrowly as 
the power to construct figures. “In Climes of Happy Eternity,” Urizen had 
grounded his power of address in an identification with the inanimate world, but 
now, in the fallen world, that power has externalized before him as spectacle: 
Urizen’s children suffer a contradiction implicit in metaphorical identity.  In 
unfallen identification with  “A Rock a Cloud a Mountain,” Urizen would 
experience these objects as humanized, even as they remain “other,” but his 
children parody this identification, by suffering reptilization, yet remaining 
themselves (“he knew they were his children...”).      
 In The Offense of Poetry, Hazard Adams draws in part on Blake’s sense of 
identity to state that “Identity is not sameness but relation, in which sameness and 
difference coexist.  Identity accounts for the great use in poetry of the trope of 
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apostrophe” (143). In Urizen’s encounter with his children, metaphor is not a 
simultaneous assertion of the same and the different, grounding an apostrophe that 
would vocalize nature. Rather, this vocative power now impinges on Urizen 
through the spectacle of “amphibians” or “borderers”—creatures who are neither 
this nor that (or both), parodying the metaphorical assertion of the same and the 
different. Adams invokes a standpoint inside of metaphorical form, albeit by 
speaking about it from the outside—an ironic standpoint, since it is impossible to 
simultaneously use and mention metaphor. Blake’s speaker similarly puts us 
outside of Urizen’s unfallen powers of address and identity by looking back on a 
golden age of sympathetic imagination in which “a rock a cloud and a mountain” 
were vocal; i.e., when Urizen shared discursive space with inanimate objects, even 
as they retained their alterity. The reflexive attempt of language to grasp its own 
power from the outside is also implicit in Urizen’s obsessional drive to externalize 
and control power, whereupon it redounds upon him as incomprehensible 
phenomena of Nature.   
Urizen can sense the intimacy of these exterior terrors: “He knew they were 
his Children, ruind in his ruind world.” He beholds his children as monstrously 
suffering, and there emerge, against the background chaos, sublime terrors of the 
abyss—a glowing scorpion and a howling lion that are partly humanized figures of 
the zodiac. Urizen retains enough of his obstructed powers to “sieze” these figures; 
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i.e., his children are not entirely assimilated into the inanimate world. Monstrously 
caught between humanity and nature, they parody the visionary humanization of 
nature described at the close of Jerusalem: “All human forms identified even tree 
metal earth & stone.” “Human forms” is in tension with the inhuman connotations 
of “tree metal earth & stone” as a contradiction internal to vision--as the 
“otherness” of visionary identity, and the basis of its dynamism. It is this alterity 
that the ruined inhabitants of earth encounter reflexively—“scar’d of their own 
sigh.”  
Urizen’s sons are unresponsive in the depths of the fall, but in the Last 
Judgement, they are agents of his desire, and by extension, serve the desire of an 
integrated humanity in which Urizen functions. In Night IX of The Four Zoas, for 
example, the Eternal Man instructs the sons of Urizen to gather the vintage “with 
sharp hooks,” consummating revolutionary ideals in a figuratively bloody 
apocalypse, rather than literal bloodshed. Blake’s description of the bloody 
winepress cannot help but suggest the real horror of the French Revolution. Yet 
Luvah describes unfallen Urizen as the “faith” that sustains vision, and his sons are 
a visionary form of creative destruction. In the throes of the fall, however, Urizen’s 
children are forces of reification.  Under Urizen’s command, his sons helped build 
the “Mundane shell” of the material world--they “weighed and order’d all”—but 
now, abstract parameters of measurement (“Heighth” and “length”) are bleeding 
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into their ontological state: they are “stretched out in heighth/sometimes in length” 
as if stretched on a rack. Whatever it feels like to be “inside” of imagination, Blake 
presents an outside standpoint in the spectacle of Urizen’s children. From the 
“outside,” imagination acts as a power of reptilization and materialization, creating 
monsters “out there” who catachrestically yoke animacy and inanimacy. Urizen 
passively observes these transformations as though they were literal. Visionary 
power returns as spectacle, resisting Urizen’s control—resisting a rational 
dichotomy of inside and outside that would allow Urizen to instrumentalize and 
enslave his children, treating them as objects with a separate existence.    
More fundamentally, power cannot grasp itself as something external.   
Blake describes this failed self-grasping through Urizen’s rejection of his 
emanation Ahania—the event that causes his children to flee. As a masculine 
principle or personality, creativity expresses its production through a female 
“emanation,” which also provides sensual food and a place of repose. The danger 
is that repose would turn into a fatal “contraction” of visionary power, pulling 
imagination into passive fascination with its own materialized production. Jacob 
Boehme influences this myth when he describes Adam going with his spirit into 
substantiality and becoming captivated by it: “Now when Adam’s hunger was set 
after the earthliness, it did, by its magnetic power, impress into his fair image the 
vanity of evil and good; whereupon the heavenly image of the angelical world’s 
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essence did disappear; as if a man should insinuate some strange matter into a 
burning and light-shining candle, whereby it should become dark and at last wholly 
extinguish” (19.3, 129).                     
For Blake, the fall into “substantiality” is the abstraction of an outside world 
from the visionary (tropological) identity of inside and outside. Blake’s myth 
thematizes unfallen identity as a relation between active-masculine and passive-
feminine contraries—and this also echoes Boehme’s account of an unfallen 
relation: “The fiery dark-world rejoiced in the holy light-world, and the light-world 
in the outward [world], as in its manifestation. Again, the outward world joyed 
itself in both the inward worlds; as in its life…” (17.18, 115). In Blake’s myth, 
“rejoicing” figures an unfallen eroticism; a dynamical, figural relation between the 
“fiery” and its outward manifestation, that falls when the manifestation assumes its 
own will and desire. Boehme writes of Adam: “He was a fire-spark of God’s 
might. But when he was formed into a creatural being of the creatures, he 
withdrew into self-lust, and broke himself off from the universal being, and entered 
into a self-fullness” (17.42, 120).  
Boehme’s reflexive formulations are fundamental to Blake’s myth. When 
visionary power grasps a fragment of itself as “external,” it meets resistance—just 
as Urizen meets resistance by grasping and questioning figures of the zodiac. The 
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bind is self-referential: what Blake will later call “selfhood” (via Boehme) emerges 
in passing from 1 to 2 below:  
1.  I-am-myself-and-other 
2.  I am myself    
 
For Boehme, “Adam was a man and also a woman, and yet none of them 
[distinct]” (18.2, 121), and for Blake, this not a mystical doctrine but a “logic” of 
visionary form, lived as a form of being and desire. I have reduced this scenario as 
#1 above. Conversely, the abstraction of self from other is a foreclosure of 
visionary power, since there is no separate “selfhood” in the “logic” of #1.   
 These preliminaries set up Urizen’s rejection of his emanation, Ahania—the 
event that causes Urizen’s children to flee. Urizen’s relation to Ahania is the 
relation of reason to sensuality, but in the depths of the fall, Urizen would purify 
reason by rejecting her:     
Shall the feminine indolent bliss, the indulgent self of weariness, 
  The passive idle sleep, the enormous night & darkness of Death 
  Set herself up to give her laws to the active masculine virtue? 
  Thou little diminutive portion that dar’st be a counterpart! 
  Thy passivity, thy laws of obedience and insincerity, 
  Are my abhorrence.  Wherefore hast thou taken that fair form? 
  Whence is this power given to thee?  Once thou wast in my breast 
  A sluggish current of dim waters, on whose verdant margin 
  A cavern shagg’d with horrid shades, dark, cool and deadly, where 
  I laid my head in the hot noon after the broken clods 
  Had wearied me: there I laid my plow, & there my horses fed. 
  And thou hast risen with thy moist locks into a wat’ry image 
  Reflecting all my indolence my weakness and my death, 
  To weigh me down beneath the grave into non Entity (43: 6-19,  
E 322)  
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Urizen represses Ahania, and her sensual-sexual pull of cyclical sleep. As Urizen 
describes her, Ahania is a phase where rational sense gives way to sensual sense; 
the logical instrument of reason  (organon) disappears into an organic and bodily 
cyclicity. Reason gives way to figural transfers and poly-vocal echoes in the 
“horrid shades” of the skull-cave, and Urizen views this sexual-somnabulistic 
energy (“sluggish current of dim waters”) as sinister rather than recuperative. He 
realizes that sleep once was necessary (“in the hot noon after the broken clods/Had 
wearied me”), but Ahania’s sleep now seems like a dangerous contraction of 
power.  Urizen substantializes Ahania as a “diminutive portion,” thereby splitting 
their dynamical unity, but he claims the opposite; i.e., that Ahania is 
substantializing herself. She was in his breast as the place spirit of “a sluggish 
current of dim waters” on whose verdant bank he had rested, but now “thou hast 
risen” as a “watr’y image.” This movement from inside to outside is 
substantialization—or a malign literalization-effect.  
 Urizen’s misgivings recall Jacob Boehme’s reading of Genesis, in which the 
fall into materialism was Adam’s fall into carnality and sleep. But the pastoral 
place where Urizen sleeps is a place where language recycles itself: a nodal point 
at “hot noon” where he rests (“there I laid my plow”), and awakens to renewed 
labor. Noon is a cyclical clock-position that poses risk—elsewhere in The Four 
Zoas we are told that Vala seduced the Eternal Man at “high noon,” and contracted 
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his visionary senses. At noon, the figuralizing aspect of visionary power contracts, 
reifying externality to a precarious extent. There could be an expansion into 
renewed vision, or a checked expansion that Harold Bloom has called a “checked 
breath”--an expansion catching itself in self-reference and doubling back, reifying 
its own production, and getting stuck.     
 Unfallen language recycles its form through a nodal point where dead and 
living metaphor, literal and figural, outward-pointing and inward-creating language 
collapses, and Ahania will bear this discontinuous self-intersection as death from 
which language emerges renewed. Near the end of the Four Zoas, Ahania dies at 
the moment when she unites with a repentant and regenerated Urizen: 
  ...Ahania rose in joy 
Excess of Joy is worse than grief—her heart beat high her blood 
  Burst its bright Vessels  She fell down dead at the feet of Urizen 
  Outstretchd a Smiling corse... (121: 35-38, E 376) 
    
If Urizen and Ahania were to embrace as separate selfhoods, it would threaten a 
mirror-scene in which visionary power tries to grasp itself as a narcissistic image.    
A version of this pathological scene occurs in The Book of Urizen, when Los and 
Enitharmon horrify the Eternals by sexually embracing:  “Man begetting his 
likeness,/On his own divided image.” The mirror-scene is static, sterile and 
substantializing.  Divided vision cannot reunify through the sexual act since the 
sexes are (for Blake) the very symptom of that division. Through her death, Ahania 
allows language to pass through itself dynamically, so that it is self-devouring, self-
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renewing and self-recycling--passing continuously from figural to literal and back, 
without getting stuck in mirrors, self-pointing or self-grasping: 
  ...bright Ahania shall awake from death     
  A glorious Vision to thine Eyes a Self renewing Vision 
  The spring.  the summer to be thine then sleep the wintry days 
  In silken garments spun by her own hands against her funeral 
         (122:6-9, E 376)   
  
Visionary power cycles through forms on the model of Natural cycles, so that it 
never doubles back on itself, grasping itself materially, or getting stuck in mirrors.   
In its passive phase, power is dangerously reifying, in the sense that the 
sympathetic identity of inside and outside gives way to the passive sight of an 
outside world.  The danger of reification is that the “self-renewing” of visionary 
forms freezes, and what takes over is a sinister impulse to substantialize and 
control production as an “externality.”   Described through the meta-language of 
myth, Blakean metaphorical imagination passes through a nodal point of non-
metaphorical “passivity” in which the sense of an outside world predominates—
and back into a sympathetically metaphorical identification of outside and inside 
again.   It is a risky passage in which productive power might freeze itself in 
substantialization, becoming other to itself.   “Self-renewing vision” tropes the 
creative destruction of visionary power--the paradoxical point at which language 
recycles itself and safely passes through the dangers of paradoxical self-reference. 
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 In the Four Zoas, Ahania creates a space where visionary power enters a 
passive phase, reifying an “outside” world without falling into the abyss of 
absolute reification.  This is a tricky distinction that will ultimately fail to hold, 
triggering the fall in one version of the story offered in The Four Zoas.  In the 
myth of Ahania, passively “sleeping” vision projects the verdant river bank and the 
cave.  Slumbering powers recuperate, awakening to a “self-renewing vision.”   In 
parallel with this scene, emanations die, are renewed as visionary form, die, and 
renew themselves again, and these cycles implicitly express Urizen’s expanding 
and contracting powers, which move from visionary identity to a more passive and 
externalizing mode and back.  These cycles, modelled on natural cycles, are 
readable as the passage from dead to living form—dead to living metaphor, 
inasmuch as the form of desire, experience and thought is sympathetically 
metaphorical.  Metaphor in this sense, is a form of desire and inseparable from the 
passion that motivates sympathetic imagination; it grounds a self-annihilating and 
visionary mode of address.  
 Nonetheless, Blake’s myth is not an illustration of doctrine: it stages the 
problem of embodied metaphor rather than merely telling a story about it.  Ahania 
poses the problem of embodied metaphor when we get the sense that her death is 
not just an allegory of renewed visionary power but retains something of the 
trauma of a real death.  Urizen wept when Ahania dropped dead, and the Eternal 
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Man “Darkend with sorrow.” There is strangeness in the speaker’s depiction of the 
emanation effectively sewing her own winding cloth.   Because they manifest the 
destruction and renewal of visionary form, the emanations are entities who are “but 
for a time, & who pass away in winter” (287), just as all form must pass away, and 
be renewed.   In this sense, the emanations are close to personifications—but 
acquire a more three-dimensional awareness when they feel threatened.   For a 
certain reader, they may acquire a certain humanity when we see them about to 
disappear into the dynamic and apocalyptic form of eternity. 
It is here that Blake’s myth becomes formally strange.  There are moments 
in Blake’s prophecies when the emanations protest, becoming something more 
than personifications of visionary output, and what are we to make of this?   In 
Milton the emanations complain: “Give us a habitation & a place/In which we may 
be hidden under the shadow of wings” (287).  That place is the “pleasant shadow” 
called “Beulah,” where the fall might have been triggered in the Four Zoas.   The 
emanations should function as personified visionary production—they should not 
be “aware” of their deaths as anything but visionary renewal, nor become 
substantialized in their existential anxiety. Yet, Enitharmon does become self-
aware in this way at the end of Jerusalem, as Hazard Adams has noted in The 
Offense of Poetry:   
  We learn toward the end of the poem that one of  
  the story’s principal characters, Enitharmon, knows 
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  that she is in a poem, for as the climax of Jerusalem 
  approaches she remarks that the poem is about to end. 
  It is not clear whether she fears for her existence because 
  of this or is concerned about maintaining her fallen 
  alienated selfhood when Albion awakens.  Probably 
  both.  No matter which, she is in error on this point, 
  for she remains eternal in the poem, her world, whenever 
  it is read.  (173) 
 
When Urizen rejects Ahania, he represses a sympathetic power of address 
grounded in a metaphorical form of desire: he posits his children as alien and 
exterior phenomena.  That he can address or recognize them at all is evidence that 
he retains something of a half-oblivious memory of “Golden Climes”—but the 
repressed energy of his address takes the form of a Yahweh-like noise from the 
standpoint of the addressee: “His voice to them was but an inarticulate thunder for 
their Ears/were heavy & dull & their eyes and nostrils closd up” (70:39-40, E, 340-
41). The symptom bleeds into Urizen’s world, and its inhabitants: “Scar’d at the 
sound of their own sigh that seems to shake the immense...” (70: 7, E 340). 
 The closed-up senses of Urizen’s children are Urizen’s own closed-up 
senses, contracted by his rejection of Ahania. As figures of the zodiac (lion, tyger, 
scorpion) the outward forms of his children are “in the abyss”:  
  The eyelids expansive as morning & the Ears 
  As a golden ascent winding round to the heavens of heavens 
  Within the dark horrors of the Abysses lion or tyger or scorpion 
  For every one opend within into Eternity at will 
But they refusd because their outward forms were in the Abyss 
(73:37-39, 74:1-2, E 343-44) 
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They refused apocalypse because they are fragments of visionary creativity 
clinging to the outward form of its creation. The “Ears ” open inward “into 
Eternity” as hearing mediated by poetic form, spiraling upward like Jacob’s ladder, 
but Urizen’s children are unwilling to surrender outward corporeal sensation—they 
contracted their ears and eyelids, further materializing their outward forms.  
This refusal of apocalypse is also the refusal of Blake’s reader, looking up at 
the night sky, where wonders of the abyss admonish her from afar. Self-referential 
or self-conscious imagination poses the problem of figurality trying to grasp itself 
in literal form, arresting visionary dynamism. The Blakean “borderer” or 
“amphibian” is the symptom of this self-grasping: entities that signify visionary-
poetic agency as an external and inhuman power.          
4.   “Resolution and Independence” 
 “Resolution and Independence” opens with descriptive personifications that 
figure nature folding on herself in echoes and reflections: the sky “rejoices in the 
morning’s birth,” the Hare’s feet raise a mist that “Runs with her all the way...” 
and the Stock-dove’s auto-affection mimics the procreative brooding of the 
Miltonic God (“Over his own sweet voice the Stock-dove broods”) (1-14, N 397). 
The poet seems within nature’s circuit of call and response inasmuch as his present 
joy motivates the first two stanzas.   
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Abruptly, the poem cuts from present to past tense, introducing a lyric “I.”   
The poet now views present joy from the outside by reflecting on a past self: 
I was a traveler then upon the moor, 
  I saw the hare that raced about with joy; 
  I heard the woods and distant waters roar; 
  Or heard them not, as happy as a Boy…  
           (15-18, N 398) 
 
The anaphora locates an “I” among creatures who respond unselfconsciously to 
nature, but unlike those creatures, the speaker uses simile: “And I bethought me of 
the playful hare:/Even such a happy Child of earth am I…” (30-31, N 398). Self-
consciousness is marked by a disjunction, used to describe a state that bypasses 
conscious sensation: “I heard the woods…or heard them not” (18, N 398). This 
disjunction recalls the language of “The Old Cumberland Beggar.” In that poem, 
the speaker asks that the beggar have the melody of birds around him “whether 
heard or not”—a formulation that preserves the opacity of the beggar’s inner life 
by keeping the speaker’s standpoint outside of it.  Moreover, lines 15-18 rephrase 
previous lines of poetry as if translating from the outside, reducing and even 
garbling them. Line 17 seems to disrupt an echo figure: “I heard the woods and 
distant waters roar” makes it seem as if the woods are not so much echoing the 
waters as roaring on their own, or resisting the muting distance established in the 
first stanza (“The birds are singing in the distant woods”).  
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In addition, the waters did not “roar” in line 7; rather, there was a pleasant 
noise of waters suffusing “all the air”: “And all the air is fill’d with pleasant noise 
of waters” (7, N 397).  
This is the Biblical noise of many waters—God’s voice softened as the voice of the 
air, albeit retaining its incomprehensibile equivocation, since water is a noncount 
noun and “waters” poses the peculiarity of difference as indifference. This line 
recalls Dorothy Wordsworth’s journal entry of April 29, 1802:  
“…William and I lay in the trench under the fence—he with  
his eyes shut and listening to the waterfalls and the birds.  There  
was no one waterfall above another—it was a sound of waters in the 
air, the voice of the air.”  (311) 
 
In her journal entry, Dorothy reports Wordsworth’s response as he lies in the 
trench: “That it would be as sweet thus to lie so in the grave to hear the peaceful 
sounds of the earth and just to know that one’s dear friends were near” (311). 
Wordsworth needs to know that friends are near, but the earth would not need to 
hear something other than its own peaceful sounds. Otherwise put: Nature folds on 
herself, recognizing herself in her echoes and reflections, but this is a rhetorical 
standpoint whose impossibility and artifice recall, with a shift of imagery and 
meter, a Spenserian twist on the Locus amoenus—an enervating bower that reflects 
itself not because there is call and response in nature, but because nature is 
unnaturally entangled in art. 
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 Compare the opening stanzas of “Resolution and Independence” to the 
Bower of Bliss in Book II, Canto xii of The Faerie Queene:  
The joyous birdes shrouded in chearefull shade 
      Their notes vnto the voice attempred sweet; 
                 The’Angelicall soft trembling voices made 
        To th’instruments diuine respondence meet: 
                 The siluer sounding instruments did meet 
                 With the base murmure of the waters fall: 
                  The waters fall with difference discreet, 
         Now soft, now loud, vnto the wind did call: 
The gentle warbling wind low answered to all.  (282) 
  
   The mirror of the central rhyme—“meet”-“meet”—places the Witch Arcasia’s 
music on either side of a call and response, harmonizing it with birds, water and 
wind. Why would Wordsworth draw on this imagery and meter?  The poet 
identifies with the “blissful” creatures—“even as these blissful creatures do I 
fare”—and this recalls “Intimations of Immortality”: “Ye blessed creatures, I have 
heard the call/Ye to each other make…”  However, there is a threat of excessive 
identification. Nature’s joy is autonomously posited and sustained by its circuits of 
call and response—a singular knowledge sustains it. This is a kind of enchantment, 
however, and the Spenserian bower figures it as somewhat sinister. If joy is the 
agency of nature’s echo and response and her self-sustaining drive, it is also a 
figure of figural agency, whose standpoint—if we could achieve it—would be 
oblivion. Perhaps as a providential protection, joy has an internal limit: 
  But, as it sometimes chanceth, from the might 
  Of joy in minds that can no farther go, 
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  As high as we have mounted in delight 
  In our dejection do we sink as low… (22-25, N 398) 
 
The symmetry of “no farther go…sink as low” signals something law-like in the 
onset of dejection, qualifying the symmetrical tropes of nature’s echo. Present joy 
had seemed an impulse to lyric expression, but after line 15, the bliss of creatures 
is distinct from the poet’s genial response because the latter does not sustain him: 
  My whole life I have liv’d in pleasant thought, 
  As if life’s business were a summer mood; 
  As if all needful things would come unsought 
  To genial faith, still rich in genial good; 
  But how can He expect that others should 
  Build for him, sow for him, and at his call 
  Love him, who for himself will take no heed at all? (36-42 N 398) 
 
On line 40 the dactylic “Build for him, sow for him” breaks up the iambs, and a 
trochee opens the alexandrine. These are anxious, upbraiding beats, carrying a 
worry that might well be answered by Matthew 6:28: “And why take ye thought 
for raiment? Consider the Lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither 
do they spin…”  In the opening stanzas, a lyric impulse had found its metrical 
expression in iambic pentameter, but self-doubt breaks it up. The lily clothes itself, 
builds for itself, and does not need to know that friends are near.  Its “genial faith” 
is the impulse to grow. Unlike the wildflower, the poet is conscious of clothing and 
depends on others to sow for him because his genial spirits do not sustain him like 
a natural drive.  
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 The distinction is between a nature who recognizes herself through the self-
reflecting agency of joy (the sun rises, the sky rejoices), and a speaker who can no 
longer recognize his own joy and creativity in the bliss of nature’s creatures. 
Unlike nature folding on itself, the lyric “I” encounters resistance when it 
reflects—the poet wants to experience the source of his own power as something 
meaningful and self-sustaining, but he can no longer do it (if he ever could).  This 
is self-awareness is a check on a dangerously autonomous identification with 
power, for the speaker now turns to Chatterton, who ended in madness and death. 
When the speaker describes  “Chatterton, the marvelous Boy,” the iambic 
pentameter again breaks up into paired dactyls: “CHAT-ter-ton…MAR-vel-ous” 
on line 41 and “MOUN-tain-side…DE-i-fied” on line 47, the latter turning with the 
inner couplet into a flash of identification: “By our own spirits are we deified” (47, 
N 398). Inasmuch as “our own spirits” are “our own faculty,” we draw on them in 
something of a “fanatical” identification with the negative presentation of reason—
they make us godlike.  Wordsworth’s prior repetition of “genial” makes “our own 
spirits” sound like spirits of place.  By its own genius a river or tree is deified, but 
genii are something “other” than individual spirits, being interchangeably 
constituted as modes of archaic power.  With the inflection of “genius loci,” the 
poet’s genius is both personal and alien—both self and not-self.   This “both-and” 
logic may have become a pathological mode of identification in Chatterton, who 
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transmitted the spirit of the fifteenth century as though he were literally 
transcribing it.  
 The yoking of “gladness” and “madness” (lines 48 and 49) now directly 
links “joy” to ruin. In the next stanza, “given,” “striven” and “driven” are all 
trochees, breaking up the meter with anxious beats that are nonetheless paired 
symmetrically: 
  Now, whether it were by peculiar grace, 
  A leading from above, a something given, 
  Yet it befell, that in this lonely place, 
  When up and down my fancy thus was driven, 
  And I with these untoward thoughts had striven, 
  I saw a man before me unawares; 
  The oldest man he seem’d that ever wore grey hairs (50-56, N-399) 
 
The inner couplet “driven-striven” marks a turn from centripetal fancy (rapidity of 
association and mania) to centrifugal thought (fixation and excessive 
identification). The “up and down” movement of fancy already anticipates the 
pacing of the Leech Gatherer across the moors— “When up and down my fancy 
thus was driven…” (53, N 399)—and echoes a description of the Leech Gatherer 
from a previous draft: “Now I am seeking Leeches up and down” (45). 
The narrator strives with what drives him, and in the Leech Gatherer he 
encounters that drive as an opaque image. It has been noted that “I saw a man 
before me unawares” reads as “I saw without awareness.” In striving with his 
angel, the narrator emerges wounded like Jacob inasmuch as what he receives is 
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something less than a providential blessing that would relieve his guilt and 
anxiety—something other than an emblem of “Resolution and Independence.”   
The speaker will find it impossible to completely identify with the Leech Gatherer 
as an emblem of elemental self-sufficiency; this despite the claim of the final 
Alexandrine of the poem—“God,” said I, “be my help…” etc.  (Hartman calls it 
“that last rag-tag Alexandrine,” in which the meter is now riddled with awkward 
and uncertain beats). 
 In line 55 the poem folds on itself a second time with the appearance of the 
Leech Gatherer, although this time the self-referential turn seems less 
psychologized.  The sudden appearance of the Leech Gatherer recalls the 
appearance of a first-person speaker in line 15, and suggests a reading in which the 
speaker, like the Leech Gatherer, appears as an effect of that turn: instead of an “I” 
that reflects, reflection precipitates the lyric “I” as its symptom.  Otherwise put, the 
speaker, like the Leech Gatherer, is not reflecting upon himself in a psychological 
sense; rather, the speaker dramatizes a resistance to reflection—the poem’s 
resistance to folding on itself.  Knapp takes a version of this latter route when he 
claims that what the speaker encounters in the person of the Leech Gatherer is the 
“materialized deposit of the stanzas that serve as the alien medium of the speaker’s 
meditation” (119). Here, the “stuff” of resistance is the very medium that supports 
the lyric “I” in its reflection, and although Knapp focuses on the “agency” of 
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meter, we should include the “impulse” to allegorize, the “agency” of imaginative 
operations such as “endowment and abstraction,” and the agency of figures.  
Inasmuch as a fictive speaker faces these impulses and agencies, it is as if the 
poem had turned inside out to face its drives.   
 Along these lines, what drives the speaker’s “untoward thoughts” is what 
Thomas Weiskel in The Romantic Sublime called “the relentless agency of 
Spenserian stanza”—an observation that inspired Knapp’s reading. What would 
this agency look like if the speaker could get “outside” of it and face it?  The 
premise here is that meter and metaphor mediate the speaker’s thought—but that 
the speaker-as-character-in-the-story might detach himself from his own poetic 
voice, encountering, in a self-referential turn, its metric and figural agency.  
Thematically, it as though the speaker were “outside” of his own thought, 
regarding its form.  Formally, it is as though the poem were “looking at” its poetic 
form from a meta-level. In line 57, for example, Wordsworth employs the 
Spenserian archaism “espied” to achieve a perfectly regular line—“My course I 
stopped as soon as I espied…”  Here, meter and diction flag “espied” as something 
other than ordinary “seeing.”  “Espying” is not just poetically informed “seeing,” 
for what it sees is poetic agency.  Whatever drives the speaker’s fancy now turns 
inside out in an emblematic freeze-frame whose centerpiece is the epic simile 
beginning at line 64 (and cited earlier in this chapter).  The epic simile is a figural 
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form of seeing that sees the agency of figurality itself, reified as whatever 
deposited the stone atop the bald eminence.   Wordsworth writes of these boulders 
(glacial erratics) elsewhere, presumably strewn--with an eye on Thomas Burnett—
by catastrophe, but also by an inaugural violence of language, impinging on the 
rambler as visionary spectacle.    
  Inside the diegesis, the speaker sees and hears the old man, encountering 
him in the landscape, while outside of the diegesis, narrative filters the old man’s 
words metrically and metaphorically as reported speech. This disconnection 
produces sublime effects.  The speaker describes the Old Man’s lofty utterance as 
something “Such as grave Livers do in Scotland use”—but grave livers in Scotland 
do not use Spenserian stanza. In Steven Knapp’s reading, the narrator faces the 
poetic agency that mediates his own narrative (or “thoughts”), in a sublimely self-
referential effect. These “sublime” misrecognitions turn on a discrepancy between 
intra- and extra-diegetic levels, and the strangeness of their entanglement. The 
Leech Gatherer personifies poetic agency, but is is only by entangling narrative 
levels that the speaker could encounter agency in the first place. Through this 
collapse of levels, the poem faces its “agencies,” “forces” and “drives.”   
These considerations emerge more concretely when “The Old Man” no 
longer scans as three syllables: “And now, not knowing what the Old Man had 
said…” (124, N 400). “The old Man” should be pronounced as two syllables 
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(“Th’old man”) to maintain iambic pentameter in the line above—in the same way 
that “untoward” and “genial” should be pronounced elsewhere in the poem. The 
difference between “the old man” or “the’old man” manifests the impulse to 
regulate meter. What would this impulse say if it could say something?  Maybe it 
would answer the speaker’s question “How is it that you live, and what is it that 
you do?” insamuch as the “life” or “vitality” of the old man is strongly connected 
to the regularity and order of his speech (“And there was, while he spake, a fire 
about his eyes”) (98, N 400).  
  What the Leech Gatherer “renews” is not so much “discourse” as the 
impulse to speak in “Choice word and measured phrase, above the reach/Of 
ordinary men” (102-03, N 400). The agency of meter assumes the form of the old 
man’s directionless movement “from pond to pond…from moor to moor” and then 
mutates into an indiscriminate flow: 
   But now his voice to me was like a stream 
   Scarce heard; nor word from word could I divide; 
   And the whole Body of the man did seem 
   Like one whom I had met with in a dream; 
   Or like a Man from some far region sent; 
   To give me human strength, and strong admonishment. 
(114-119, N 400) 
 
There are well-known echoes here of Spenser’s Prothalamion (“Sweet Thames, 
run softly, till I end my song…”) and the “pleasant noise of waters” from the 
opening stanza. What “moves” from “stream” to “seem” to “dream” is a rhyme 
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scheme that drives the speaker’s “untoward thoughts.”  The inner couplet propels a 
thematic turn, which in lines 115 and 116 above (“And the whole Body of the man 
did seem/Like one whom I had met with in a dream;”) is a sublime turning “with 
the might of waters.”  For the speaker, however, what propels this turn is 
uncertainly located; close as a dream, yet an admonishment from afar. Like the 
“pleasant noise of waters” (“no one waterfall above another” as Dorothy puts it) 
the old man’s speech is articulate without being meaningful. It is as though the 
narrative voice of “Resolution and Independence” had achieved a standpoint 
“outside” of its own rhetorical flow, where flowing numbers are not assimilable to 
a flowing consciousness.1   
Lines 114 to 115 make the transition from “nor word from word could I 
divide” to “the whole Body of the man…”   Both the stream of the old man’s voice 
and his Body are whole and indivisible, and whatever moves them, moves them as 
a whole: 
   Motionless as a Cloud the Old Man stood; 
   That heareth not the loud winds when they call; 
   And moveth altogether, if it move at all.  
(82-84, N 399) 
 
In the part of the 1815 preface pertaining to “Resolution and Independence,” 
Wordsworth explains how the imagination can “unify” and “coalesce.”  Yet the 
narrator of “Resolution and Independence” cannot attain access to Wordsworth’s 
preface because it exists on a different narrative level.   Nor should we assume that 
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the speaker is a person who “uses” metaphors and similes, although the poem 
might well be “mentioning” them through the speaker’s description of the Leech 
Gatherer.   The speaker encounters the unifying and coalescing power of voice and 
figurality through the uncanny agency of the old man, and as a figure of this 
unifying agency, the old man coalesces through movement.  The old man is not 
conscious of his means of movement—he is like a cloud that “heareth not the loud 
winds when they call.”   Moreover, the old man is not unified at all when standing 
motionless: “Himself he propp’d, his body, limbs, and face,/Upon a long grey Staff 
of shaven wood… (78-79, N 399). 
 
In these lines, the old man’s body is not “the whole body,” but an item in a list 
(body, limbs and face) all of which are propped on his staff.   Body, limbs and face 
are not unified—unity has to be propped.   What unifies unity—what supports it?   
The Old Man’s long grey staff seems to be a figure for this mystery. 
 Wordsworth tells us what supports figural unity in his preface to Poems of 
1815, and in particular, the unity of life and death, animate and inanimate figured 
by the Leech Gatherer.  He takes as his example the epic simile cited earlier in this 
chapter:  
The stone is endowed with something of the power 
of life to approximate it to the sea-beast, and the  
sea-beast stripped of some of its vital qualities to 
assimilate it to the stone—which intermediate image 
is thus treated for the purpose of bringing the original 
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image (that of the stone) to a nearer resemblance to 
the figure and condition of the aged man, who is 
divested of so much of the indications of life and 
motion as to bring him to the point where the two  
objects unite and coalesce in just comparison. (N 514) 
 
The operation of “endowment” and “abstraction” sets up or “props” figural unity 
by endowing the stone with vital qualities, and stripping “vital qualities” from the 
sea beast, thereby “assimilating” stone and sea beast. The stone is now an 
“intermediate image” with animate qualities, and by abstracting life from the old 
man, the two come together in a second-order simile. The imaginative operations 
of endowment and abstraction thereby prop the figural “unity” or “just 
comparison” of man and stone (“unify,” “coalesce,” “approximate” and 
“assimilate” are all figures of figural agency, set up by endowment and 
abstraction). 
 What are “endowment” and “abstraction”? Geoffrey Hartman invokes a 
dialectical reconciliation that brings life and death eternally closer in this 
description of the Leech Gatherer: 
…if he is dying, it is into the life of nature, and if he seems so alive, 
it is because he gives the impression of having already died, in the 
sense that his great dignity and steadfastness appear no longer as 
purely mortal qualities…”  (202)  
  
In formal terms, the negation is relative: “dying” is inverse life (“the life of 
Nature”), and living is inverse death; i.e., life predicated on a steadfastness beyond 
life. In these terms, endowment and abstraction precipitates an equilibrium of life 
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and death. Equilibrium is not a spatial trope of “in-betweeness” and “blending,” 
nor is it a dialectical reconciliation. Inasmuch as equilibrium “reconciles” 
opposites, it does so by putting a hole in classical logic—a point that Kant made in 
a pre-critical essay called “Attempt to Introduce Negative Magnitudes into 
Philosophy,” in turn taken up by Coleridge in his Treatise on Logic (Barfield 265) 
when he noted that a physical object in equilibrium is both moving and not 
moving—a contradiction. Wordsworth describes the imagination stripping vitality 
from the sea beast and adding it to the stone, but the language of stripping and 
adding qualities masks a relation: the vitality of the stone is inversely related to the 
vitality of the sea beast. The resulting poetic image is a relative entity, in 
“equilibrium”—like the “relative zero” in “1 + -1 = 0,” to use Kant’s example: a 
“relative zero” that logic can only read as unrepresentable contradiction.   
 The Leech Gatherer is such an antithetically relative entity—and likewise 
the Cumberland Beggar.  Wordsworth uses endowment and abstraction to figure 
the Cumberland Beggar’s agency, which approaches the elemental, even as the 
elements become more vital—his freedom and vitality relative to a subtraction of 
freedom and vitality:    
  …let him breathe 
The freshness of the vallies, let his blood 
  Struggle with the frosty air and winter snows, 
  And let the charter’d wind that sweeps the heath 
  Beat his grey locks against his wither’d face. 
Reverence the hope whose vital anxiousness 
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Gives the last human interest to his heart. (165-171, E 137) 
 
Inasmuch as animate and inanimate are exchanging properties in the above, it 
happens through a series of privative symmetries: the elements are declared free, 
even as the beggar’s freedom begins to seem more elemental (more tied to animal-
mineral agency); in struggling with air and snow, the old man’s blood is placed on 
the level of the elements, while the elements become more like a vitalizing force; 
the wind that sweeps the heath beats the old man’s locks, making the heath more 
like hair, and the hair more like the heath. We can read these negations as 
“dialectical,” but only by trying to imagine whatever it is the Leech Gatherer and 
the Cumberland Beggar might become at the limit, when the animate and 
inanimate realms really do swap properties.  At that limit they are like the 
“equilibrium” or “relative zero” precipitated by mutually negating forces—like 
those objects all around us, “out there” in the real world, that logical negation can 
only “see” as contradiction.   
  In the Leech Gatherer and the Cumberland Beggar, animate and inanimate 
are exchanging properties to create a state that is impossible to imagine as an inner 
life.   In particular, the Cumberland Beggar’s eye becomes more mineralized and 
attached to the ground, even as “nature’s eye” begins to acquire a gaze. Sight in 
these terms could be taken as sight-in principle, beyond any naturalized notion of 
sight. What matters is that the sun shines into the Cumberland Beggar’s eyes 
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whether they see the light of the sun or not:  “…let the light at least/Find a free 
entrance to their languid orbs./And let him, where and when  he will, sit down 
(182-84, N 187). Light’s freedom to move becomes (in line 184) the Cumberland 
Beggar’s freedom to sit down where and when he will, although in this “freedom” 
the old man becomes mineralized and animalized; his movement is a repetitive 
principle of continuity for the neighborhood, through his daily rounds of begging.   
 The “eye of Nature” embodies a similar principle of continuity for the old 
man: “As in the eye of Nature he has liv’d,/So in the eye of Nature let him die 
(188-89, N 137). “Resolution and Independence” picks up this image of an eye in 
the sky: “Beside a pool bare to the eye of heaven/I saw a Man before me 
unawares”—which recalls the description of an epitaph in Wordsworth’s “First 
Essay on Epitaphs”: “open to the day; the sun looks down upon the stone,/and the 
rains of heaven beat against it  (334). In all of these passages the emphasis is on 
bareness or openess to “the eye of heaven” whose gaze is corrosive via the 
Shakespearean echo “sometimes too hot the eye of heaven shines” and connected 
with images of erosion, such as rains beating against the headstone and wind 
beating the locks of the Cumberland beggar against his face. By “reading” an old 
solitary as one of its own, the solar eye would assimilate him into the life of 
Nature—albeit by eroding or breaking him down to inanimate matter. A similar 
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privation affects the gaze of the sun, as something of a dead gaze, relativized like 
the Beggar’s own sight. 
 The solar amelioration of ruin recalls the sun’s endowment of voice to the 
ruined statue of Memnon —a colossus on the Nile, and a stock image of German 
and English Romanticism.  The life with which the solar eye endows the Leech 
Gatherer and the Cumberland Beggar is privative because it implicates them in the 
inanimate realm—and so too are the “endowment” and “abstraction” of 
imagination, which is very close to the touch of ruin, which adorns as it destroys.   
5.  Blake and Wordsworth  
In this chapter I juxtaposed Blake’s “Urizen” with the narrator of 
Wordsworth’s “Resolution and Independence”: both encounter poetic agency from 
the outside, and thereby encounter the alterity of imagination.  The poetry of 
Wordsworth and Blake folds on itself—or “encounters” its own power.  For Steven 
Knapp, the Leech-Gatherer is “nothing more than a materialized deposit, a kind of 
personified sediment or precipitate, of the stanzas that serve as the deliberately 
awkward and alien medium of the speaker’s meditation” (119).  In encountering 
the Leech Gatherer, the speaker encounters the “alien medium” of his thought, 
which in fact exists one narrative level up: he cannot know that it was Wordsworth 
who imposed meter on his thought.    
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Put another way, the speaker cannot know the form of his own meditation 
because it exists one narrative level higher than the diegesis: when he encounters 
it, he experiences a drift of attention that marks a place where the poem stumbles 
on its power of representation.  By encountering the Leech Gatherer, the narrator 
encounters something alien in the fit between his thought and Spenserian stanza.  
Along analogous lines, Urizen purifies himself of “the awkward and alien 
medium” of sympathetic metaphorical identification, only to witness the return of 
the repressed as the metamorphosis of his children: metaphor slips into 
metamorphosis.  This slippage occurs at the level of the narration, where 
tropological transfers slide into descriptions of change; a phenomenon that Urizen 
“experiences” as reification.  Thus, the blurring of literal and figural agency signals 
a point where the poem folds on itself to register its power.     
Steven Knapp, however, necessarily cuts Blake from his brilliant study on 
self-reference, personification and the sublime because he does not find a sharp 
discrepancy between literal and figural agency in the mythic figures of Blake: 
Much of the interest of the issue of personification… 
depends on an overt distinction between allegorical 
and literal agents.  In the partly figurative and partly 
literal characters of Romantic myth-making, the contrast 
between these separate kinds of agency disappears.   
I have focused instead on examples in which the shock 




While it is easy to agree that personification sets up an “overt” distinction between 
figural and literal agents, it is not true that “the contrast between these separate 
kinds of agency disappears” [my italics] in myth-making.  It is replaced with a 
contrast between tropological transformations and metamorphic change—and their 
strange re-entanglement.  Considering the “dire change” that passes over Urizen’s 
children, Vincent de Luca says that “because Blake’s poems are nonmimetic, there 
is a blurred distinction between rhetorical figures and scenic dramatizations, where 
tropes (already by definition “turns”) palpably turn into metamorphic beings” (75).  
The “palpable” nature of the turn registers a discrepancy: a detectable “bump” in 
the movement from rhetorical figures to “scenic dramatization” through which 
imagination stages “the shock of encountering embodied metaphors.”   
Thus, the somatic symptoms (dire physical changes suffered by Urizen and 
his children) are not just mythically described—they register the shock of reified 
metaphor, much as Virgil’s personified description of Mt. Atlas does when it 
threatens to reify the suffering of a man-mountain.   Atlas is a bridge between 
Blake’s amphibians and Wordsworth’s borderers discussed at some length by 
Geoffrey Hartman, and taken up in the next chapter of this study.  De Luca brings 
up a related tension between myth and rhetorical figures when he cites Paul de 
Man in connection with the turning of tropes into metamorphic beings: “when one 
speaks of the legs of a table or the face of the mountain, catachresis is already 
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turning into prosopopoeia” (75).  Inasmuch as de Luca is taking Urizen’s children 
as catachresis, there is something peculiar about his analysis—they are 
metamorphic beings. Yet, “leg of the table” is a metaphor that takes a monstrously 
reifying turn, and in this sense, recalls the reifying turn of figures into 
metamorphosis (Virgil’s Atlas is the “face of the mountain”—a dead metaphor 
revived). It is in the slippage between categories of the rhetor and the literary critic 
that imagination produces “the shock of embodied metaphor,” thematized as the 
suffering of Atlas, the “dire constraint” of the Leech Gather that bends him double, 
or the glittering torment of Urizen’s children (symptoms of contracted vision).  
Myth, from this angle, is not entirely distinct from what John Ashbery calls 
“over-particularized” personification, or its incongruities.  For example, when 
Urizen’s children become something more than personifications, the shift is 
marked: they take on monstrous grandeur reminiscent of Milton’s Satan. When 
female emanations begin complaining, or developing a separate will, or a higher 
awareness, there is often trouble or a threat of trouble, and Blake marks this 
discretely.   Following the work of John B. Pierce on The Four Zoas, Vincent de 
Luca has noted that “Tharmas is notably absent from the earliest extant layer of 
copperplate transcription found on pages 7-42, except for two fleeting allusions 
where he seems “little more than a name or a personification of the sea [my italics] 
(119).  As a fully mythic being, however, Tharmas “inflicts trauma on the cosmos” 
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and “is perhaps the emblem of a trauma the author has himself imposed on his own 
developing text” (119). This trauma is both a textual discontinuity and one of many 
material marks of revision: it occurs at a place where the manuscript changes 
abruptly from “ornate (or copperplate transcription)” to Blake’s writing on the 
proofsheets of Young’s Night Thoughts—a poem that Blake illustrated  (117). The 
distinction between personification and fully mythic being gets marked by a cut or 
trauma in the text—a thematic reification of chaos (Tharmas) and a physical mark 
of Blake’s revision in the manuscript of The Four Zoas. Marking the break is 
Urizen’s rejection of Ahania—analyzed in this chapter as a trigger of chaos. 
By incarnating poetic agency, the state of amphibious beings resists 
understanding, and through this resistance, imagination signifies itself. As I read 
Blake and Wordsworth in the next chapter, identification with the amphibian 
stages a “death drive” whose aim is a border-state of basal existence. For Blake, 
identification with the amphibian is the reductio of the impulse to contemplate the 
index of imagination rather than identify with it directly.  Blakean vision 
annihilates “self-conscious” imagination—and along with it, the “selfhood.” In 
contrast, certain poems of Wordsworth evidence “the self-reference” of the 
“Wordsworthian sublime” as Steven Knapp calls it—generalizing the structure 
from “Resolution and Independence” to Wordsworth’s doctrine of the spots of 
time. Taken into its fully linguistic turn, this kind of reflexivity poses a problem: 
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language apparently stumbles on its own power as something outside of 
language—or at least beyond representation. How can a power external to 
language appear inside of it?  It is signaled by images charged with apparent 
meaning that nonetheless pose a formal resistance to understanding. The 
“amphibian” or embodied metaphor is a special case.     
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CHAPTER 3 
REFLEXIVE IMAGINATION: THEORY AND EXAMPLES 
1. What is a Reflexive Figure? 
In this chapter, I read Ashbery and Wordsworth together, focusing on 
the salience of images and decontextualized objects that are the “survivors” 
of ruin, mutability or eroded memory. These index power, and are analogs of 
the “amphibians” examined in the last chapter. I conclude by analyzing 
Blake’s metaphors, which disrupt conventional decorum to index 
uncastrated desire—suggesting forms of identification grounded in 
something other than analogy.  At the limit, Blakean figurality is a mode of 
being, or annihilation of “selfhood,” and there is a similar extreme in the 
poetry of A.R. Ammons: a performative self-reference, through which the 
“energy” of metaphor collapses into the energy of nature. Before turning to 
these readings, however, I shall describe “reflexive imagination” in terms 
friendlier to everyday notions of rhetoric; i.e., as the special case of a 
reflexive figure. 
Reflexive figures perform operations on their own definitions and 
formal constraints. As I define it, this kind of figurality modifies its own 
meta-language by modifying dichotomies that rationalize the theory of 
tropes, or tropological imagination. Among the 
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are “burying” of the tenor by an over-particularized vehicle (Blake and 
Ashbery), deferral of vehicle (Ashbery), semi-descriptive or 
overparticularized personification (Ashbery), highlighting of the difference 
between metaphor and non-analogical substitution (Paul de Man), a blurring 
of that very same distinction (Ashbery and Blake), interference between 
myth and allegory (Blake), and a collapse of the difference between emblem 
and idea (Blake).  
  
Figurality is “self referential” when it disrupts oppositions in its meta-
language.  When figurality blurs the opposition between figural and literal 
agency it operates on a distinction that is one level up—in the meta-
language of figures. This crossing of language levels is a cognitive 
discontinuity that the poet and critic take to signify “power,” variously 
thematized as imagination, spirit, or an extra-linguistic “real” of language. 
This study brackets thematizations of power, to focus on the reflexive 
conceits that point to it. Why do poets and critics feel that the cognitive 
discontinuity of a reflexive figure is an index of power? In this study, I take 
this “feeling” to be primarily aesthetic. What follows is an attempt to explain 
and describe instances of such a feeling, read in the poetry of Wordsworth, 
Blake and Ashbery, and the work of literary critics on the reflexivity of 
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tropological language. Thus, while the examples in this chapter are intended 
to illuminate reflexive tropological form, they are not catalogs of examples, 
but readings of poetry and criticism that explore how and why reflexive 
figurality gives us pleasure, and in particular, why it gives us pleasure to re-
thematize the cognitive disruption of a reflexive figure as “power.”  
Wordsworth reminds us that poetry should give pleasure, and literary 
theory sometimes arises from the close reading of a particular poet. For 
example, Hazard Adams—by drawing on Blake and the literary theory of 
Northrop Frye (Frye 124)—introduced an antithetical event into his 
dynamical theory of tropological language: the point at which “outward” 
pointing language turns “inward,” by containing the world in mathematical 
language, or as mythic form, or metaphorical identification. What Blake 
figured as the “opening” of a center into a circumference is a sublime trope 
insofar as it exceeds a distinction between “inward” and “outward” pointing 
language: there is a nodal point where the distinction breaks down—“inside” 
contains “outside”—and this is an irrational index of creative power: “The 
Circumference is Within, Without is formed the Selfish Center” (71). In his 
reading of Wordsworth’s “There was a boy…,” Paul de Man takes the 
substitution of living speaker for dead boy as an index of linguistic power. 
The sense that language defends against its own power is generated by a 
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reflexive figure—and the reader of the critic’s text takes pleasure in the 
critic’s construction, which has its own, austere power (10).  
What emerges is an imagination that seems exterior to us, while 
simultaneously intimate—or  “extimate,” to borrow Lacan’s portmanteau 
word (itself a reflexive figure).1 Thus, in Wordsworth’s “Resolution and 
Independence,” an equivocation between figural and literal agency results 
from an impulse to allegorically personify the Leech Gatherer, in conflict 
with his “natural” status (Knapp, 106). I have argued that there is an 
analogous equivocation in Blake’s myth—a turn of tropes into 
metamorphosis. The resulting anomalies, considered in Chapter 1 and 
elaborated in this chapter, “index” figurality that disrupts understanding—
and all the more asks that the reader interpret the disruption.   
The rhetor’s categories take the form of oppositions, and all such 
dichotomies are open to a reflexive turn of tropes: 
1.  Figural vs. literal 
2.  Tenor vs. vehicle  
3.  Use vs. mention 
4.  Meta vs. object level 
5.  Metaphor vs. metamorphosis 
                                                
1 Glossing Lacan, Jacques Alain-Miller’s website notes that “the most interior…has in the 
analytic experience, a quality of exteriority…this Other who, more intimate than my 
intimacy stirs me.” The discourse of “this Other” would be that of the unconscious 
(Miller). Yet, “extimacy” is not just a theoretical term; it generates a naïve topological 
construction of what—as portmanteau word (“extimate”)—cannot be understood. It is 
this movement beyond figural understanding to construction that indexes figurality in its 
“unconscious” dimension.  
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6.  Allegory vs. myth 
7.  Proper vs. improper 
8.  Inside vs. outside 
9.  Difference vs. sameness 
10. Metaphor vs. mistake 
11. Logical contradiction vs. metaphor-as-contradiction 
12. Logical paradox vs. paradox-as-poetic-meaning 
13. Analogically grounded metaphor vs. ungrounded substitution 
14.  Observer language (meta-language) vs. human observer (narrative 
standpoint) 
15.  Contrary vs. negation (Blake) 
16.  Active vs. passive contrary (Blake) 
17.  Center vs. circumference (Blake) 
 
A reflexive figure can destabilize the definition of allegory by bleeding the 
latter into myth, or collapse the distance between emblem and idea. 
Personification is also a malleable category: personifications seem like 
literal agents when overparticularized—and literal agents seem like 
personifications when they become abstract. The distinction between 
analogical and non-analogical substitution sometimes is qualified by 
substitution that seems partially analogical, or by something non-analogical 
in the attempt to define metaphor as substitution. An observer language—
assumed by the rhetor in order to talk about figurality—can mutate into an 
observer (#14 above). An observer can narrate from the “inside” of 
figurality, from the “outside,” or from somewhere in between—as I showed 
in Chapter 1, taking Urizen and the narrator of “Resolution and 
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Independence” as such points of view. It is also a conceit that I examine in 
my chapters on A.R. Ammons and John Ashbery. 
The throughline in these examples is that the meta-language of 
tropological imagination—the mention of figurality—always serves a use. 
Quintillian, for example, defined metaphor as “substitution,” but his 
definition redounds upon itself:  
1. Metaphor is substitution. 
2.  “Metaphor is substitution” is a substitution of “substitution” for 
“metaphor.”  
 
Cleanth Brooks invoked a version of this use-mention entanglement in “The 
Language of Paradox.” Citing “palm to palm is holy palmer’s kiss” from 
Romeo and Juliet, Brooks noted that in Shakespeare, as in the poetry of 
Donne, there is a connection between “the sense in which the lovers become 
one” and “the sense in which the soul is united with God”: 
Frequently, as we have seen, one type of union becomes a metaphor 
for the other. It may not be too far-fetched to see both as instances of, 
and  metaphors for, the union which the creative imagination itself 
effects. For that fusion is not logical; it apparently violates science and 
common sense; it welds together the discordant and the contradictory. 
[my italics] (18) 
 
Inasmuch as metaphors of union are also “instances” of union, such 
metaphors mention their own agency, collapsing the distinction below:  
1. “Welding of opposites” (metaphor of metaphorical union)  
META-LANGUAGE  




The rhetor “mentions” figurality in definitions, and “uses” figures in 
examples—but the entanglement of those levels is itself a figure, and one 
that necessarily eludes the rhetor’s classifications. More generally, the 
metalanguage of tropes sets up tropes that operate on metalanguage. Such 
figures I call “reflexive,” turning now to examples. I.A. Richard’s distinction 
between tenor and vehicle (95-100)—a “mention” of figurality—serves a 
poetic “use” when figurality operates on it, and we find a version of this 
entanglement in Blake’s poem, “The Human Abstract,” when the speaker 
describes the Tree of Mystery’s growth: 
Soon spreads the dismal shade 
  Of Mystery over his head; 
  And the Catterpiller and the Fly 
  Feed on the Mystery. (E 28) 
  
Robert Essick has noted that ““The Caterpiller and the Fly,” which we can 
imagine feeding on a tree, instead feed on its tenor, “Mystery”” (225). The 
word “feed” is a reflexive metaphor because it collapses tenor and vehicle, 
substantializing “Mystery.” Metaphorical imagination points to an irrational 
dimension of its power by blurring tenor and vehicle—imagination deforms 
its own form, inasmuch as its mode of creation becomes perversely 
substantializing or materializing.  
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W.K. Wimsatt reads a different entanglement of tenor and vehicle in 
the following lines from Wordsworth’s ode, “Intimations of Immortality”: 
“And see the children sport upon the shore,/And hear the mighty waters 
rolling evermore” (169-70, 438). Wimsatt paraphrases: “our souls in a calm 
mood look back to the infinity from which they came, as persons inland on 
clear days can look back to the sea by which they have voyaged to the land.” 
However, the figure entangles its tenor (which “concerns souls and age and 
time”) with its vehicle (which “concerns travelers and space”): the children 
“are…attracted over, from tenor to vehicle” (114). The figure imposes time 
onto space (children onto beach) through “a warping or modification of 
vehicle by tenor” or “a sleight of words, an imposition of image on image, 
by the modifying power of imagination” (114). This is the “modifying 
power” that Wordsworth describes in his Preface of 1815 (115); yet, the 
terms “imposition” and “sleight of words” also suggest positional power, 
which, in Paul de Man’s sense, is not figural.    
For Wimsatt, however, tenor and vehicle short-circuit to index an 
irrational power of imagination. He maintains that nature, as the source of a 
surmise or reminiscence, is also “the source of the metaphors by which the 
reminiscence is described” (113).  Thus allegorical personifications of nature 
“descend into the landscape and fuse with it”; for example, when Blake’s 
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“Summer” takes on characteristics of the sun, “only to sleep in the shade of 
the oaks and be invited to rush into the river for a swim” (133).  Elsewhere, 
“the iconic or directly imitative powers of language” seem to conjure up the 
natural phenomena that figure them, as in Shelley’s “Ode to the West 
Wind,” where iconic power gives “an impression beyond statement of the 
very wildness, the breath and power which is the vehicle of the poem’s 
radical metaphor” (115). 
William Keach examines short-circuits or near-short circuits in his 
study of reflexive imagery in Shelley. He notes that “coreless heart” from 
Queen Mab (80) is a figure that threatens to collapse tenor and vehicle 
through the near-synonymous meaning of “core” and “heart.” Keach 
connects this to Wimsatt’s model of nature imagery in which “tenor and 
vehicle are wrought in a parallel process out of the same material” (80). Like 
Wimsatt, Keach invokes a mental power that both distinguishes tenor and 
vehicle—and narrows the distance between them—threatening to collapse 
the distance entirely. Thus, reflexive imagery presents a capacity of 
Romantic imagination to beget difference from sameness, and collapse it 
again. An example is “circling steps which rested on/Their own deep fire” 
from The Revolt of Islam. Keach says that “what the steps rest on is an 
aspect of themselves” (80). Therefore, “the basis of the reflexive image per 
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se is grammatical and syntactical; the signifying function of a phrase or 
clause turns back on itself, and its doing so marks an ‘operation of the 
human mind’ that couples analysis or division (as an aspect is separated 
from the idea to which it belongs) with synthesis or reunion (as the separated 
or divided aspect is re-identified with that same idea)” (80). 
Such a figure is uncertainly invoked, either as a “reconciliation of 
opposites,” or as a generator of difference, due to its purely formal character 
as a suspension of difference and sameness. William Empson had noted, 
somewhat disparagingly, the pro-forma nature of what he called “short-
circuits” and “interwoven similes” in Shelley—exemplified by the repeated 
grammatical formulation “their own,” “its own,” “his/her own.” Empson 
noted that Shelley could weave a spell with reflexive imagery—but also 
relied on it too much, deploying it as an empty formal device (161).  
There is something spectral about the “reconciliation” of the reflexive 
image, and something hollow about the difference it generates. Keach 
stresses “the figure’s peculiar capacity to suggest both the creative power 
and limitation of imagination” (81)—for example, imagination’s auto-
eroticism, in taking itself as its own object. In  Shelley’s Alastor, the poet 
projects an ideal female companion, and  “saw by the warm light of their 
own life/Her glowing limbs.” The self-illumination of the female’s limbs is 
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the self-sufficiency of the visionary’s own imagination, but also, a solipsism 
figured by the grammatical reflexivity of an “involuted adverbial phrase” 
(“saw by the warm light of their own life”) (Keach, 82).   
In Blake’s myth, solipsism takes a dark turn. Sexual division, for 
Blake, begets difference through a “division of the soul—it consolidates a 
“selfhood” in relation to a separate feminine counterpart (most 
characteristically figured as an externalized nature). Vision seizes a 
misrecognized portion of itself when it seizes its sexual other, as in the scene 
below (analyzed in Chapter 1, and mentioned in the opening of the present 
chapter):  
Eternity shudder’d when they saw, 
Man begetting his likeness, 
On his own divided image (78) 
 
By repressing sympathetic identity in favor of self-begetting difference, 
visionary power falls into a solipsistic eroticism. A gap opens up between 
male and female, perversely “reconciled” by their sexual congress. The 
grammatical form “his own” recalls “the emphatic possessive” analyzed by 
Keach, and Blake also uses the formulation to describe Urizen’s children in 
The Four Zoas: “Scard at the sound of their own sigh that seems to shake the 
immense [my italics]” (340).  
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In Blake’s myth, we see a conscious attempt to frame self-begotten 
difference as a perversion of visionary form. The self is other to itself when 
it falls into self-division through aberrant forms of self-relation, such as 
“pity”—or the self-division that manifests Urizen’s “self-begotten armies,” 
and his isolation as “A self-contemplating shadow.”” Sympathetic identity—
which simultaneously asserts the same and the different—shifts to the self-
begotten difference that abstracts Urizen from a presumably integral whole 
in The Book of Urizen, making him “self-closd, all repelling” (1.3, E 69). 
For Blake, the crux of reflexive images is, therefore, their capacity to beget 
difference—and simultaneously collapse it. In this, they parody a dynamical 
and creative tension between difference and sameness. Reflexive images put 
us oddly “outside” of imagination—as though it were logical paradox—and 
“inside” of it, as a form of understanding “analysis or division” that is 
“coupled with synthesis or reunion” (Keach, 80). In short, the reflexive 
image disrupts a distinction between “reconciling” and “non-reconciling” 
power, staging a self-relation that is not quite comprehensible.  
2. Wordsworth and the Mirror-Lake 
Analogically sympathetic imagination would seem ideally figured by 
the Romantic mirror-lake: an image of mind reflecting nature, figuring a 
harmony (“fit” and “fittedness”) between them that Blake famously 
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critiqued. But, the image also undermines the “logic” of sympathy by 
transforming imagination’s reconciliation of the same and different into a 
suspension that is austere and uncanny. The lake’s surface introduces a cut 
between reflected and real sky—yet also receives that “uncertain heaven” 
into its bosom, to paraphrase famous lines from Wordsworth’s poem on the 
Boy of Winander. Consider, for example, the lines below, written by 
Wordsworth in 1833:   
The leaves that rustled on this oak-crowned hill, 
 And sky that danced among those leaves, are still; 
 Rest smooths the way for sleep; in field and bower 
 Soft shades and dews have shed their blended power 
 On drooping eyelid and the closing flower; 
 Sound is there none at which the faintest heart 
 Might leap, the weakest nerve of superstition start; 
 Save when the Owlet’s unexpected scream 
 Pierces the ethereal vault; and ‘mid the gleam 
 Of unsubstantial imagery—the dream, 
 From the hushed vale’s realities transferred 
 To the still lake, the imaginative Bird 
 Seems, ‘mid inverted mountains, not unheard. (241) 
 
Dubbed “the imaginative bird,” the Owlet strikes a “nerve of superstition” 
that interrupts the speaker’s drowsy identification with the scene. The 
description of the owl as “imaginative” suggests, for a moment, that owl has 
an imagination—rather than rather than provoking the listener’s 
imagination—or that the Owl has become an imaginative type through his 
cry. The ambiguities put imagination in play, as though it were dislocated, 
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and entangled with the Owl. Inasmuch as the owl’s scream is 
“Transferred/to the still lake,” it “Seems, ‘mid inverted mountains, not 
unheard”; i.e., heard amid the reflected mountains in the lake, as though they 
were part of an alternate world—or a world of imagination that opens onto 
the inhuman realm, and perhaps partakes of it.   
Such an imagination is what the poem figures as the reflected abyss of 
the lake—where the “dream” of the vale is “transferred.” The image recurs 
in these opening lines from another late poem called “Twilight by the Side 
of Grasmere Lake”: 
A twofold slumber the huge hills partake 
 High in the air and deep in the still lake (248) 
 
But, as Wordsworth tries to ameliorate the startling effect of the owl, he 
retreats from a dream-like absorption of the owl’s cry, and appeals to a crude 
form of sympathetic imagination. He apostrophizes the “Grave Creature” as 
the classical “soul/Of sapience,” and the owl of ruin (“Rising from what may 
once have been a Lady’s bower”) (242). Again, however, he is interrupted 
by the bird’s screech: 
  Hark to that second larum! far and wide 
  The elements have heard, and rock and cave replied. (242) 
This time the owl has definitely been “heard”—the litotic undercutting 
(“seems…/not unheard”) is swept aside. Now, nature has heard the bird 
 78 
through its internal echo. The speaker can only stand outside of this echo (a 
property of the surrounding hills) even as he stood, alienated from an 
imagination figured as the inverted abyss of the mirror-lake. 
 The setting of this poem recalls that of Wordsworth’s famous poem 
on the Winander Boy, cited below in the version that appeared in the 1800 
edition of Lyrical Ballads:  
  There was a Boy, ye knew him well, ye Cliffs 
  And Islands of Winander! many a time,  
  At evening, when the stars had just begun 
    To move along the edges of the hills, 
  Rising or setting, would he stand alone, 
  Beneath the trees, or by the glimmering lake,  
  And there, with fingers interwoven, both hands  
  Press’d closely palm to palm and to his mouth 
  Uplifted, he, as through an instrument, 
  Blew mimic hootings to the silent owls 
That they might answer him. And they would shout  
Across the wat’ry vale and shout again, 
Responsive to his call, with quivering peals, 
And long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud 
Redoubled and redoubled, a wild scene 
Of mirth and jocund din… (178) 
 
The boy is unselfconsciously and passionately identified with nature—
Hartman invokes the “glad animal movements” described in “Tintern 
Abbey” (19) and de Man describes an “analogical correspondence between 
man and nature”: “the solid ground of a world in which nature and 
consciousness are ‘interwoven’[my italics]”—like the boy’s fingers (684 N).  
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In these opening lines, the boy’s relation to nature is nonetheless 
framed in a larger context that implies the latter’s alterity. “The stars had just 
begun/To move along the edges of the hills,/Rising and setting,” but the 
“movement” of those stars is somewhat vertiginous and illusory: the place 
where the boy would “stand alone” is “rolled round in earth’s diurnal 
course” (115 N). “Blew mimic hootings” puts the boy’s articulate mimicry 
in counterpoint to the owls’ cries and whatever motivates it; “silent owls,” 
moreover, foreshadows the silence that will mark a traumatic break between 
the boy and nature. Finally, “fingers interwoven”—read as de Man’s 
interwoveness of nature and consciousness—is in tension with “would he 
stand alone [my italics].”  
Metaphor, as a simultaneous assertion of the same and the different 
(interwoven and alone), fails as a form of sympathy, splitting the boy into 
conscious and unconscious boy: 
And when it chanced 
That pauses of deep silence mock’d his skill, 
Then, sometimes, in that silence, while he hung 
Listening, a gentle shock of mild surprise 
Has carried far into his heart the voice 
Of mountain torrents; or the visible scene 
Would enter unawares into his mind 
With all its solemn imagery, its rocks, 
Its woods, and that uncertain Heaven, receiv’d 
Into the bosom of the steady Lake. (R 178)  
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“Pauses of deep silence” anticipate the boy’s death. In Hartman’s reading, 
nature “leads the child into consciousness of nature”—although “he dies 
before self-consciousness can fully emerge” (20). The boy is conscious of 
the failure of sympathetic imagination, but unconsciously, an irrational mode 
of identification takes over—one not based on analogy. The picturesque, 
reflecting lake described in An Evening Walk—“Whose mirror makes the 
landscape’s charms its own”—should be distinguished from the inverted 
depths in which the owl’s screech is “not unheard.” Inasmuch as “the visible 
scene would enter, unawares,” imagination imagines the form of its 
“sympathy” as something other than analogically metaphorical; rather, it is a 
trance-like state of absorption.  
At the level of diction, C.C. Clarke noted in many of Wordsworth’s 
poems that his “language effectively cancels sharp disjunctions 
between…mind and the things it perceives”: “The uncompromising 
apposition ‘…its solemn imagery, its rocks,/Its woods ‘ implies a simple 
equivalence of imagery and outward objects and suggests that if it is not 
quite the rocks and woods themselves that enter the mind neither is it a mere 
picture of representation of them” (7). From this angle, the equivocation 
between “imagery and things imaged” situates—at the level of language—
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the boy’s “absorption” into nature, and recalls Hartman’s claim that diction 
is a defense against discontinuity.  
The sense that nature is defending against its own tutelary shock—
softened via the “beautiful dimmenuendo” (Hartman 19), “a gentle shock of 
mild surprise”—might be qualified by considering that the shock might just 
as well be that of imagination: consciousness of a break from nature is also 
consciousness of imagination. Elsewhere in Wordsworth’s Poetry, Hartman 
remarks that “The strongly neutral or ‘it’ aspect of much Wordsworthian 
landscape reveals an imagination in man or in nature which is strangely 
‘unnatural,’ dehumanized” (350). “An imagination in man or in nature” 
suggests a non-local imagination—or an intersection of imagination and 
nature through something inhuman and common to both.  
The opposition “imagination vs. nature” entangles to index a 
discontinuity uncertainly redeemed as a tutelary influence of nature. The boy 
dies: 
  Fair are the woods, and beauteous is the spot, 
  The vale where he was born: the Church-yard hangs 
  Upon a slope above the village school, 
  And there along that bank when I have pass’d 
  At evening, I believe, that near his grave 
  A full half-hour together I have stood, 
  Mute—for he died when he was ten years old. (178) 
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Hartman says of the boy’s arrested entry into self-consciousness, “Perhaps it 
is better thus to die into nature than to survive one’s former self. The poet 
who stands at the child’s grave knows that consciousness is always of death, 
a confrontation of the self with a buried self” (22).  
The speaker stands outside of his identification with the boy, even as 
the Winander boy stands outside of his identification with nature. 
Imagination, in failing to imagine itself, projects such standpoints:   
1. “At evening…/would he stand alone.” [my italics] 
2.  A full half-hour together I have stood…” [my italics] 
The artifice of the speaker’s standpoint is made clear by his capacity to 
report what the child experienced “unawares.” How is this possible—even if 
we take the child as a childhood self? Where does the speaker stand in 
relation to this child?  
 In de Man’s reading, the speaker substitutes himself for a dead boy 
who we might read as the speaker’s boyhood self; however, there is no 
analogical basis for comparing a living and dead self. The death that befell 
the boy is—through an implied substitution of speaker for boy—the death 
that the speaker anticipates. “A pseudo-metaphorical and thematically 
inconceivable substitution of persons leads to a temporal reversal”—a form 
of “metalepsis.” Thus, “the poem does not reflect on death but on the 
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rhetorical power of language that can make it seem as if we could anticipate 
the unimaginable” (9). 
 In this reading, tropological language “reflects on” (writes) its power 
through a pseudo-metaphorical (non-analogical) substitution. De Man 
distinguishes (and entangles) semantic and non-semantic aspects of language 
in his reading of “There was a boy…,” noting that: “we look for the delicate 
area where the thematic, semantic field and the rhetorical structures begin to 
interfere with each other, begin to engage each other” (5). The substitution 
of speaker for Winander boy marks this interference: rhetorical substitution 
usurps theme, and the poem takes that very usurpation or discontinuity as a 
thematized power, or more accurately in this poem, as an index of death’s 
radical discontinuity.   
Reflexive disruptions are elsewhere situated in Wordsworth’s poetry 
when surprise collapses into shock—unsoftened by diminuendo, and perhaps 
beyond the defense of diction: 
  Surprised by joy—impatient as the wind 
  I turned to share the transport—Oh! With whom 
  But thee, long buried in the silent tomb... (CPWW 310) 
The speaker’s aborted turn to his dead daughter (“I turned to share…”) 
becomes a defensive turn of apostrophe: the “Oh!” of pain becomes the “O!” 
of apostrophe in the lyric present. Through this collapse, the speaker’s 
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imagination defends against a faithless imagination—allied with present 
joy—that had momentarily blotted out the memory of his daughter. Neither 
the speaker nor the poem really recovers from this moment. 
Although reflexive turns are set up by hard and fast distinctions 
between shock and surprise, imagination and nature, analogical and non-
analogical substitution—the entanglement or blurring of these distinctions 
also signifies power. Blake complicates the distinction between analogical 
and non-analogical substitution when describing “the great city of 
Golgonooza” in Jerusalem:  
 And the eyes are the South, and the Nostrils are the East. 
And the Tongue is the West, and the Ear is the North.   
(12.59-60, E 154) 
  
There is no analogy between organs of sense and points of the compass—no 
naïve image of a face that would reconcile the image. The above is 
catachresis, and moreover, as Vincent de Luca notes, “we cannot speak 
easily of vehicle and tenor here, for the facial images and the geographical 
regions rob each other of their vehicular power” (100).  
However, the reader of Blake’s myth also knows that these compass 
points map to Urizen, Luvah, Tharmas and Urthona. In the fallen world, the 
gate of the ear is the portal of imagination (Urthona), whose compass point 
is north. The ears are “the every-varying spiral ascents to the heavens of 
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heavens” in Europe, alternately described in Thel as “a whirlpool fierce to 
draw creations in” (17). Cleared of dross and vapors, the ear opens to take 
dictation from spirits, or so Blake claimed. The identification of “ear” and 
“North” remains non-analogical, but when informed by Blake’s myth, it 
figures the act of hearing with an active ear. Assimilated further into myth—
or visionary reality—the line reads as “literal” description: the particulars of 
the vision are—what they are. By deliberately disrupting distinctions that 
regulate figurality, vision draws attention to the way that it is slipping the 
rhetor’s chains: it “rouzes the faculties to act” (E 676).   
Blake’s description of his painting A Vision of the Last Judgment 
concludes with a statement on the individual nature of imagination:  
What it will be Questiond When the Sun rises do you 
  not see a round Disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea O 
  no no I see an Innumerable company of the Heavenly 
  host crying Holy Holy Holy is the Lord God Almighty 
  I question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more 
  than I would Question a window concerning a Sight I look 
  thro it & not with it. (E 555) 
 
The guinea-sun grounds a consensus about the nature of reality that 
Northrop Frye calls “a communal perception of the sun” (29). Explicit to the 
idiot, this happy agreement represses an idiosyncratic identification of the 
rising sun with a celestial choir. Song-burst and sun-burst are identified via 
synesthesia. The identity of sun and hallelujah chorus also figures a non-
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analogical leap of faith and creative perception—as in Blake’s image for the 
Book of Job, “when the morning Stars sang together, & all the Sons of God 
shouted for joy” (38.7). 
 On one extreme, the reduction of Phoebus to a round guinea is what 
Alexander Pope called “diminishing metaphor” in the Peri Bathous (387). 
The other pole threatens private enthusiasm, or what Vincent de Luca calls 
“catachrestic embarrassment”—the shock of “pseudo-metaphor.” At the 
limit, this kind of identification threatens non-transmittable fantasy—
imagination parts ways from “sense” and “logic,” as Coleridge seems to 
have detected when he criticized Wordsworth for apostrophizing the child in 
Ode, “Intimations of Immortality”: 
Thou best Philosopher, who yet dost keep 
 Thy heritage, thou Eye among the blind, 
 That deaf and silent, read’st the eternal deep, 
 Haunted for ever by the Eternal Mind,-- 
 Mighty Prophet!  Seer blest! (110, N 437) 
The child, in this elevated sense, is no longer the historical Wordsworth or 
any other flesh and blood child; he emblematizes a collapse of power and 
meaning, as an “Eye” that “read’st.” Steven Knapp reads the child’s 
consciousness as imported from an allegorical personification and 
incongruously naturalized: “he” is a reflexive figure, indexing power (98-
106). 
 87 
Coleridge was especially critical of the child’s sense of the grave as: 
…a lonely bed without the sense or sight 
            Of day or the warm light, 
  A place of thought where we in waiting lie; (121-23, N 437) 
 
In analyzing Wordsworth’s lines, Coleridge notes that the grave as a “lonely 
bed” could only make sense if the child takes death for sleep. This is a 
banality, but the alternative does not make sense; i.e., that the child “has no 
other notion of death than that of lying in a dark, cold place? (571)  And still 
I hope, not as in a place of thought! not the frightful notion of lying awake in 
his grave!”  Coleridge concludes, “Thus, you must at once understand the 
words contrary to their common import, in order to arrive at any sense; and 
according to their common import, if you are to receive from them any 
feeling of sublimity or admiration” (571).  
Coleridge takes this to be typical of “splendid paradoxes in general” 
(571), but this kind of “paradox” is not the “language of poetry” per Cleanth 
Brooks; i.e., it is not a reconciliation of opposites. In reading Wordsworth’s 
lines, Coleridge found himself caught between…  
1. A literal meaning that is sublime—but meaningless.  
2.  A figure that is banal, but meaningful.  
Although Coleridge marks as “sublime” the impetus to hold in mind, “at 
once,” the literal meaning of living death and the banal metaphor of sleep-
as-death, the tension between absurdity and banality is not reconcilable.  
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Coleridge stands “outside” of Wordsworth’s identification with the child 
because he does not understand it, but he is “inside” in the sense of 
acknowledging an impulse to read against sense.  
 The “inside” of the child’s consciousness is the inside of unfallen 
imagination—however, this “inside” is being viewed from an outside that 
de-stabilizes reading. Coleridge asks how Wordsworth’s child could be a 
philosopher—how he “reads the eternal deep,” is a “Mighty Prophet,” and so 
forth: “By reflection? by knowledge? by conscious intuition? or by any form 
or modification of consciousness?” Coleridge asks: “if these mysterious 
gifts, faculties, and operations, are not accompanied with consciousness; 
who else is conscious of them? or how can it be called the child, if it be no 
part of the child’s conscious being?” (571)  
Wordsworth is not imagining the grave, but trying to imagine the 
child’s imagination of it as “a place of thought where we in waiting lie.” 
This imagination of imagination situates an inscrutable kernel of fantasy 
motivating Worsworth’s apostrophe to the child, detected by Coleridge. It is 
the kind of opaque investment that attracts John Ashbery to the poetry of 
Thomas Lovell Beddoes, and other fragments, culled from obscure corners 
of English poetry.   
3. John Ashbery 
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Ashbery’s deformations of metaphor, syntactical aberrations, and 
figural fragments blur a distinction between metaphor and mistake. The 
reader must suppress the impulse to straighten out syntax, trace back the 
missing tenor of a metaphor, or reconstruct sentences whose parts connect at 
odd angles.  
Ashbery’s figures resemble Wordsworth’s spots of time in their 
decontextualization: they read like objects whose meaning is often obscure 
or indiscernible, although their salience is undeniable; they arrest (and 
formally project) a reader who stands outside of figural “imagination.” 
Consider this line from a later poem, “Chinese Whispers”: “Mute, the 
pancake describes you” (31). Objects that describe us, or tell us what we are, 
constitute a reader—or project the standpoint of a reader. The pancake, 
although a bit of a joke, might be compared with the more famous trees from 
Ashbery’s early poem, “Some Trees”: 
 These are amazing: each  
 Joining a neighbor, as though speech 
 Were a still performance. (51) 
 
These trees also seem to project a spectator, constituting her: “…you and I 
are suddenly what the trees try/To tell us we are” (51). The trees seem solid 
and thing-like, but the pancake clock begins to mutate as the poem 
continues: 
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Mute, the pancake describes you. 
It had tiny Roman numerals embedded in its rim. 
It was a pancake clock. They had ‘em in those days. (31) 
 
The lines drift from present to past tense, and as the poem continues, we get 
a sense of senile drift and old man’s memory—or the titular game of 
Chinese Whispers, in which a whispered message is incomprehensibly 
altered through transmission.  
Like chance impressions in a walk through nature, the mutability of 
language produces “salient” objects, or things that “jump” out (“salient” is 
from the Latin, salire—to jump). Was Ashbery struck by the thingliness of 
the trees when he wrote about them? Is salience the property of an object or 
a piece of linguistic detritus? Salience is not a property of objects. 
“Thingess” and “salience” are the representatives of figural imagination 
rather than a property of objects. “It was in truth/An ordinary sight” (1805 
11.307-308, 480 W), as Wordsworth notes of the landscape beneath the 
Penrith beacon, and only now, in a moment of tranquility, does he realize 
that imagination had charged it with “visionary dreariness” in childhood. 
Steven Knapp connects this disparity between a past and present point of 
view to the discrepancy between an allegorical and literal reading of the 
Leech Gatherer’s agency—a discrepancy which is the true source of the old 
man’s uncanniness. Inasmuch as Ashbery’s figures draw attention to similar 
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discrepancies, he updates the self-referential sublime of overvaluation and 
error (Knapp, 109)).  
The mutability of Ashbery’s poems implicates figural language in a 
mutability of language—and especially the kind of reflexive mutations that 
are the focus of this study. Consider the “self-aware” figurality in this 
passage from “The Suspended Life”—a poem from Ashbery’s somewhat 
infamous volume, The Tennis Court Oath: “The igloo sun, while I was 
away,/Chastened the wolverine towels” bleeds into free-association: “Isn’t 
Idaho the wolverine state…” The passage returns to the towels, by way of 
“Ashtabula,/the towel city…” (36) Alternatively, consider the way that the 
following description dead-ends: “The colony of ants was marching toward 
me, stretching/far into the distance, where they were small as ants (YNH 
126). “Ants…small as ants,” is a silly tautology, but the ants turn out to be 
surreally large: and so, it might be a comparison after all (of regular-sized 
and surreally large ants):  
Ants are walking down the Champs-Elysees… 
The larger ones have almost reached the allegorical statues 
of French cities (is it?) on the Place de la Concorde (YNH 126) 
 In these lines, the poetry draws attention to narrative; as it flows, it 
forces us to re-evaluate lines that we took to be figural, or it otherwise 
distorts figurality. For example, description produces a reflexive figure when 
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it overruns the vehicle of a comparison, by giving too much information 
about it. Consider, for example, the over-particularized “lady” in the simile 
below, from the poem “Like a Sentence”: 
 …I was going to say I had squandered spring 
 when summer came along and took it from me 
 like a terrier a lady has asked one to hold for a moment 
 while she adjusts her stocking in the mirror of a weighing machine. 
         (ASWS 42)   
The lines below are similar—but capture more of the mystery of embodied 
metaphor: 
  As inevitable as a barking dog, second-hand music 
  drifts down five flights of stairs and out into the street, 
  adjusting seams, checking makeup in pocket mirror (YNH 15) 
 
“Second-hand music” is background noise wafting into foreground, and the 
swapping of foreground for background recurs elsewhere in Ashbery’s 
poetry, marked by the slamming of a screen door, or snatches of overheard 
conversation. In the above lines, the personification of drifting music—
through its heightened particulars—is also a personification of figural form, 
drifting from decorum, and snapping into foreground.   
In the case of the poem “Heartache,” rhetorical excess is a comic 
effect—but also signals trauma:    
  Sometimes a dangerous slice-of-life 
  like stepping off a board-game 
  into a frantic lagoon 
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  drags the truth from the bathroom, where it has been hiding. 
  “Do whatever you like to improve the situation, 
and—good luck,” it added, like a barber adding an extra plop of 
lather to a stupefied customer’s face. (YNH 42) 
 
The passage releases a great deal of energy through a collision of mixed 
metaphor, jagged syntax and pushed personification, and thematize that very 
excess, as in the previous examples. The shock of “stepping off a board-
game/into a frantic lagoon” is the shock of hidden depths opening up 
beneath routine existence; “frantic lagoon” suggests cartoonish thrashing 
and near-drowning. Allegory collapses under the weight of strange 
particulars, when the “slice of life” mutates into an accuser, compared to a 
barber.  
 As the poem continues, heartache becomes abstract—even as 
personification becomes more particular:  
 Snow lashed the windowpanes as though punishing them 
 for having the property of being seen through… 
 
 …Night sprang out of the dense cold 
 like an infuriated ocelot with her cub that someone had been trying 
 to steal, or so it pretended. (YNH 42) 
 
In lieu of a backstory about heartache, the poem relates a vague fable about 
children, transported out of a town, and converges on the following 
penultimate image: 
  There was no longer any room on the sidewalk 
  for anything but “v’s” drawn in pink chalk, the way a child 
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  draws a seagull. (YNH 43) 
 
“More seagull snapshots,” Ashbery writes in his Vermont notebook.  
“You know they reduce to brownish blobs like old Bible camp photos” (65). 
These blobs on the emulsion of memory are like the pink “v’s” (above) that 
the child scrawls on the sidewalk to represent seagulls— they are markers of 
childhood memory and imagination. Charged with obscure feelings and 
queer tonalities, this kind of image seems to index repressed or forgotten 
context. But, it seems flat here—a screen memory with nothing to screen.  
Ashbery’s personifications also have this flatness: as though “aware” 
of their own effects. They do not look like classic textbook examples—such 
as Carl Sandburg’s description of fog:  
The fog comes 
 on little cat feet 
 
 It sits looking  
over harbor and city 
on silent haunches  
and then moves on (71) 
     
Compare this to the following excerpt from Ashbery’s “It Was Raining in 
the Capital” in his volume, The Double Dream of Spring:  
  For spring had entered the capital 
  Walking on gigantic feet.  
  The smell of witch hazel indoors  
  Changed to narcissus in the street. (235) 
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By “walking on gigantic feet” spring seems to make a brash entrance—and 
the image also stages this entrance through its own effect. 
“It was Raining in the Capital” ends with a much quieter version of 
this swerve from description: 
  The sun came out in the capital 
  Just before it set. 
  The lovely death’s head shone in the sky 
  As though these two had never met. (DDS 21) 
 
The sun, as “lovely death’s head,” emerges briefly to dispel the rain and 
meet the sky, as if meeting a stranger—a change in what Ashbery elsewhere 
calls “climate” or “weather.” As descriptive personification, it carries hints 
of a Thomas Lovell Beddoes-like usurpation of nature by artifice, but the 
figure is balanced between an analogical transfer of properties (the fog is 
quiet like a cat) and a leap (the sun is like a death’s head). The 
personification figures the sun as dead nature, but also brings the sun to life, 
and thereby mirrors the paradox of nature that precedes it: “the life around 
you is dead.” 
 Ashbery elsewhere figures changes of season through pushed 
personifications: “With half-parted lips/The way the breath of spring creeps 
up on you and floors you” (DDS, 254). Here is another example: “It was the 
solstice, and it was jumping on you like a friendly dog” (ASWS 76). In each 
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case, the personification highlights an excess in personification itself—an 
index of power that is tied to fluctuations of language.   
 Ashbery’s void emblematizes itself through figural fragments that 
surface in the poem, or in the old man’s memory of English poetic tradition, 
like found-objects dug up in the back yard. Thomas Lovell Beddoes, for 
example, presents a curio cabinet of embalmed surprises, and regarding his 
poetry, Ashbery remarks that “one can end up feeling that he just likes 
talking about death, that the sound of the word is comforting” (40). The 
death-obsession of Beddoes precipitates a “poisoned artifice” that detaches 
itself from context, turning inward on itself. Examples include the 
description of a crocodile—“The brown habergeon of his limbs 
enameled/With sanguine almondines and rainy pearl”—or, “These are as 
many/As bird-roads in the air.” Ashbery asks: “Why not just stay here, 
trying to plumb the seemingly bottomless meaning of these fragments that 
are scarcely even chips?” (41)   
Ashbery’s poem “Flow Blue” from Shadow Train, begins by invoking 
fragments—and possibly talking about itself: 
 It may sound like a lot of odds and cloud-filled  
 Ends—at best, a thinking man’s charmed fragment, perhaps 
 
 A house (42)          
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It ends by responding to the aesthetic pleasure that Ashbery in lingering with 
fragments—the impulse to ask, “Why not stay here…?” 
This is not a place where I could stay.  The endless ladder being carried 
Past our affairs, like strings in a hop-field, decants 
A piano-tuning we feed on it as it dances us to the edge. (42) 
  
The speaker likens the “endless ladder”—already the vehicle of a 
metaphor—to the hop-field’s trellis strings. Both ladder and strings run off 
to infinity, perhaps giving us an image of windblown strings, dancing and 
vibrating, Aeolian lyre like, and taking our line of sight to the horizon. The 
vehicle of this metaphor is deferred from ladder, to trellis strings, to piano 
strings, and never really resolved: “we feed on it as it dances us to the edge” 
(of meaning), and this deferral introduces time into the poem.  
4. Ashbery and Wordsworth 
By invoking “piano tuning,” poetry aligns itself with the tonal and 
formal plasticity of experimental music, drawing attention to a distinction 
between timeless (spatialized) form and temporal unfolding. Ashbery 
elsewhere stages paradoxes of “flow” in such poems as “Flow Blue,” “Blue 
Sonata,” and “Syringa,” which implicate lyric in loss: the “flowing 
numbers” of a poem produce a string of self-erasing moments penetrated by 
a vertical axis in which a pattern is anticipated. In situating Ashbery in “the 
Western lyric tradition” Helen Vendler cites his notion that “The passage of 
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time is becoming more and more the subject of my poetry as I get older…” 
(185)  
Ashbery would attune the ears of his readers to a background “drone” 
of existence and mutability—“the endless ladder being carried past our 
affairs.” Wordsworth’s very different figure of dissolution is that of a 
“melancholy chime” heard by uncorrupted ears:  
From low to high doth dissolution climb, 
 And sink from high to low, along a scale 
 Of awful notes, whose concord shall not fail; 
 A musical but melancholy chime, 
 Which they can hear who meddle not with crime, 
 Nor avarice, nor over-anxious care. 
 Truth fails not; but her outward forms that bear 
 The longest date do melt like frosty rime, 
 That in the morning whiten’d hill and plain 
 And is not more; drop like the tower sublime 
 Of yesterday, which royally did wear 
 His crown of weeds, but could not even sustain   
 Some casual shout that broke the silent air, 
 Or the unimaginable touch of Time. (3.34 179) 
 
In Wordsworth’s sonnet, the loss and discontinuity implicit in the flow of 
music is a privileged metaphor for mutability, which touches the high and 
the low (nobody and nothing escapes it). The world wears down as it moves 
through time. In Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens, the opening dialog between 
the Poet and the Painter captures something of this idea: “Poet: How goes 
the world? Painter: It wears sir, as it goes” (1.1.3-4, 70). However, the poem 
also sets up a discrepancy between time and a vertical axis penetrating the 
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flux of time at every moment—like the shafts of light that penetrate a hole in 
the roof of a ruined building. This immutable axis is named “truth.” 
The poem manages to index what it cannot imagine. Dissolution’s 
continuous rising and falling is a pattern that the listener might anticipate: it 
runs “along” a scale (spatialized pattern). The poem, however, builds toward 
an unanticipated discontinuity—the tower “drops.” It is by collapsing the 
“chime” and the “drop” that the poem points to an unimaginable touch. 
Moreover, “crown of weeds” echoes “crown of thorns”: the poem substitutes 
its “truth” for the entry of the logos into time. Imagination signifies its own 
failure to imagine or anticipate time—even as this identification points to the 
time of a figure.  
The tension between continuity and discontinuity recalls Dyer’s 
“Ruins of Rome”: 
…The pilgrim oft 
  At dead of night, ‘mid his oraison hears 
  Aghast the voice of time, disparting towers, 
  Tumbling all precipitate down-dashed, 
  Rattling around, loud thundering to the moon; 
  While murmers soothe each awful interval… (316) 
 
 The “murmers” of rivers “soothe each awful interval,” as though 
maintaining continuity between soundings of “the voice of time.”   
However, time, as destroyer, is also “adorner of the ruin,” as Byron 
famously put it. The discontinuity of destruction—and the continuity figured 
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by the growth of weeds, ivy and flowers—are aspects of the same power. 
Dyer figures ruin as the “voice of time” and flowing numbers (figured as 
rivers) “soothe each awful interval.” But in reading Wordsworth and 
Ashbery’s poetry, we will have trouble distinguishing between the 
continuities of flowing number and figure, and the discontinuities of ruin. 
The spectator who stands before ruin contemplates an entanglement of 
healing imagination and destructive time.  
George Simmel notes that “Nature has used man’s work of art as the 
material for its own creation, just as art had previously taken nature as its 
raw material (qtd. in Matterson 51). In contrast to this reconciliation, 
consider Wordsworth’s self-conscious and ambivalent figures of nature’s 
touch and the “touch of time.” In Wordsworth’s 1824 poem “Composed 
Among the Ruins of a Castle in North Wales” we learn that time “upon these 
wounds hath laid/His lenient touches, soft as light that falls,/From the wan 
moon…” There is never any doubt that time is a destroyer here—but “his 
lenient touches” are distinct from the violence of “forgotten wars.”Abruptly, 
the speaker5 addresses the ruin: “Relic of Kings! Wreck of forgotten 
Wars,/To winds abandoned and the prying stars,/Time loves thee!” (41)   
  In “Inscriptions Supposed to be Found In and Near a Hermit’s Cell, 
1818” the speaker finds inscribed on a rock the story of a “gorgeous pile,” 
 101 
undermined by frost which, “with secret guile,” had rendered it “Unsound as 
those which fortune builds.” The weather warms, and the structure is 
“sapp’d by the very beam that gilds.” Even as the speaker gazed, “with 
sudden shock/Fell the whole fabric to the ground;/And naked left this 
dripping Rock/With shapeless ruin spread round!” The sun, taking the role 
of “truth,” destroys shape (figure) (K 265). Wordsworth returns to figures of 
adornment in “Memorials of a Tour in Italy, 1837” (C 255). The speaker 
addresses the wild flowers “that no one heeds,/And ye—full often spurned 
as weeds--/In beauty clothed.” Given that “weeds” also means clothing, 
weeds are “clothes clothed in beauty,” and clothing in beauty their capacity 
to undermine ruined buildings, and set up shocks of destruction. There is a 
sense in this poetry, that ruin stages the spectacle of power defending against 
its own shocks. The wild flowers “Do but more touchingly recall/Man’s 
headstrong violence and time’s fleetness”—even as they are implicated in 
the latter (C 255). The weeds and the frost, through “lenient touch” or 
“secret guile” remind us of sudden shocks of crashing ruin. Figural 
reconciliation, as a defense against “shocks” of language, points to its own 
implication in discontinuity: “lenient” touches are the touch of time, all the 
same. 
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 A poem by Wordsworth brings all of these conceits together.  In his 
(very) late poem, “At Furness Abbey” (written around 1844 or 1845), 
Wordsworth revisits the ruin of Furness Abbey, described in The Prelude. 
The faint “sobbings of the place” described in The Prelude (“the shuddering 
ivy dripped large drops”), and the lone wren who sang there, are 
transformed: 
Here, where, of havoc tired and rash undoing 
  Man left this Structure to become Time’s prey 
  A soothing spirit follows in the way 
  That Nature takes, her counter-work pursuing. 
  See how her ivy clasps the sacred Ruin, 
  Fall to prevent or beautify decay; 
  And, on the mouldered walls, how bright, how gay, 
  The flowers in pearly dews their bloom renewing! 
  Thanks to the place, blessings upon the hour; 
  Even as I speak the rising Sun’s first smile 
  Gleams on the grass-crowned top of yon tall Tower 
  Whose cawing occupants with joy proclaim 
  Prescriptive title to the shattered pile 
  Where, Cavendish, thine seems nothing but a name! (C 350) 
 
The willful destruction visited upon the abbey, and the (absurdly long) chain 
of title that gave Cavendish ownership, are answered by nature in two ways. 
Ivy now has the power to prevent the walls from falling—although “Fall to 
prevent…” puts the emphasis on “Fall.” The “grass-crowned” tower 
emerges yet again as a stock element, touched now by the sun: another 
moving piece in what Paul de Man called a “tropological system” (as read, 
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for example, in Shelley’s “The Triumph of Life,” in “Shelley 
Disfigured”(93-123)).  
Here, as in other of Wordsworth’s poems on ruin, nature “recalls” and 
lays balm upon the destruction wrought by man and mutability by 
aestheticizing destruction. The cawing of the rooks is a claim to place from 
creatures who are themselves elements of that place: a performative short-
circuit that fully incorporates the ruin into nature. Wordsworth wrote the 
poem in a pocket notebook alongside an earlier version in which we see him 
working out the paradox of “nature’s counter-work”:  
Nature puts forth her gentle powers 
  to stay 
  And to adorn where there is no 
  renewing 
  Her ivy props this venerable Ruin 
  In beauteous [blank] of her kind in- 
  tent 
  And where are sweeter flowers than 
  over rent 
  Tottering or prostrate here her hand 
  is shewing (88) 
The ivy that “props” the ruin does so by an echo that we find elsewhere in 
Wordsworth. The ivy is actually pulling the walls down, and was cleared 
from Furness Abbey for that reason, but it “props” the wall as a figure that 
“props” its reconciling power, or is oddly “self conscious” of it. Where we 
might read “beauteous sign of her kind intent,” we get a blank. Yet it is the 
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final figure that seems the most self-conscious—in a way that crosses over 
now, from the “sublime” self-reference of imagination, to the “self-aware” 
figurality of John Ashbery. “Tottering or prostrate” describes the walls (and 
probably Wordsworth, as an old man), but via the indeterminate syntax in 
lines of a draft, instead describe the personified hand of nature: “Tottering or 
prostrate here her hand is shewing.” It is the kind of fragment that draws 
attention to itself by seeming to say something that the poet has repressed.  
The “amphibious work of Nature’s hand” is replaced now by nature’s hand 
itself, in ruin. One might easily imagine Ashbery lifting this line, and 
inscribing it in his own pocket notebook. 
Ashbery and Wordsworth both present an imagination “aware” of its 
entanglement in chance events—the very mode in which nature “speaks,” 
according to Wordsworth, in a passage of The Prelude that I will analyze 
shortly. Consider, for example, the last line of Ashbery’s “What is Poetry?”: 
“It might give us—what?—some flowers soon?” (47) The line’s vernacular 
weirdness reanimates the cliché of flowers as a stock subject of poetry. The 
“it” personifies the poem as having an arbitrary temperament: it may or may 
not give us flowers—as though the speaker were expecting a delivery of 
flowers. Someone who has read Ashbery enough will suspect that the line is 
a fragment of conversation, and in an interview with Daniel Kane, Ashbery 
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does note that he heard a boy say it to a girl in a bookstore: “I…like it that 
the couple who were talking seemed to be lovers, so the line ‘It might give 
us—what?—some flowers soon?’ seemed to have special meaning for them” 
(Ashbery). The overheard lovers are “inside” of charged meaning, figural 
form, or forms of imagination. The eavesdropping poet, however, stands 
outside, struck by the obscure salience of the fragment. 
 We might fantasize that what the conversational fragment retains of 
the lover’s intensity is its own intensity or authoritative vector of intent—a 
characteristic of Ashbery’s poetry, even when it seems obscure. This 
“charge” attends the fragment in  “What is Poetry?,” from Ashbery’s 
Houseboat Days: 
  …In school 
  All the thought got combed out: 
 
  What was left was like a field. 
  Shut your eyes, and you can feel it for miles around. 
 
  Now open them on a thin vertical path. 
  It might give us—what?—some flowers soon? (47) 
 
In the Kane interview, Ashbery remarks: “the ‘thin vertical path’ would be 
what suddenly appeared in your eyes as you open them after looking at a 
broad field, and the line would perhaps be a trellis, or the field about to 
flatten out again and burst into bloom” (Ashbery). We might recall the 
simile of the hop field from “Flow Blue” (written after the above lines), and 
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the “piano tuning” of the trellis. A poem is an open field whose openness 
hides things: it produces surprises.   
Surprise is strongly linked to chance. For Ashbery, poetic effects arise 
from the senile drift of an old man’s memory, the distortion of whispered 
messages in a parlor game (“Chinese Whispers”), snatches of mis-heard or 
overheard conversation, and dexcontextualized echoes of the tradition. 
Fractured syntax, sliding of tenor under vehicle, and over-particularized 
personification also point to fluctuations of language.  Rather than reading 
Ashbery’s interest in time as metaphysical or psychological, it is worth 
considering that in Ashbery’s poetry—as in Wordsworth’s—the 
“unimaginable touch of time” is the touch of figurality. Figurality registers 
its unimaginability by remaining one step behind its moment, thematizing it 
as an intersection with accident or mutability (including a mutability internal 
to language). Along similar lines, perception or understanding is always one 
step behind itself—grasping flux as the frozen snapshot of the “historical 
present”—and always “concerned with itself on another level.” Ashbery 
explicitly describes the structure in Fantasia on the Nut-Brown Maid:   
    But if each act 
Is reflexive, concerned with itself on another level 
As well as with us, the strangers who live here, 
Can one advance one step further without sinking equally 
Far back into the past?  There was always something to see, 
Something going on, for the historical past owed it 
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To itself, our historical present. Another month a huge 
Used-care sale on the lawn shredded the sense of much 
Of the sun coming through the wires, or a cape 
Would be rounded by a slim white sail almost 
Invisible in the specific design, or children would come 
Clattering down fire escapes until the margin 
Exploded into an ear of sky. Today the hospitals 
Are light, airy places, tented clouds, and the weeping 
In corridors is like autumn showers. It’s beginning.  (HD, 86-87) 
 
 The concluding images capture the sense of an unfolding present, slipping 
into a historical past—a situation captured by a reflexive figure: “the 
historical past owed it/To itself, our historical present.” What did the 
historical past owe itself? It owed image fragments, charged with obscure 
feelings—so that “there was always something to see.”  
In Ashbery’s lines above, the “huge/Used car sale on the lawn” 
suggests an entropic jumble, or excrescence of the “historical present”: it 
disrupts sense, or “shredded the sense of much/Of the sun coming through 
the wires.” The used car sale is a vehicle that buries its tenor under 
incongruous particularity; a signifier that overtakes its signified. Meaning is 
dimly perceived, even as the “slim white sail almost/invisible in the specific 
design” is dimly perceived and all the more sets up a sense of expectation—
and a release of energy: “children would come/Clattering down fire escapes 
until the margin/Exploded into an ear of sky.” The violence of ear, 
substituted for sky, figures a shift that Geoffrey Hartman has highlighted in 
 108 
Wordsworth: the emergence of voice. The final line describing the cloud 
hospitals is a lyric flash—as though an illness of language had been cured. 
However, Ashbery second-guesses the lyric present in the next lines: 
“Unless this is the shelf of whatever happens?” A shelf is a repository for 
objects, and poetry collects them—even as it goes: 
  The cold sun- 
rise attacks one side of the giant capital letters, bestirs a  
little the landmass as it sinks, grateful but asleep. And you 
too are a rebus from another century, your fiction in piles 
like lace, in that a new way of appreciating has been in- 
invented… (87) 
 
The lines abstractly personify the impulse that drives them—a “you” whose 
“fiction in piles/like lace” is a pile of worn rhetorical ornamentation. In its 
place, we have the “cold sunrise,” “giant capital letters,” the “landmass,” and 
a “rebus from another century”—“a new way of appreciating has been 
invented.” This rebus has given us something to see: the ordinary made 
strange through a rebus-like knitting together of different orders (images and 
letters). The sun that “attacks one side of the giant capital letters” attacks the 
side of letters that is material and thing-like—like a landmass, or spectacle, 
witnessed without comprehension.   
Image-making (“imagination”) in these terms, is not the active, eternal 
present of Blake’s “poet’s work,” which creates time. It is not the run-on 
process monologue of A.R. Ammons, marking time through jags of 
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improvisation and digression. Rather, Ashbery’s image-making more 
resembles those moments when Ammons reflexively encounters imagination 
through the melancholy feeling that attends the refuse heap of used-up form. 
In English poetic tradition, the antecedents of Ashbery’s images are 
Wordsworth’s “objects recognised,/In flashes, and with glory not their own.” 
Like Wordsworth, Ashbery approaches imagination by way of the “obscure 
feelings” that haunt its archaic index. For Ashbery, time is 
decontextualization, producing a “spot of time” with each moment, and 
although these spots are not visionary, they are haunted by what 
Wordsworth called “obscure feelings.” 
Like the memory image, the figural fragment signifies “absent” 
context that, in Ashbery’s case, is structurally absent; i.e., lost by definition, 
or structurally lost (rather than “forgotten,” for example, or “repressed”). 
Although Wordsworth claims to have experienced “vulgar joy” as a child, 
the situation is different in  Ashbery’s “The Instruction Manual,” where the 
name “Guadalajara” no longer refers only to the city in Mexico, but also an 
absence around which the distracted office worker, compelled to “write the 
instruction manual on/the uses of a new metal,” rears a fantasy world. 
Having entered a reverie of Guadalajara in a day dream, the speaker says: 
“What more is there to do but stay?  And that we can-/not do” (18).  
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 “Guadalajara” is a series of vague images to which obscure feelings 
are attached, and the speaker’s generic language is a comic effect that also 
maintains a strange melancholy: “dim Guadalajara! City of rose-colored 
flowers!/City I most wanted to see, and most did not see in Mexico!” (14) 
Even the flowers are once-removed: “rose-colored” describes the color of a 
flower with the color of a flower. Describing the flower girls—“Each 
attractive in her rose-and-blue striped dress (Oh! such shades of rose and 
blue)” the a sense of flattness and removal—and an effective parody of 
“colours and words that are unknown to man” (480). 
There is a sense of flatness, removal, and occasional parody in 
Ashbery’s voice that  dissuades the reader from looking for actual loss to 
explain a sense of loss and mystery that attends the language. Time opens a 
gap between the memory-image and meaning—and this is true as well, of 
the figural fragment: both are subject to mutability, and both generate an 
inexplicable ecstasy, melancholy and mystery; both project a reader who 
stands outside of figural “imagination,” or in the paradox of the obsessional, 
“inside-out”; a hovering between outside and inside that Ashbery has 
described as “fence sitting raised to an esthetic ideal.” From this angle, 
language is constantly slipping backward into the “de-contextualization” of 
the past—and trying to re-figure its originating “climate”; i.e., trying to 
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figure a “beginning” or “starting out” that has slipped into a nostalgia for 
“beginning”:  
 The being of our sentences, in the climate that fostered them, 
 Not ours to own, like a book, but to be with, and sometimes 
 To be without, alone and desperate. 
 But the fantasy makes it ours, a kind of fence-sitting 
 Raised to the level of an esthetic ideal (DDS 18) 
 
“Fence-sitting” is the capacity of poetic language to blur the seemingly hard-
and-fast distinction between foundational power and meaning—between 
accident and imagination. As a figure, “fence sitting” attacks dichotomizing 
that serves our attempts to conceptualize figurality, and is a reflexive trope 
by my definition. The fantasy that makes “the being of our sentences” ours 
is the fantasy that there is, in the partially “random” rebus puzzles offered up 
in Ashbery’s poetry, a partial meaning, or liminal middle ground between 
meaningless power and meaningful figure. Poetry stays “open” by 
maintaining the gap between accident and imagination, even while closing it 
in flashes, to create allegorical fragments, half sunk in particularity, or 
metaphor that interferes with its own analogical scaffolding, shredding “the 
sense of much/Of the sun coming through the wires.” The fantasy, in short, 
is that there would be something between noise and signal, or to invoke a 
different dichotomy, between the cry of the owls (nature’s sounds), and the 
articulate mimicry of the Winander boy (language).  
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Wordsworth invokes “the mystery of words” in his great speech on 
visionary power: “There, darkness makes abode, and all the host/Of 
shadowy things work endless changes.” “Endless changes”—echoing the 
“endless fluctuations and arbitrary associations” of language described in 
Wordsworth’s Essay Supplementary to the Preface of Poems of 1815—
suggest the intersection of creativity and randomness that Ashbery invokes: 
 Even forms and substances are circumfused 
 By that transparent veil with light divine, 
 And through the turnings intricate of verse, 
 Present themselves as objects recognised, 
 In flashes, and with glory not their own. (1850 5.601-5, W 205)  
 
Ashbery often highlights the mysterious salience of fragments: 
“Things overheard in cafes assumed an importance previously reserved for 
letters from the front” (HD, 87)). However, Ashbery is not a collector of 
flotsam, burnished by the tide. What Ashbery gets from Wordsworth’s 
speech on visionary power is its run-on vector of obscure intent—a working 
sea of deferred epiphany, in which archaic fragments (“viewless,” 
“circumfused”) bob to the surface.  
Ashbery’s run-on speeches similarly fold back on themselves to 
manifest the power that they are talking about—as in the run-on address to 
the “rebus,” partially quoted above. This performative reflexivity seems to 
close the gap between power and meaning—as in Pope’s remark that 
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Longinus “is himself the great Sublime he draws.” Read as a reflexive 
figure, talk about power collapses into a manifestation of power—as though 
power might close the gap opened by the self-referential paradox of 
reflexive figurality. In the case of the decontextualized fragment, however, 
the conundrums of reflexive figurality are not resolved by an invocation of 
power, since power is the very thing “indexed” by the object; i.e., it is not 
“present” power. 
Along these lines, the figural fragment, the conversational fragment, 
and the memory fragment share a common feature: they implicate figurality 
in what Wordsworth called “chance collisions and queer accidents.” 
Through these events, nature allegedly strengthened imagination in the child, 
and in Ashbery’s poetry as well, chance has a mysterious agency. Ashbery 
has said: “I really think that meaningfulness can’t get along without 
randomness and they somehow have to be brought together…” (Bloom, 65) 
In “Fantasia on “The Nut Brown Maid,” we read that “Time is sorting us all 
out.” (HD, 73) Ashbery frames accidents as figures and vice versa, 
collapsing time—along with its related notions of mutability and chance—
into the time of a figure:    
1. The time of chance collisions and quaint accidents. 
2. The time of an imaginative event that transmutes accident into figural 
“surprise.” 
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In Wordsworth’s famous account of crossing the Alps, the figural 
recuperation of accident is a self-referential figure: accidents are proleptic of 
a moment when they are figured as proleptic—a paradox (Warminski, 990). 
 In the long view of English poetic tradition, Wordsworth is a 
reference point for this entanglement of accident and imagination; notably, 
in the 1799 two-part Prelude: 
  …I might advert  
To numerous accidents in flood or field, 
Quarry or moor, or mid the winter snows, 
Distresses and disasters, tragic facts 
Of rural history that impressed my mind 
With images to which in following years 
Far other feelings were attached… (1799 1.279-85, W 15) 
 
A related passage from the 1805 Prelude also makes a theme of accidents: 
 
 …The earth 
 And common face of nature spoke to me 
 Rememberable things—sometimes, ‘tis true, 
 By chance collisions and quaint accidents 
(Like those ill-sorted unions, work supposed 
 Of evil-minded fairies), yet not vain 
 Nor profitless if haply they impressed  
 Collateral objects and appearances, 
 Albeit lifeless then and doomed to sleep 
 Until maturer seasons called them forth 
 To impregnate and elevate the mind. 
 And if the vulgar joy by its own weight 
 Wearied itself out of the memory, 
 The scenes which were a witness of that joy 
 Remained in their substantial lineaments 
 Depicted on the brain, and to the eye 
 Were visible, a daily sight. And thus, 
 By the impressive discipline of fear, 
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 By pleasure and repeated happiness— 
 So frequently repeated—and by force  
 Of obscure feelings representative 
 Of joys that were forgotten, these same scenes, 
 So beautiful and majestic in themselves, 
 Though yet the day was distant, did at length 
 Become habitually dear, and all 
 Their hues and forms were by invisible links 
 Allied to the affections. (1805 1.586-640, W 69-70) 
 
The changeful face of Nature speaks through accidents that impress 
“rememberable things.” Yet works of nature already look like works of 
imagination; the “work supposed/Of evil-minded fairies” recalls the work of 
Mercutio’s Queen Mab, who “plats the manes of horses in the night/and 
bakes the elflocks in foul sluttish hairs,/Which once untangled much 
misfortunes bodes…” Insofar as accidents take the form of “ill-sorted 
unions,” they already resemble an accident of imagination—or the child has 
(mis)read catachrestic figurality as an alien power: he collapses accidents of 
figural imagination into accidents of nature from the beginning. This 
collapse could only be traumatic, and the child is already defending against 
it—alienated from imagination (“self-conscious” in Hartman’s formulation), 
experiencing a “self-consciousness,” proleptic of the speaker’s more 
developed self-awareness in the above lines.    
The passage implicitly sets up a distinction between imagination, 
experienced from the “inside” as “vulgar joy,” “fear,” and “superstition,” 
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and imagination reflexively marked as a discrepancy between the banality of 
a scene, and the charge upon it. As reflexive trope, imagination entangles 
meta-imaginative dichotomies that distinguish between the “inside” and 
“outside” of imagination, past and present, impressive power vs. impression 
(via Locke and associationist doctrine). Imagination, for Wordsworth, is 
characteristically reflexive, or encountered through an unstable discrepancy 
between natural objects that usurp imagination and an imagination that 
threatens to overwhelm the thingness of the thing-world in its autonomous 
violence. Along these lines, the entanglement of mind and nature is marked 
by a “too-muchness” or “not-enoughness” implicit in their relation, 
thematized in Geoffrey Hartman’s readings as a consciousness of 
consciousness—or  “link,” in Wordsworth, between consciousness and 
imagination.  
As “accident,” imagination registers its traumatic or alien aspect—a 
disruptive moment, spatialized through images, or “spots of time.” These 
images are charged by “obscure feelings representative/Of joys that were 
forgotten.” How were these joys forgotten? Wordsworth deploys a starkly 
reflexive image: “the vulgar joy by its own weight/Wearied itself out of the 
memory…” There is, finally, something unsustainable or even unbearable 
about present joy, or the experience of being “inside” of it as an informing or 
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meaningful passion. Imagination turns inside-out, or stands outside of itself. 
Instead of taking the form of “vulgar joy,” “fear” or “superstition,” 
imagination represents those very feelings, with “obscure feelings.” Thus, 
the child experiences imagination as “vulgar joy,” “superstition,” or “fear,” 
and when these feelings are forgotten, they leave behind “obscure feelings” 
as their representative: feelings represent feelings, as though imagination 
were defending against itself. As James Chandler has put it, “the vulgar 
emotions that were responsible for impressing the image in the first instance 
also continue to have a life in the mind even after they have wearied 
themselves out of memory. They are “re-presented” there by (or 
as)…“obscure feelings” associated with the mind’s surviving images (209).  
In what sense does the spot of time retain a life in the mind, or a 
“renovating virtue”? Via geological trope, the memory-fragment resembles 
the glacial erratic figured in “Resolution and Independence” as a “sea beast”: 
marooned atop an eminence as resistant cap-stone, it seems to have dragged 
itself up there, or acquired an uncanny agency. The spot of time acquires a 
“pre-eminent virtue,” as Wordsworth calls it elsewhere: it is a strange-
attractor of associations, or a repeated metaphorical substitution that never 
quite catches up to its meaning. In Wordsworth’s formulation, the spot of 
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time is “By the impressive discipline of fear,/By pleasure and repeated 
happiness—/So frequently repeated.” 
 A famous example of such a repeated image is a childhood memory of 
a spot beneath the Penrith beacon, where “a murderer had been hung in iron 
chains”: 
The gibbet-mast had mouldered down, the bones 
  And iron-case were gone; but on the turf, 
  Hard by, soon after that fell deed was wrought, 
  Some unknown hand had carved the murderer’s name 
  The monumental letters were inscribed  
  In times long past; but still, from year to year, 
  By superstition of the neighborhood, 
  The grass is cleared away, and to this hour 
  The characters are fresh and visible: 
  A casual glance had shown them, and I fled, 
  Faltering and faint, and ignorant of the road…  
(1850 12.237-247, W 481) 
 
The appearance and re-appearance of the monumental letters recalls the 
repetition that makes the spots of time appear and re-appear. “The grass is 
cleared away” to reveal “characters…fresh and visible,” even as 
Wordsworth clears away the ornamentation of poetic language to lay bare 
generic words—“turf,” “grass” “characters,” “road.”  
 What is laid bare on the turf by clearing the grass are characters that 
draw attention to the “superstition” that inscribed them. To “character” 
already has this reflexive sense—to “character” is to inscribe, and when 
“presences of nature” had “impressed upon all forms the characters/Of 
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danger and desire,” such characters derive their force from indexing force—
by blurring inarticulate charactering and articulate characters, so as to index 
foundational violence. When the child reads such characters, rational 
meaning gives way to an overwhelming feeling of salience—and he flees. 
Power threatens to collapse into meaning that is annihilating—happening in 
the moment of a “casual glance.”  
When the speaker looks back over the years, he maintains a gap 
between meaning and power: he characterizes meaning as lost meaning and 
power as a charged series of image-fragments—as in the climax of the scene 
beneath Penrith beacon: 
  …I fled, 
  Faltering and faint, and ignorant of the road: 
  Then, reascending the bare common, saw 
  A naked pool that lay beneath the hills, 
  The beacon on the summit, and, more near, 
  A girl, who bore a pitcher on her head, 
  And seemed with difficult steps to force her way 
  Against the blowing wind. It was in truth,  
  An ordinary sight; but I should need 
  Colours and words that are unknown to man, 
  To paint the visionary dreariness 
  Which, while I looked all round for my lost guide, 
  Invested moorland waste, and naked pool, 
  The beacon crowning the lone eminence, 
  The female and her garments vexed and tossed 
  By the strong wind. (11.246-61, W 481) 
 
“Visionary dreariness” is a quality that would bring these images together as 
a scene and perhaps explain their salience: it functions as synechdochical 
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power, and the poet would need “Colours and words that are unknown to 
man” to paint it. However, this is to be “outside” of synecdoche rather than 
“inside” it—signifying it, in its indescribability, by the words “naked,” 
“bare,” “dreary,” “pool” and “wall.” Through repeated readings of the above 
passage, these words abstract themselves from context to signify the power 
that impressed them. 
 “It was in truth/An ordinary sight,” as Wordsworth remarks of “the 
naked pool and dreary crags,” but the figurality of “pool” and “crags”—like 
that of Ashbery’s “huge used car sale”—is that of a signifier, salience, or 
mode of vehicular transport that eclipses the signified, or meaning. We 
might imagine that what figural language “reflexively” operates on—or 
plays upon—are distinctions that set up the possibility of meaning; as though 
a signifier might point to the abstract place that it occupies in a system or 
game, or point to the abstract notion of a signified instead of a particular 
signified. These contemporary scenarios stage the self-pointing of language, 
much as Wordsworth’s Blind Beggar does with his label (“Wearing a written 
paper to explain/The story of the man and who he was” (7.613-14)). 
Through this label, the beggar is pointing less to himself, and more to a 
distinction between himself and his label that threatens to collapse, inasmuch 
as he is labeled “Blind” as the allegorical personification of fear is labeled 
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“FEAR.” Along these lines Knapp notes the beggar’s “preternatural self-
enclosure…the abstract and formal reflexiveness of sublime personification 
“ insofar as his “identity is wholly absorbed by the inscription he literally 
wears around his neck” (Knapp  99). More fundamentally, Neil Hertz reads 
the Blind Beggar as “an emblem of minimal difference”: “the beggar 
triangulates the poet’s self in relation to his double [the beggar], who is 
represented for a moment, as an emblem of minimal difference fixed in 
relation to itself”  (Hertz 57).  
In the case of Ashbery, it is the “minimal difference” between 
meaning and figurality that he would highlight: the opening and closing of 
that gap, in its temporality, allegedly allows us—in highly privileged 
moments—to be aware of a “now” while we are in it. This awareness 
requires a particular affective attunement and discipline: “Those/Suffering 
from the blahs are unlikely to notice that the topic/Of today’s lecture doesn’t 
exist yet” (74). Rather than grasping the topic of a lecture, we would be with 
“the being of our sentences, in the climate that fostered them”: we would be 
inside of a “climate,” a feeling that spring is arriving, or a “new weather,” as 
Ashbery describes it in “A Wave”:  
 And some day perhaps the discussion that has to come 
 In order for us to start feeling any of it before we even 
 Start to think about it will arrive in a new weather 
 Nobody can imagine but which will happen just as the ages 
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 Have happened without causing total consternation (73) 
 
Ashbery is describing a renovating power of life and language, “breathing 
mystery back into all the sterile/Living that had to lead up to it” (73). 
“Without causing total consternation” humorously undercuts any sense that 
this is a revolutionary renewal: 
…Moments as clear as water 
Splashing on a rock in the sun, though in darkness, and then 
Sleep has to affirm it and the body is fresh again, 
For the trials and dangerous situations that any love, 
However well-meaning, has to use as terms in the argument 
That is the reflexive play of our living and being lost 
And then changed again (73) 
        
Ashbery deliberately avoids using the word “memory” in this extended 
sequence from “A Wave,” but the passage nonetheless invites us to read 
“reflexive play” as the play of remembered images, decontextualized by 
“sleep,” and re-emerging as emblems of power with a renovating virtue. 
What is the “it” that sleep affirms? Possibly, “it” is “love,” a “new weather,” 
a memory-image, or the “obscure feelings” attached to “moments”—but the 
word “it” is also a reflexive figure with an obscure antecedent. It lacks 
context that would explain its meaning, and therefore functions in the above 
lines just like the “moments” that it is describing.  
Earlier in the poem, the speaker asserts that “the waves talk to 
us,/Preparing dreams we’ll have to live with and use”: 
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I became as a parent to those scenes lifted from “real life.” There was the 
quiet time 
In the supermarket, and the pieces 
Of other people’s lives as they sashayed or tramped past 
My own section of a corridor, not pausing 
In many cases to wonder where they were—maybe they even knew. (72) 
  
The meditation continues: 
True, those things or moments of which one 
Finds oneself an enthusiast, a promoter, are few, 
But they last well, 
Yielding up their appearances for form  
Much later than the others (72) 
 
The tone here is removed—the “enthusiast” or “promoter” of things and 
moments is humorously detached. There is no focus on visionary salience; 
rather, a connoisseurship. The reference to “form” emerges again in “A 
Wave,” as I will show, and seems here to describe images resistant to the 
erosion of memory. Yet the language is deliberately abstract: it is 
highlighting a structure, not a theme or a doctrine—it is not “about” 
memory, or the spots of time. The speaker later distinguishes himself from 
Wordsworth (or someone like him): 
 And though there are some who leave regularly 
 For the patchwork landscape of childhood, north of here, 
 Our own kind of stiff standing around, waiting helplessly 
 And mechanically for instructions that never come, suits the space 
 Of our intense, uncommunicated speculation (76) 
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Although the alienation of urban life leaves us “standing on one leg while 
emerging continually/Into an inexpressive void” (76), its moments of 
emptiness also suit speculation about an originary void of language:  
All those days had a dumb clarity that was about getting out 
 Into a remembered environment. The headlines and economy 
 Would refresh for a moment as you look back over the heap 
 Of rusted box springs with water under them, and then, 
 Like sliding up to a door or a peephole a tremendous advantage 
 Would burst like a bubble. Toys as solemn and knotted as books 
 Assert themselves first… (72) 
 
The catalog feels like a descent into a liminal realm between sleep and 
waking. The “tremendous advantage” is the freedom opened up by the 
concrete opacity of “the heap/Of rusted box springs with water under 
them”—language that begins to signify opaquely, liberating itself from 
“dumb clarity.” There is harshness in the comparison of “sliding up to a door 
or a peephole” and “a tremendous advantage/Would burst like a bubble.” To 
“fix” the lines we might write: “sliding up to a door or a peephole/we see a 
tremendous advantage/burst like a bubble.” But, the lack of fit in the simile 
is just what opens up the advantage—“like” a peephole.  The “knotted toys” 
seem like knots of reason, externalized as playthings, and they “assert 
themselves” like the trees of “Some Trees” and the pancake clock, 
constituting the speaker, or his subject-position. 
 125 
These images put cracks in the dumb clarity of form; however, the 
sense of threshold meaning gives way to the “remembered environment” of 
work and obligations—and “reminders to be better next time”:       
And this would spell out a warm business letter urging us 
All to return to our senses, to the matter of the day 
That was ending now. And no special sense of decline ensued 
But perhaps a few moments of music of such tact and weariness 
That one awakens with a new sense of purpose (72) 
Ashbery’s poetry is designed to train our ears to hear “a few moments of 
music of such tact and weariness…”—it recalls the climbing and descending 
scale in Wordsworth’s “Mutability,” which is heard by uncorrupted ears. 
The speaker of “A Wave” is especially attuned to its cycles: 
 Meanwhile I have turned back  
 Into that dream of rubble that was the city of our starting out (74) 
  
The “dream of rubble” is our waking world of “dumb clarity”—but its 
“dream-like” aspect suggests that there are charmed fragments amid the 
rubble, that remind us of “the city of our starting out”—or “the being of our 
sentences, in the climate that fostered them” (DDS 18). It is the mysterious 
capacity of the fragment to index “beginning” that drives Ashbery’s poetry, 
rather than any present feeling of “beginning” expressed in a lyric flight.  
“Beginning” or “starting out” is an important figure in Ashbery’s 
poetry. “The mooring of starting out” is the constancy of “starting out” as a 
figure of linguistic renovation or renewal; “starting out” is a form of being 
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and desire, although Ashbery most characteristically keeps it in past tense—
or indexes it through figural drift. Even when the poetry evokes a feeling of 
renewal or heightened sensitivity to ordinary particulars, Ashbery displaces 
it as a possibility that is elsewhere: 
…I can  
  Hear the dust at the pores of the wood, and know then 
  The possibility of something more liberated and gracious 
  Though not of this time. (77) 
 
Elsewhere in A Wave, Ashbery figures a sense of expectation but adds 
a caveat: “The past absconds/With our fortunes just as we were rounding a 
major/Bend in the swollen river” (78) We might imagine here, that the sense 
of something beginning—or something new about to arrive—structurally 
necessitates the defense of the past. The past defends against the intersection 
of figurality and accident—almost instantaneously—by re-establishing a 
“remembered environment” and “dumb clarity”: 
Your finger traces a 
Bleeding violet line down the columns of an old directory and to this spongy 
State of talking things out a glass exclamation point opposes 
A discrete claim: forewarned. So the voluminous past  
Accepts, recycles our claims to present consideration 
And the urban landscape is once again untroubled, smooth 
as wax. (78) 
The poetry performs (and describes) renovating language as the tracing of 
“a/Bleeding violet line down the columns of an old directory”—but it is 
already undercutting itself by characterizing itself as “this spongy/State of 
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talking things out.” The figural surprise of the “glass exclamation point”—
its insistence as a pretty object—is already serving as a warning about the 
encroaching past; a warning that the past will recycle claims to the present 
based on just this kind of figural swerve: it will bind figurality more tightly 
to ideas, and separate metaphor from mistake. As the passage continues, 
however, we learn that: “As soon as the oddity is flushed out/It becomes 
monumental and anxious once again…” (78)       
When language intersects with mutability to partially efface 
meaning—it recovers the sense of “starting out.” In “Soonest Mended” 
Ashbery ends with the lines: “Making ready to forget, and always coming 
back/To the mooring of starting out, that day so long ago” (DDS 18)). 
“Forgetting” here is the erasure of a “remembered environment,” and an 
attempt to recover a pure creative potential that is not quite our own. In 
contrast, the lines below from A Wave describe an attempt to maintain a 
“feeling of security” (75):     
  …only the absence of memory 
 Animates us as we walk briskly back and forth 
 At one with the souless, restless crowd on the somber avenue. 
 Is there something new to see, to speculate on? Dunno, better 
 Stand back until something comes along to explain it,    
This curious lack of anxiety that begins to gnaw 
 At one. Did it come because happiness hardened everything 
 In its fire, and so the forms cannot die, like a ruined 
 Fort too strong to be pulled down? And something like pale 
 Alpine flowers still flourishes there 
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 Some reminder that can never be more than this (75) 
 
The “lack of anxiety that begins to gnaw,” does so because it begins to 
demand an explanation of what “animates us.” The speaker imagines that 
“happiness hardened everything/In its fire,” leaving behind “some reminder 
that can never be more than this.” It as though there were a lost or forgotten 
happiness marked now by pale reminders. Yet, “absence of memory” is not 
a forgetting of happiness, but a repression necessary to sustain a minimal 
“lack of anxiety” in the drone of city life. This uncertainty recurs in 
Ashbery’s poetry as a mode of being in the “urban landscape.” But what 
does it defend against?  
“Absence of memory” is a repression of “the poem”: 
But always and sometimes questioning the old modes  
And the new wondering, the poem, growing up through the floor   
 Standing tall in tubers, invading and smashing the ritual 
 Parlor, demands to be met on its own terms now, 
 Now that the preliminary negotiations are at last over (79) 
The “ritual/Parlor” seems readable as the routines and repetitions of life, and 
its uncertainty: “Our own kind of stiff standing around, waiting 
helplessly/And mechanically for instructions that never come” (76). The 
poem smashes all of that, and like the alien vitality of plant-life, it is figured 
here as a force of ruin. To meet the poem on its own terms is to be projected 
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as a reader who occupies an impossible moment: the moment when the 
intersection of creativity and randomness (time) would be read: 
 …there is no point  
 In looking out over the yard where tractors run, 
 The empty space in the endless continuum 
 Of time has come up: the space that can be filled only by you. (79) 
  
For Wordsworth, a very different reflexive encounter with imagination 
marks time, and although there is no thematic comparison to the scenes I 
have read in Ashbery, a structural homology emerges when we consider that 
continuity and discontinuity, space and time, metaphor and mistake, are 
among the meta-imaginative oppositions that imagination interrupts to signal 
its power. In aestheticizing or spiritualizing that self-encounter, the poet 
finds a “renovating virtue,” or a sense of “beginning.”    
4. Tenor, Vehicle and Blake 
Nothing could be farther from Ashbery than Blake, although the 
reader might note a formal similarity in Blake’s use of figures. There are 
leaps of catachresis, and instances of run-on “over-particularization,” in 
which vehicle begins to overwhelm tenor, developing its own narrative 
momentum. Blake’s reflexive figures index an obscure power, born of 
repressed energy. At other times, they can point to energy, overrunning 
rhetorical form. As I read Ashbery at the end of the last section, he seems to 
ask: how is power repressed? What would a lifting of repression mean for 
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the subject? In what follows, I examine how Blake situates these themes 
through reflexive figures. 
In The Book of Ahania, the speaker compares Urizen’s “dire 
contemplations” to “floods,” but the simile bleeds into description of an 
actual flood and its consequences.  The vehicle of the simile begins to bury 
the tenor under its “overparticularization” (to borrow a formulation of John 
Ashbery, who also uses the device): 
For his dire Contemplations 
  Rush’d down like floods from his mountains 
  In torrents of mud settling thick 
  With Eggs of unnatural production 
  Forthwith hatching; some howl’d on his  hills 
  Some in vales; some aloft flew in the air 
 
  Of these: an enormous dread Serpent 
  Scaled and poisonous horned 
  Approach’d Urizen even to his knees 
  As he sat on his dark  rooted Oak. 
 
  With his horns he push’d furious. 
  Great the conflict & great the jealousy 
  In cold poisons: but Urizen smote him 
 
  First he poison’d the rocks with his blood 
  Then polish’d his ribs, and his sinews 
  Dried; laid them apart till winter; 
  Then a Bow black prepar’d: On this Bow, 
  A poisoned rock plac’d in silence… (2.7-24, E 84) 
 
“For his dire Contemplations/Rush’d down like floods” is a simile that 
extends for many lines, but the flood of mud propagates metamorphoses—
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even while becoming a flood of words that bleed into description. The “Eggs 
of unnatural production” are products of perverted sexual-imaginative 
energy. They also appear in The Four Zoas, where Los—the vehicular form 
of imagination in the fallen world—hatches them:  “His broodings rush 
down to his feet producing Eggs that hatching/Burst forth upon the winds 
above the tree of Mystery” (81.8-9, E 349).   
Thus the anomalous, reifying effect of Urizen’s “dire 
Contemplations” is rhetorical—albeit not a figure we will find in a 
handbook; rather, it is the kind of figure that disrupts classical rhetoric. A 
line break marks the discrepancy between figural and literal senses of 
“poison”—even as a reflexive trope blurs the two senses:     
  …great the jealousy 
  In cold poisons: but Urizen smote him 
 
  First he poison’d the rocks with his blood [my italics] 
 
“In cold poisons” metaphorically associates jealousy with poison, but “First 
he poison’d the rocks with his blood” reifies the figure: Urizen literally 
poisons a rock that he will fashion into a projectile to smite his son, Fuzon, a 
figure of sexual and revolutionary energy.  Why is this a reflexive trope?  
Metaphor slips into metamorphosis, and thereby disrupts rational 
understanding as a “repressed” form of imagination, alienated from human 
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desire and understanding (an interpretation meant to capture the sense of 
Blake’s myth). 
The shift from metaphor to metamorphosis recalls Blake’s famous 
lyric “A Poison Tree,” in which a metaphorically poisoned apple kills the 
speaker’s literal enemy.  
I was angry with my friend: 
I told my wrath, my wrath did end. 
I was angry with my foe: 
I told it not, my wrath did grow. (E 28) 
“Wrath” could be an active form of desire, such as the wrath of the prophet, 
but the speaker did not tell his wrath.  Instead, he repressed it in imitation of 
the passive “reactor” and “accuser” Satan, who tempts humanity with the 
tree of Knowledge. The speaker’s repression recalls the repression of 
metaphorically sympathetic imagination in Blake’s lyric “The Human 
Abstract,” and as in that poem, it “grows” a tree of Mystery.   
Does the speaker’s wrath “grow” metaphorically or literally? 
    And I watered it in fears, 
   Night and morning with my tears; 
   And I sunned it with smiles, 
   And with soft deceitful wiles. 
   And it grew both day and night, 
   Till it bore an apple bright. 
   And my foe beheld it shine. 
   And he knew that it was mine, 
   
   And into my garden stole 
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   When the night had veiled the pole; 
   In the morning glad I see 
   My foe outstretched beneath the tree. (E 28) 
 
The “apple bright” has the fetishistic shine of reified metaphoricity.  The tree 
“bore” the apple in the mode of Blake’s early allegory, “And She bore Pale 
desire” [my italics] (E 436), which describes a birth-contraction that is also a 
contraction of power. In “A Poison Tree,” this power operates behind the 
scenes “when night had veild the pole,” and the poem’s power would be 
diminished if Blake had parted this veil, allowing the speaker to describe the 
foe eating the poisoned apple. Instead, darkness veils the transmutation of 
wrath into poison: a metaphorical apple kills the speaker’s literal enemy. 
The poem stages an equivocation between:  
1.  Metaphorical transformation of the speaker’s wrath into a poisoned 
apple.  
2.  Metamorphosis of his wrath into a poisoned apple.    
 
The blurring of #1 and #2 above is a reflexive trope: figural imagination 
blurs a meta-figural distinction between metaphor and metamorphosis. The 
apple figures the growth of repressed wrath into poison; however, this 
growth is also literal.  
The equivocation points to the work of an irrational power, alienated 
from human understanding and desire. Thus there is a kernel of 
incomprehensibility in Blake’s rhetoric of materialization. Blake thematizes 
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this gap as Urizen’s “oblivion,” his “stony sleep,” and his astonished 
reaction to self-begotten monsters. In The Book of Ahania, Urizen’s 
repressed power torments him as the tree of Mystery’s growth, which he 
reacts to as incomprehensible metamorphosis:  
  For when Urizen shrunk away 
  From Eternals, he sat on a rock 
  Barren; a rock which himself 
  From redounding fancies had petrified 
  Many tears fell on the rock, 
  Many sparks of vegetation; 
  Soon shot the pained root 
  Of Mystery, under his heel: 
  It grew a thick tree; he wrote 
  In silence his book of iron: 
  Till the horrid plant bending its boughs 
  Grew to roots when it felt the earth 
  And again sprung to many a tree. 
 
  Amaz’d started Urizen!  When 
  He beheld himself compassed round 
  And high roofed over with trees (3.55-70, E 85) 
 
Urizen is not initially aware of the tree’s growth—it droops branches to the 
ground and shoots up new trees, roofing him over, and only then is he 
“Amaz’d.”  By constraining living form (spirit) with dead law, Urizen 
triggers a labyrinthine outgrowth, readable as the wilderness of repressive 
religious doctrine—the law of Aaron and Moses, which represses the 
passionate and apocalpytic aspect of imagination. This outgrowth is an 
unconscious production, and Urizen is therefore “amaz’d” by it.  His shock 
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is a stock element of Blake’s story about reflexive imagination, along with a 
reflexive locution (“beheld himself”), self-limitation (“compassed round”), a 
foreclosure of speech (“he wrote/In silence his book of iron”) and the self-
begetting of metamorphosis (“Till the horrid plant bending its boughs/Grew 
to roots…”). The crux of self-reference is repressed power, obstructing itself 
with its own index—the Druidic oak. The self-obstruction of imagination—
and the obstruction of nature—are structurally connected: “nature” is the 
name of a reflexive blind spot.  
I have claimed, however, that there is something incomprehensible 
about the scene of productive power, “obscured” by its own production: 
“Mystery” names this blind spot in Blake’s poetry, and The Tree of Mystery 
therefore stands for many mysteries, including that of original sin, the veiled 
ark, and the mystery of nature (the obscure, self-pointing of power is 
implicit in each). The image of this tree is from Milton’s description of the 
tree in Paradise, based on images of a Banyon tree: “A pillar’d shade High 
overarch’d, and echoing walks between” (9.1105, 233)—a passage of Milton 
that interested Coleridge in Chapter 22 of Biographia Literaria (129) as a 
transmutation of aural echo into visual image. Banyon trees bend their bows 
to take up root—an uncanny agency readable as perverse figurality or 
imagination: the living form of energy, repressed and returning as the 
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parodic life of nature. “Echoing walks” is Milton’s aural echo of the tree’s 
self-begetting propagation. In Blake’s poetry, however, the tree’s 
redounding figures the solipsism of Urizen. When he “shrunk away/from 
Eternals” he sat “on a rock which himself/From redounding fancies had 
petrified,” and enjambment intensifies the echo, suggesting that Urizen 
petrified himself:“himself/From redounding fancies had petrified” [my 
italics].    
Moreover, Urizen’s tears of pity feed the tree’s growth…  
Many tears fell on the rock, 
  Many sparks of vegetation (3.59-60, E 85) 
 
…in the way that jealous tears feed the poison tree’s growth:  
  And I waterd it in fears,  
  Night & morning with my tears (E 28) 
 
The speaker “waterd” his wrath in a metaphorical sense, and in a 
metamorphical sense as well—he grew his wrath into a physical symptom, 
rather than transmuting its energy into speech (“I told my wrath, my wrath 
did end” (E 28)).   
When repressed, tropological forms of desire re-emerge as the mute 
speech of a suffering body. In The Book of Urizen, Urizen suffers “dire 
changes” and the collapse of metaphor and metamorphosis signifies the 
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unconscious nature of the symptom.  In “stony sleep” Urizen suffers 
metamorphosis; he is like “a dark waste stretching chang’able”:     
Ages on ages roll’d over him! 
  In stony sleep ages roll’d over him! 
  Like a dark waste stretching chang’able 
  By earthquakes riv’n, belching sullen fires 
  On ages roll’d ages in ghastly  
  Sick torment; around him in whirlwinds 
  Of darkness the eternal Prophet howl’d… (4[b] 1-7, E 73) 
 
It is (again) worth noting Blake’s anomalous use of simile: Urizen is like a 
“dark waste”—A is like B—but B soon “thickens” into a materialized 
landscape that begets its own phenomena—effacing the simile. The “dark 
waste stretching chang’able” is Urizen, stretched out like his children in The 
Four Zoas, or like the serpent form of Orc, crucified on the Tree of Mystery 
in the same poem, suffering his extension in time and space. Changeable 
waste is also changeable language and its arbitrary fluctuations—akin here 
to ongoing geological catastrophe. Thomas Burnet’s “Sacred Theory of the 
Earth” was a popular nineteenth-century treatise that linked the fall of 
humanity to a breaking of symmetrical perfection in the features of the 
unfallen earth (5-105). Blake revises Burnett by presenting geological 
change as symptoms in the fallen body of humanity; i.e., that part of 
humanity that is outside of imagination, human existence or what is called 
“Eternity” in The Book of Urizen. This physical realm—the realm of the 
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body—is where repressed metaphorical desire (“prolific” energy) presents 
itself as a somatic symptom, or a writing on the body.    
 The distinction between metaphor and metamorphosis is among the 
dichotomies that limit and rationalize metaphor, and when metaphor 
overflows its own definition by collapsing into metamorphosis, it signifies 
its own power self-referentially. The image of “overflowing” or “flooding” 
figures this self-pointing of metaphorical “energy.”  Thus, Urizen’s “dire 
Contemplations/Rush’d down like floods” in The Book of Ahania—an effect 
of repressed metaphorical energy.  In the description below from The Four 
Zoas, “the Springs/Flow into rivers of delight” (335). This is the 
unconstrained energy of “Orc”—a virility and abundance that exceeds the 
chains of form:    
His nostrils breathe a fiery flame.  His locks are like the forests 
Of wild beasts there the lion glares the tiger and wolf howl there 
And there the Eagle hides her young in cliffs & precipices 
His bosom is like starry heaven expanded all the stars 
Sing round.  there waves the harvest & the vintage rejoices.  the Springs 
Flow into rivers of delight.  There the spontaneous flowers 
Drink laugh & sing.  the grasshopper the Emmet & the Fly 
The gold Moth builds there a house & spreads her silken bed 
 
His loins inwove with silken fires are like a furnace fierce 
As the strong Bull in summer time when bees sing round the heath 
Where the herds low after the shadow & after the water spring 
The numerous flocks cover the mountain & shine along the valley 
       (61.24-62.4, E 335) 
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The speaker compares Orc’s loins to those of a bull, but the simile shifts 
(with the word “where”) into a description of lowing and shining herds. 
Orc’s locks are “like the forests/Of wild beasts,” and Blake twice uses 
“there,” as if to reify the forest, and the harvest that waves “there” in his 
bosom. The use of “there,” “there,” “there,” “where…” overflow Blake’s 
use of simile, to imply a world out “there.”  
Orc slips the chains imposed on him by fallen imagination: “His limbs 
bound down mock at his chains for over them a flame/Of circling fire 
unceasing plays to feed them with life…” (334)  In describing Orc’s energy, 
Blake’s language presents the thing it describes: his language exceeds 
decorum. Yet visionary power becomes aberrant when it operates on the 
meta-visionary oppositions that regulate healthy imagination, becoming 
“reflexive.” These oppositions are familiar to a reader of Blake: 
1.  Prolific and devourer 
2.  Contrary and negation 
3.  Center and circumference 
 
Even as the distinction between use and mention, metaphor and 
metamorphosis, tenor and vehicle, are subject to a reflexive turn of tropes, 
visionary power is subject to a reflexive turn, or what Milton O. Percival 
called a “self-limitation” of imagination (123). Thus, Blake begins to tell a 
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story about reflexive figurality: certain reflexive turns—those that deform 
the three oppositions listed above—trigger the fall of humanity.  
In “A Memorable Fancy” from The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, the 
speaker states:  
 …one portion of being, is the Prolific.  the other, the Devouring: 
 to the devourer it seems as if the producer was in his chains, but it is 
 not so, he only takes portions of existence and fancies that the whole.  
          (16, E 39) 
The devourer transmutes prolific power into conceptual abstractions; on the 
other hand, “the Prolific would cease to be Prolific unless the Devourer as a 
sea received the excess of his delights” (16. E 39).  In the description of 
Orc’s energy however, we recall that “the Springs/Flow into rivers of 
delight,” but these rivers have no “sea” to receive them. The “excess” 
delight of Orc is not contained—his unbound energy is not in a productively 
contrary relation to form.  Instead, Orc devours his own energy, “turning 
affection to fury & thought into abstraction”; he is a trope of aberrant 
tropological reflexivity:    
…Orc began to organize a Serpent body 
Despising Urizen’s light & turning it into flaming fire 
Receiving as a poisond Cup Receives the heavenly wine 
And turning affection into fury & thought into abstraction 
A Self consuming dark devourer rising into the heavens 
       (80.44-48, E 349) 
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The passage suggests that Orc is coiling back on himself with hints of the 
tail-eating snake, or Ouroboros.  Orc’s “self consuming” transmutes the 
tropological form of his wrath into cycles of historical violence—an outward 
form of metamorphosis, manifested by his serpent body. The “poisoned cup” 
of communion emphasizes this perversion of metaphorical energy into 
metamorphic change: communion is a miraculous identity rather than 
metaphor.    
What is the nature of Orc’s fallen reflexivity—or “self consuming”?  
Doctrinally, Blake claims that “Devouring” transmutes metaphor into ideas 
that serve understanding, and darkly so, when it substantializes them; for 
example by reifying a distinction between body and soul. Blake develops 
this conceit in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, through the voice of the 
Devil: “Man has no Body distinct from his Soul for that calld Body is a 
portion of Soul discernd by the five Senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this 
age” (34). The self-discernment (self consuming) of soul produces the 
illusion of the body as something separate, or extended into the abyss of 
materiality. The Devil describes a fallen reflexivity, but he himself is an 
example of it; through him, “energy” abstracts itself as a portion of existence 
which threatens to acquire a separate life. When the Devil describes energy 
as “the only life” [my italics] and “Eternal delight” (“Energy is the only life 
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and is from the Body and Reason is the bound or outward circumference of 
Energy” (34) he suggests the kind of absolutist and “overflowing” tendency 
of energy that pushes Orc beyond the “bounds” or “circumference” of form.  
Thus, the crux of the Devil’s account is the soul’s self-blinded self-
discernment: the soul discerns its “outward” and materialized form through 
contracted senses; it discerns a portion of itself (the body) as separate.   
Nature is a similar symptom—“discerned” by the senses as a separate, 
material reality, or mortified body, “stretched out” in space and time, and 
Blake’s prophecies emphasize the reflexive paradox buried in this notion: 
human existence—or imagination—is outside of itself when visionary power 
“contracts” (limits its power—or form).  Shifting from reflexive trope to 
oxymoron: when visionary power contracts, it contracts outward to roll out 
the sprawl of Newtonian space and time. Thus, Orc’s body symbolizes the 
part of the body of humanity that has fallen, extended into linear time and 
space (contracted outward) and Urizen materializes this fall by extending 
Orc on the Tree of Mystery:     
He knew that weakness stretches out in breadth & length he knew 
That wisdom reaches high & deep & therefore he made Orc 
In Serpent form compelld stretch out & up the mysterious tree   
       (81. 2-4, E 349) 
 When Orc represses the tropological form of his desire by “devouring” it, 
he underwent a metamorphosis—he “began to Organize a Serpent body 
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(80.44, E 349).” The appearance of Orc’s serpent form inaugurates the fallen 
cyclicity of natural process and history—which has a visual analog in the 
serpent coils constraining Adam in Blake’s painting (analyzed at the 
beginning of Chapter 1). Orc’s self-coiling figures a pathological “self 
devouring” of the infinite: by transmuting Urizen’s energy into “fury,” Orc 
becomes Urizenic—he “devours” his eternal, prophetic-poetic wrath to 
produce historical violence.   
In the historical allegory, Orc’s metamorphosis stands for the French 
Revolution’s degeneration into carnage—his prophetic wrath becomes 
reactive aggression. In the passage above, Orc begins disappearing into 
allegorical personification, snake-symbol, or degraded parody—with echoes 
of Milton’s Satan. The fullness of Orc as a mythic being, crucified on the 
tree of nature, and the flatness of Orc as symbol, are not reconciled in the 
above passage. Rather, a collapse of mythic being into “flat” symbol 
signifies something formally incomprehensible about the Blakean fall. The 
tension between Orc’s mythic “fullness” and his symbolic “flatness” recalls 
the metamorphorphic turn of Urizen’s children; personifications of 
elemental forces who acquire pathetic depth by enduring punishment or 
mortification of the body. Urizen himself makes the connection between Orc 
and his children: in compelling Orc to stretch out, Urizen “knew” that 
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weakness “stretches out in breadth & length (81.2, E 349).” This is because 
he has already seen his own weakness—his alienated children—“sometimes 
stretchd out in heigth/Sometimes in length sometimes englobing wandering 
in vain…” (340) Put succinctly, the collapse of (mythic) fullness into 
(allegorical) flatness is an index of perverted power. 
Thus when Orc takes serpent form as a “self-consuming Dark 
devourer,” his self-begetting metamorphosis reminds us of changes suffered 
by Urizen.  Orc’s serpent body is “outside” of eternal imagination, and 
subject to “dire changes,” but more fundamentally, imagination is “outside” 
of itself.  When the soul discerns a materialized body through contracted 
(materialized) senses—it discerns itself as “other.” Like Urizen, Orc begins 
to discern himself as external to integrated humanity: he forgets his unfallen 
form (“Luvah).”  
In describing Orc’s energy, Blake’s language presents the thing it 
describes: his language exceeds decorum—vehicle overtakes tenor.  Blake is 
not celebrating the infinite capacity of vision to exceed all boundaries 
however.  Rather, he tells a very specific story about energy: it becomes 
aberrant when it disrupts meta-visionary constraints that regulate it. What 
does healthy imagination look like? What is it to annihilate the selfhood in 
apocalpytic forms of desire—yet not fall into a self-consuming abyss (as Orc 
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does—or as Robespierre did)? Blake’s poetry ostensibly allows the reader to 
understand this for herself by “rouzing the faculties to act.” However, 
Blake’s vision of vision is also reflexive; i.e., he shows us the “inside” of 
visionary power from the “outside”—encouraging the reader to identify with 
forms of vision that are dormant in her. By presenting “inside” from 
“outside,” Blake can frame his rhetoric with a doctrine of meta-visionary 
form.   
This is what Blake attempts in Ahania’s lament, from The Book of 
Ahania. In this speech, Ahania describes her unfallen union with Urizen—
before he became possessed by selfishness and shame:  
 When he gave my happy soul  
 To the sons of eternal joy: 
 When he took the daughters of life. 
 Into my chambers of love: 
   
 When I found babes of bliss on my beds. 
 And bosoms of milk in my chambers 
 Fill’d with eternal seed 
 O! eternal births sung round Ahania, 
 In interchange sweet of their joys. 
 
 Swell’d with ripeness & fat with fatness 
 Bursting on winds my odors, 
 My ripe figs and rich pomegranates 
 In infant joy at thy feet 
 O Urizen, sported and sang; 
 
 Then thou with thy lap full of seed 
 With thy hand full of generous fire 
 Walked forth from the clouds of morning 
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 On the virgins of springing joy,  
 On the human soul to cast 
 The seed of eternal science. (9.15-12.34, E 88) 
   
Ahania recalls a time when she and Urizen annihilated selfhood and its 
attendant jealousy by giving each other (sexually) to others. Whereas “love” 
(as agape or Caritas) thematizes the “sympathy” in sympathetic 
imagination, what Ahania describes is rather different. Her lament draws on 
the “Song of Songs” to disperse eroticism into language, retaining a 
grammatical locus of personhood through the repetition of the pronoun 
“my”: “My chambers,” “my odors,” and “my ripe figs and rich 
pomegranates.” Ahania could be using metaphors or she could be describing 
her shape-shifting: her imagery is both the vehicle of her desire and its 
metamorphic expression. She is at home in tropological language—so much 
so that “she” disappears into it.    
Ahania identifies the milk in her ducts with semen, phallicizing her 
breasts and echoing (via the echo of “my chambers”) the procreative 
sexuality of Urizen: 
1. my chambers (bedroom) = my chambers (milk ducts) 
2. milk in my chambers = eternal seed 
 
“Semen = breast milk” is non-analogical (and “pseudo-metaphorical” in de 
Man’s sense)—yet it has a place in a mythic “system,” inasmuch as Ahania 
is identifying masculine and feminine, transcending the division of the 
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sexes. In Love and Logic, Stephen Cox says that “according to Ahania’s 
strangely wonderful lament, love was originally, and properly paradoxical,” 
and characterizes her images as “resisting dualism (or any other fixed logic)” 
(160). “Paradox” is the metalanguage of love—not the “inside” of love as an 
experience. What exactly is Ahania talking about? What is unfallen love?  
Love is indexed by linguistic power. It is pointed to by the blurring of 
metaphor and metamorphosis, catachrestic jumps, and the collapse of mythic 
fullness into “flat” personification. Ahania has been called a personification 
of “caritas” or charity (Stempel, 103) and in the last stanza she and Urizen 
start to flatten as emblems of passive and active contrary: she is the erotic 
mediation of intellect, and he is the sower of solar fire—echoing Aristotle’s 
famous “sun-sower” in the Poetics (“To scatter seed is called sowing: but 
action of the sun in scattering his rays is nameless. Still this process bears to 
the sun the same relation as sowing to the seed” (3.21)). Urizen casts his 
seed on the “virgins of springing joy”—a catachrestic identification of 
reason and sexuality that manifests the very eros that it is depicting. The 
collapse of catachrestic “energy” into uncastrated desire counters a previous 
scene in The Book of Ahania when Urizen’s son, Fuzon, literally castrates 
him, having sprung into being as the symptom of Urizen’s repression. 
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  Although one can understand Coleridge’s attempt to reason through 
the inner life of Wordsworth’s child in the Great Ode, no one could make 
this mistake with Ahania. She is not readable as a person, and although 
readers may well identify with her, her standpoint is primarily formal.  It is 
the standpoint of visionary power figured from the “outside” of visionary 
power; a vision of “the lineaments of gratified desire,” or desire that no 
longer predicated on lack in language. As we read in Jerusalem, a physical 
embrace has given way, somehow, to metaphorical identifications, embodied 
as “cominglings”: “Embraces are Cominglings from the Head even to the 
Feet,/And not a pompous High Priest entering by a Secret Place” (69.43-44, 
E 301). 
 Whatever we think it means to be “inside” of visionary identification 
as a form of being, Ahania’s lament is an account of it. I revisit such 
accounts in my next chapter on A.R. Ammons. Like Ahania, Ammons (or 
his speakers) sometimes narrate from standpoint of self-annihilation; for 
example, via an apostrophe to the wind spoken from the standpoint of the 
speaker’s dust, or by describing a person as a segment of flux, living, dying, 
and subducted into metamorphic changes in the earth, reared up in 
geological formations, and subducted again. Notwithstanding the 
impossibility of experiencing such a standpoint, it functions as an index of 
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power; by imagining it, we confront an imagination that is both alien (like 
nature) and our own. We are struck by the paucity of the thing we call 
“metaphor,” and confronted by its (repressed) intersection with Being.   
Thus Ammons is strangely balanced between Wordsworth and Blake; 
between a “self conscious” imagination, explored through reflexive figures, 
and an identification with metaphor as a form of being that is oddly natural 
or physical. Ammons says, for example, that his poem Garbage is “about the 
pre-Socratic idea of the/ dispositional axis from stone to wind” (20)—but it 
also is that axis, or event; figurality is a “motion” that burns off heavy 
language and dead systems, emerging into energetic lightness. Like Blake’s 







THE VIEWLESS WINDS OF A.R. AMMONS 
1.  Reflection vs. Self-Reference   
A.R. Ammons’ poetry expresses an impulse to identify with the void 
of being, or what Richard Howard has called “the great soft whoosh of 
Being” (34). Bloom also notes (and complains) about the pull of the void as 
what is “deepest and most self-destructive in Ammons” (10) and to “most of 
our central poetic imaginations in America” (10).  For Bloom, this impulse 
to unity with the nothingness of being is an abstract and spooky 
Transcendentalism—a “bad” Emersonianism. The death-drive in Ammons 
would be refuted by his own imagination, whose simultaneous assertion of 
difference and indifference checks a mystical absorption of self into “unity.” 
The trouble is that Ammons implicates metaphorical imagination in 
the void. Imagination touches—and swerves away from the void, thereby 
acquiring negative knowledge. Poetry is the vehicle of this recuperation, as 
Ammons notes in “A Poem is a Walk”:   
Poetry is a verbal means to a non-verbal source. It is a motion to no-
motion, to the still point of contemplation and deep realization. Its 
knowledges are all negative and, therefore, more positive than any 
knowledge. (20) 
 
Poetry brings the mind to a “no-motion” that hovers close to—or is perhaps 





into the sayable of the poem; albeit, a sayable about which “nothing can be 
said.” In response, Bloom says that “‘Corsons Inlet,’ ‘Saliences,’ and nearly 
a hundred other poems by Ammons are nothing of the kind, his imagination 
be thanked” (14). In the turn of Ammons to description of nature, Bloom 
finds that Ammons—like Wordsworth and Thoreau—“attempts to summon 
outward continuities to shield the poet from his mind’s own force” (14).  
This reflexive figure (“the mind’s own force”) ties Ammons to 
Hartman’s Wordsworth, defending against imagination’s capacity for 
disruptive self-inauguration by binding it in relation to nature—in contrast to 
Blake. For Ammons, poetic agency is logically indistinguishable from the 
nothingness of being. Both transcend “an antithesis that logic can’t bridge,” 
with the reverse implication that poetry’s intersection with the void disrupts 
rational thought and experience. The “non-verbal” is a source of renewal: 
“having once experienced the mystery, plentitude, contradiction, and 
composure of a work of art, we afterward have a built-in resistance to the 
slogans and progaganda of oversimplification that have often contributed to 
the destruction of human life” (20).  
Ammons often tropes the mind as a mirror of Nature and vice versa; 





poetry.   The poem “Reflective,” from the 1966 volume Northfield Poems, 
strips reflection down to a minimal figure: 
I found a  
  weed 
  that had a 
 
  mirror in it 
  and that  
  mirror 
 
  looked in at 
  a mirror 
in 
 
  me that 
  had a  
  weed in it (5) 
 
The speaker finds his desire reflecting back to him in the “other’s” mirror, 
and vice versa.      These are narcissistic misrecognitions, but that is not the 
feeling of the poem. The misrecognitions are necessary, and even cosmically 
so. Reality is folding on itself to disrupt a self-identity that Ammons will 
otherwise figure as flux and becoming.    
Such Romantic tropes of reflection (mirror lakes, the “speaking face 
of earth and heaven,” etc) ground the possibility of address according to Paul 
de Man in “Wordsworth and the Victorians,” and the fiction of a text 





language, or transmutes its symptom in the case of “Reflective,” which 
exposes a mirror-abyss: 
and that  
  mirror 
 
  looked in at 
  a mirror 
  in 
 
  me… (5) 
 
A mirror looking at a mirror produces a self-referential regress…  
1. A reflection reflected.  
2. The reflection of that reflection reflected. 
3. …and so on.   
 
Instead of reflecting its power comprehensibly, imagination opens an abyss. 
Without this abyss the poem falls flat (try replacing the line “and that 
mirror” with “and that weed”).    
 The scene of reflection recalls Blake’s Elohim and the Leech 
Gatherer, who stumble on self-reference as an obstacle to narcissistic 
reflection. In these scenes (considered in the first chapter of this study), 
sympathetic imagination does not reflect its power back to the subject as a 
narcissistic image; for example, as the power to humanize Nature or read the 
uncanny “other” as an emblem.  Rather, power refers to itself as a hole in 
cognition.    





 Ammons is a master of positive process rhetoric, affecting a 
seemingly spontaneous poetic voice that veers and qualifies, “moment to 
moment.” Process rhetoric presumes a process-doctrine. Along these lines, 
Nature’s motions mold and constrain the “motion” of metaphor, rhythm and 
rhyme in his poetry. With Ammons’ essay “A Poem is a Walk” in mind, 
Roger Gilbert has convincingly shown how the physicality and temporality 
of a walk molds rhetoric in two poems, “Corsons Inlet” and “Saliences,” 
noting that the latter “incorporates motion or mobility” through the shifting 
perspectives of the speaker on the same location observed in Nature (268).  
In this way, external reality checks discursive solipsism or autonomy of 
imagination. However, the distinction between impressions on the mind, and 
impressions of the mind, already eroding in the double-sense of 
“impression,” collapses when the observed particulars of Nature—wind and 
water especially—are recurring tropes of process rather than naively 
observed particulars. It is through such tropes that process points to itself as 
a rupture in logic and cognition.  
In “Corsons Inlet,” a well-known early poem, Ammons observes the 
Darwinian struggle on a tidal mudflat, rejecting an impulse to rationalize it 





“motions” of his thought open to the dartings, dyings and temporary 
victories of creatures on the mudflat:  
the moon was full last night:  today, low tide was low: 
black shoals of mussels exposed to the risk 
of air 
and, earlier of sun, 
waved in and out with the waterline, waterline inexact, 
caught always in the event of change: (6-7) 
 
“Low tide was low” reminds us of a cause and effect relation between moon 
and tide--made sinister with its danger to the mussels. “Air” and “sun” make 
us stop, and consider them threats as well, but risk becomes incalculable 
with the position of the waterline.  The determining factors in its “waving” 
are impossible to enumerate: they amount to change itself, and suggest to 
Ammons the incomprehensibility of God. Moreover, “the event of change,” 
as the dynamism of Darwinian Nature, will emerge as a kind of freedom in 
which “terror pervades but is unarranged.” 
 The above passage is arranged, however.  The waterline had been 
waving in the mind of Ammons long before he saw it on the seashore. 
Ammons had already plugged the waterline into his doctrine as a literalized 
figure of process, and tells the most concise version of this story in this 
interview with David Lehman in The Paris Review, describing a revelation 





One day, when I was nineteen, I was sitting on the bow of the ship 
anchored in a bay in the South Pacific. As I looked at the land, heard 
the roosters crowing, saw the thatched huts, etcetera, I thought down 
to the water level and then to the immediately changed and strange 
world below the waterline. But it was the line inscribed across the 
variable landmass, determining where people would or would not live, 
where palm trees would or could not grow, that hypnotized me.  
 The whole world changed as a result of an interior illumination— 
 the water level was not what it was because of a single command  
 by a higher power but because of an average result of a host of  
 actions—runoff, wind currents, melting glaciers. I began to  
 apprehend things in the dynamics of themselves—motions and  
 bodies—the full account of how we came to be a mystery with  
 still plenty of room for religion, though, in my case, a religion of  
 what we don’t yet know rather than what we are certain of.  I was  
 de-denominated. (Ammons) 
 
The waterline emerges here as a rational epiphany--a displacement of God 
into the incomprehensible complexity of physical dynamics.  It seems 
deceptive however to read “dynamics” in a quasi-mathematical sense of 
“complexity” or  deterministic “chaos” (though at times, Ammons seems to 
invoke it). In the above passage and elsewhere, Ammons implies a God 
more radically implicated in uncertainty—and an uncertainty more radical 
than incomplete knowledge about the initial conditions of a billiard-ball 
cosmos. What then is “dynamics” or  “process” for Ammons?    
 The waterline is a literalized figure of process that reconciles and 
exposes paradoxes of change. The mussels— 
waved in and out with the waterline, waterline inexact, 






“...caught always” catches change in a gerund-like sense, spatializing it as 
Einstein did space-time, or as V.O. Quine froze the Heraclitan river, proving 
that you can step in it twice (245). In Garbage, Ammons will invoke space-
time to describe university departments as segments of flow: 
…departments grow haired and blackhaired 
  and shade away into white and dome-shine at the top: 
 
  the dissolve moves through tenure, or a job elsewhere, 
  part-time, retirement, death: there never is 
 
  a department really but a slow flow you can’t step 
  in twice: (42) 
 
The poetry reflects the flow it is talking about by sliding the meaning of 
“dome-shine” from top of the head to top of the department, and dissolving 
the department into absences and departures that characterize it as change, 
rather than people or a static institution.  However, this spatialized “flow” 
that you can step in twice (as “the department”) is also a “slow flow you 
can’t step/in twice” at the level of human experience. This disjunction 
between the meta-standpoint of process and that of human experience 
“caught always in the event of change” is the tension of “Corsons Inlet,” and 
Ammons’s most realized long poem, Garbage.  As the above analysis 






The waving mussels are helpful here, as an image of motion that 
exceeds reason.  When mathematics formalizes process, it does so by 
repressing figurality, albeit transferring the latter’s symptoms to 
foundational or technical questions and thereby returning it in negative form. 
This dynamic is relevant to Ammons.  The mussels “waved in and out with 
the waterline, waterline inexact,” although “in and out” are exact terms;   
“inexact” describes a fuzziness of spatial position rather than actual process 
(whatever that may be), but “in” and “out” are spatially precise. Hints of 
paradox threaten to freeze the “waving” mussels.  The figure of “waving” 
thereby points to itself as an impossibility of motion, even while troping it.    
 For Ammons, at age 19, the waterline apparently suggested“things in 
the dynamics of themselves.” This is what Ammons tries to grasp, staring 
out at a darkened mudflat as a creature who is both part of--and outside of--
Darwinian dynamism, and its economy of life-energy: 
           a young mottled gull stood free on the shoals 
 and ate 
to vomiting: another gull, squawking possession cracked a crab, 
picked out the entrails, swallowed the soft-shelled legs, a ruddy 
turnstone running in to snatch leftover bits: 
 
risk is full: every living thing in 
siege: the demand is life, to keep life: the small 
white blacklegged egret, how beautiful, quietly stalks and spears 
       the shallows, darts to shore 
       to stab--what?  I couldn’t 





          fiddler crab? (7) 
 
Confronted by a darkened mill of life-energy the speaker squints at one of its 
manifestations—a frightened crab perhaps.  “The demand is life, to keep 
life”—life keeps itself bound in forms at the expense of other forms, and the 
self-reference produces a split between—  
1. Cycles of energy into and out of form… 
2. Beings tied to form and condemned to die.   
 
The “slow quiet turning” of energy is birth and death, but for a being tied to 
its own birth and death, this identity is a hole in logic and a trauma (a trou-
ma in Lacan’s formulation).   The speaker’s identification with the fiddler 
crab is not creature-to-creature (the crab might not even exist), but trauma-
to-trauma. There is a disconnect between what Ammons calls “the larger 
view” of energy exchange, and the standpoint of a helpless creature 
condemned by it—a disconnect that informs every line of the poem.  
 When a predator kills and eats its prey, we should take it in “the larger 
view” as an exchange of energy, and might even take energy in a spiritual 
sense. However, the “soft shelled legs” are both the egret’s food and the 
limbs of a dismembered being—an identification forced on us by the 
currents of energy. This negative identity impinges in the speaker’s shifts 
from admiration of the egret’s motions (“how beautiful”) to anxiety, and in 





couldn’t/see...”) and back to present (“a frightened/fiddler crab?”). As these 
shifts suggest, “Corsons Inlet” never quite reconciles Being-as-change with 
beings “caught always in the event of change.” Energy passes in and out of 
form, but it is indifferent to the terror of life-forms, condemned to pass 
away. Although Ammons elsewhere softens this indifference with an appeal 
to Eastern spirituality, the problem remains one of a perspective “inside” of 
energy, and one that is “outside”—and the short circuit that collapses them, 
when energies of an apocalyptic metaphorical identification become 
energies of nature (at the moment of the subject’s death). 
“Process” implies a distinction between two temporalities: the meta-
time of cycling energy (process), and the linear time of living things 
“caught” in mutability and change, rather than identified with it. Ammons 
brings the two levels together in the following passage from “Corsons Inlet”: 
      pulsations of order 
      in the bellies of minnows:  orders swallowed, 
broken down, transferred through membranes 
to strengthen larger orders: but in the large view, no 
lines or changeless shapes: (8) 
 
The time of creative-destruction is unavailable to the minnow, but in the 
minnow’s belly, creative-destruction emanates its meta-time: the time of 





membranes,” and presumably re-released when another creature swallows 
the minnow: 
orders swallowed, 
  broken down, transferred through membranes 
  to strengthen larger orders:  (8) 
 
“The demand is life, to keep life”--life eats itself to keep life—a self-
referential conceit that splits the “unity” of being and inaugurates the linear 
time of Darwinian struggle.  The split is between… 
1. –cycles of energy (“the large view”) and “every living thing 
in/siege…”  
2. –the spinning of ur-being, and transient beings, sacrificed to its 
motion… 
 
…which Ammons accepts as a foundational trauma—but tries 
(provisionally) to heal.  When these split levels collapse however, logical 
problems result: the “large view” of “no lines or changeless shapes” is co-
present with the static view of demarcations.  Life becomes death (and vice 
versa). For Ammons, this collapse is “negative knowledge.”   It is the scene 
of Ammons (or his surrogate), staring out at the mudflats and trying to 
reconcile the eternity of creative destruction with the finite orders it 
precipitates and destroys.  






where not a single single thing endures, 
the overall reassures, 
deaths and flights, 
shifts and sudden assaults claiming 
  limited orders, 
  the separate particles: 
  earth brings to grief 
  much in an hour that sang, leaped, swirled, 
  yet keeps a round 
        quiet turning, 
  beyond loss or gain, 
  beyond concern for the separate reach (20) 
 
 “...much in an hour that sang, leaped, swirled” has a Herrick-like music.  In 
a traditional treatment of mutability, it is heaven rather than earth that is 
“beyond loss or gain,” but in the above passage, energy cycles in and out of 
form, beyond those creatures tied to “limited orders”: “deaths and 
flights,/shifts and sudden assaults...”  Thus, “not a single single” thing 
endures, but a non-single thing does: “the overall reassures” as a vertical 
axis: the emanated time of creative-destruction or “process.” 
 With the aloofness of a “round/quiet turning” Ammons transmutes 
religious figures that traditionally put the timeless-in-time.  In particular, 
Ammons transmutes the logos in time (Christ) and Romantic versions of its 
vertical axis, such as the Blakean “Moment” of inspiration: 
-“Eternity is in love with the productions of time” 





The latter of these two quotes draws from John 14:2 “In my father’s house 
are many mansions…” and it bears on the poem “Mansion” by Ammons.  
The Ammons mansion is not in eternity, however, but in the earth’s 
“round/quiet turning.” What recuperates mutability is not love, nor what 
Blake called “the Poet’s Work”—though Ammons does, elsewhere, invoke a 
more limited version of the artist’s capacity to recuperate the loss implicit in 
flux. Instead, we have more ambiguous reasons to be reassured by the 
“overall”: it does not arrange its terrors.  
3. Short-Circuit 
 
In his first book Ommateum, Ammons presents the standpoint of a 
speaker who is dead, yet hearing things: 
  The next morning I was dead 
      excepting a few peripheral cells 
  and the buzzards  
  waiting for a savoring age to come  
  sat over me in mournful conversations 
that sounded excellent to my eternal ear (44) 
 
The speaker’s “eternal ear” puts eternity into a linear moment of time insofar 
as the “hearing” is a form of personification, transmuting the buzzard-sounds 
into conversation.  This suggests a visionary-metaphorical temporality; 
however, the passage is in narrative time. Narrative time is substituting for 
visionary time or the time of figurality--or maybe the speaker is dead.  It is 





literal identity with his corpse, and this equivocation, is exploited by 
Ammons in his well-known poem “Mansion.”  
Put otherwise, the energy of a metaphorical identification is becoming 
identified with physical, or at least metaphysical energy. Imagination, 
merging with “knowledge” of negative being, annihilates the subject. We 
should distinguish this kind of visionary power from a Blakean vision that 
concedes the loss of an “outside” reality—but only through the gain of a 
reality that is “outside-in” or humanized. In a Blakean visionary mode, for 
example, unfallen metaphor is a form of thought and desire that survives the 
abstract distinction between body and soul. Above however, the situation is 
different.   This speaker experiences the “neither-nor/both-and” “logic” of 
metaphorical identity as an equivocation between life and death. We might 
be reminded of the Leech Gatherer and Cumberland Beggar (with the caveat 
that Wordsworth kept their inner lives opaque), although the more accurate 
formal precedent is Christina Rossetti’s speaker in “After Death,” assuming 
the standpoint of her own corpse, or Emily Dickinson’s use of the device. 
These gothic echoes are detectable in the poems of Ammons, where 
absences tend to hang around as presences, or names still refer to the dead--





although it suffices to say here that they are obsessive, and in them, 
humanity bears the “logic” of figurality as a spectral state.   
 Ammons invokes standpoints in which the speaker is and is not 
assimilated to his physical remains, remaining an “I” after death.  For 
Ammons, we are our physical bodies, and there is no resurrection, although 
literal identity with the motion of reality seems to have spiritual 
implications. Inasmuch as tropological identity with the dust is threatening 
to collapse into literal identity, it is the “mystical” death-drive that Bloom 
and Howard note. Identity with dust is the univocity of the “One” or the 
void: “knowledge” about which nothing can be said or remembered. Nothing 
can be said about the void, but the poet can speak from inside of 
metaphorical identity—or invent a speaker who does. At the apocalyptic 
limit, metaphoricity is close enough to death that a speaker, speaking from 
beyond the grave, is also speaking from inside of metaphor, and vice-versa. 
In the well-known poem “Mansion” therefore, the speaker reports a 
visionary identification with dust as though it were literal. In his long-poem 
Garbage, Ammons will describe a movement from living language to dead 
metaphor, or from tropological to logical identity—and vice versa. In this 





metaphorical and literal meaning collapse: when language passes through 
the void, as it “recycles” meaning. 
4.  “Mansion” 
By positing the entity addressed, visionary apostrophe is a closed 
circuit. Poetry—as inner voice—is even more radically self-inaugurating. 
Such self-reference is a privileged signature of constitutive power, and a 
figure of its autism, cut off from the world and focused on its self-
realization. In the best case, the poet identifies with power in a way that 
brings the reader along with her, and in the worst case (when the apostrophe 
does not work) she leaves the reader—and perhaps herself—with the 
inscrutability of a private fantasy and the dead convention of the vocative. In 
neither case however, does the poetic voice have the time to dramatize its 
self-realization—or analyze it in the way that the rhetor and the critic do. By 
reporting her apostrophe rather than speaking it in the lyric present within 
the frame of the poem, the speaker buys distance and time, speaking from 
inside of the identification that ostensibly grounds it. She makes that 
identification the subject of a poem. 
 “Mansion”—an early poem by A.R. Ammons from Expressions at 
Sea Level—is an example of a mentioned or reported address: 
So it came time 





  and I chose 
  the wind 
         to be delivered to 
             
  The wind was glad 
         and said it needed all  
  the body  
  it could get 
         to show its motions with 
 
  and wanted to know 
      willingly as I hoped it would 
  if it could do 
something in return 
        to show its gratitude 
 
  When the trees of my bones 
       rises from the skin I said 
  come and whirlwinding 
  stroll my dust 
          around the plain 
 
so I can see 
         how the ocotillo does 
  and how the saguaro-wren is 
  and when you fall 
       with evening 
          
fall with me here 
      where we can watch  
the closing up of day 
         and think how morning breaks (41) 
 
The speaker reports his dialog with the wind, and then quotes his address to 
the wind in the last two stanzas (minus quotation marks)—a heightened 
effect, akin to direct address, but still distanced from it.  The distance keeps 





but thereby allows the speaker to narrate as if from inside of that 
identification.    Thus, by citing a dialog with the wind, the poet puts speaker 
and reader both inside and outside of an identification. 
 The speaker reconciles himself to death through metaphorical 
identification, and the time of his death is the time of this identification (“So 
it came time for me/To cede myself”) passed along through a series of 
infinitives:  
-to cede myself 
-to be delivered to 
-to show its motions with 
-to show its gratitude 
 
Each of these infinitives marks a “plot point” in the speaker’s dialog with 
nature.   However, they index something unassimilable to narrative through 
their repetition; an identification that occurs in apostrophic rather than 
narrative time. The last two stanzas narrate the standpoint of this 
identification as the standpoint of the poet’s dust, falling with evening into 
the place where he stands here and now. In particular, he will trade corporeal 
sensation for figural modes of being.  
 In the deal that the speaker would make with the wind, he cedes his 
selfhood, becoming self and other: he would pass into dust, but retain 
something of his present corporeal standpoint, watching the “closing up of 





himself by ceding himself to nature: paradox is the index of nature’s power 
and metaphorical contradiction alike—both partake in the void.   Question: 
when is a man home and not home? Answer: when he is dead. The 
“mansion” of the dust is a paradox from the outside, but from the inside, the 
paradox might be reconciled—a term that Ammons uses via Coleridge. 
Inside of nature—inside of its most basal energies—we are home and not 
home.  It is not just that the speaker identifies himself with matter and 
motion—he reconciles the paradoxical “logic” of that identification (that he 
is, and is not himself), by giving himself a voice. We might call such tropes 
“second-order” metaphors: accounts from the outside of what it feels like to 
experience metaphor from the inside as a form of thought and desire. 
Ammons invokes this sort of figure in his long poem, “Summer Place,” from 
one of his later volumes, Brink Road: 
our beauty, our beauty, on what shoal or shelf, ledge 
  or cloud will it lie down, dwelling beyond rust and moth, 
  so beyond it will know the worm and have no cognizance 
  thereof....  (226-227) 
 
To “know the worm and have no cognizance thereof” is to know death and 
not to know that we know it.  This is not metaphor, but the “logic” of 
metaphor, troped as “negative knowledge”-- a “second order” metaphor.     
 In the above passage, as in “Mansion,” the “inside” of metaphor is the 





also something of death in metaphorical agency. In his most overtly 
transcendentalist mode, Ammons claims, in Garbage, that there is an 
“indifference of all the differences” (27) penetrating every moment of flux, 
even attending casual slaughters and excrement in its “storms of generosity” 
(as he puts it in his poem “City Limits,” from Briefings (105)). What would 
it be to know this informing spirit of flux?  In a famous passage from 
Nature, Ralph Waldo Emerson claimed to have experienced it:  
Standing on the bare ground,--my head bathed by the blithe air, and 
uplifted into infinite space,--all mean egoism vanishes.  I become a 
transparent 
eye-ball.  I am nothing.  I see all.    The currents of the universal being 
circulate through me; I am part or particle of God. (6) 
 
Emerson’s eyeball collapses seer into seeing by making the former 
transparent.  The eyeball thereby figures metaphorical identity as the 
immersion of seer and seen into “currents of the universal being.” Currents 
of the universal being are electrical currents whose polarities might be 
thought to hold opposites in tension; ergo, to identify with those currents is 
to experience a reconciliation of opposites—seer and seen—as an 
impersonal form of vision.  
 Emerson’s sentence “I am part or particle of God” retains the personal 
pronoun “I,” and Ammons seizes on a similar paradox: for Ammons, subject 





tension in his long poem Garbage, where the name of a person still refers to 
the person after his death—his body dissolved and subducted into the 
geological record (38). In “Mansion” also, the speaker accepts the 
annihilation of corporeal sight, but remains an “I” who retains a form of 
sight through his identity with dust and motion:    
so I can see 
       how the ocotillo does 
and how saguaro-wren is 
    and when you fall 
       with evening  
 
fall with me here (41) 
 
M.H. Abrams has noted that these lines echo the casual greeting “How are 
you doing” and “how are you?” However, the speaker is not saying “how do 
you do” but seeing “how the ocotillo does...”--seeing-as-saying.   “Seeing” 
is the faculty of an “I,” but also impersonal.  The shift to class name 
(“saguaro-wren”) from the definite article (“the ocotillo”) emphasizes this 
universality by collapsing individuals into universals, as though the speaker 
were interacting with concrete universals or those patterns of permanence in 
flux that Goethe called Dauer im Wechsel.  The last line of the poem 
substitutes “think” where we would expect “see,” yielding the formulation: 
“and think how morning breaks.” Thus, the speaker is not just contemplating 





dust--thinking nature from the inside, as though the wind were currents of 
thought, falling with evening to a death-like still-point.   
 Elsewhere, Ammons invokes this non-verbal still-point from which an 
ideal reader would contemplate the “motions” of a poem: 
     ...but why is it of use 
    
to be brought through organized motion from chaos and 
  ephemerality to no-motion: to touch the knowledge that 
  motions are instances of order and direction occurring 
  briefly in the stillness that surrounds: to touch, to know, 
  to be measured and criticized by the silence, to acknowledge 
  and surrender to wholeness and composure: the non-verbal 
 
  energy at that moment released, transformed back through the 
  verbal, the sayable poem: spirit-being, great one in the world 
beyond sense, how do you fare and how may we fare to Thee:  
        (40-41) 
 
As in “Mansion,” infinitives pass along the force of an identification with 
the void... 
-to be brought 
-to touch  
-to touch, to know 
-to be measured and criticized 
-to acknowledge and surrender 
 
At the moment of “surrender,” the “non-verbal/energy” of the void is 
“transformed back through the/verbal the sayable poem.” Ammons enacts 
this release of “non-verbal energy” by transforming it through apostrophe, 





“..spirit-being, great one in the world/beyond sense, how do you fare and 
how may we fare to Thee:” (41). This apostrophe releases “the non-
verbal/energy” of identification into the temporality of dialog. “How do you 
fare and how may we fare to Thee?” recalls the greeting-form “how do you 
do,” noted by M.H. Abrams in “Mansion”—it tropes a subject-subject 
relation (Abrams). The use of “may” in “how may we fare to Thee” suggests 
that the Spirit-being may not care how we fare. Who or what is this power?   
The apostrophe is self-referential. “Spirit” personifies the apostrophe’s 
motivating power: the turn of apostrophe is the thing turned to.  
 Apostrophe faces its own identification with the “other” as “other,” 
reminding us that metaphorical identity is negative.   The reader, and by 
extension, the poet, touch the formlessness of non-being--and “in that 
moment,” transmute its “energy” back into “the sayable.”  This “surrender” 
to “non-verbal/energy” recalls the speaker of “Mansion,” surrendering his 
dust to the invisible wind--albeit swerving from death through that very 
identification. Making the non-verbal sayable is like making the invisible 
wind visible, which the speaker of “Mansion” does by sacrificing his dust 
(“The wind was glad and said it needed all the body it could get to show its 
motions with”).   The speaker’s injunction to the wind--“Stroll my 





swagger of Ammons, and recalls the latter’s comparison of a poem to a 
walk.   Through this comparison, Ammons states that a poem has the “body” 
and “physiology” of organic form, but a poem, like the invisible wind, 
acquires its body through a sacrifice.    
 In “Mansion,” the wind gets its body from the poet’s sacrificed body, 
and by implication, the motions of a poem likewise manifest themselves 
when a poet or reader sacrifice something of themselves to the nothingness 
of existence, or the no-motion that penetrates motion at every instant. Even 
as the speaker of “Mansion” imagines falling with the evening wind to think 
how morning breaks, we have seen that Ammons elsewhere describes the 
mind sinking to non-verbal contemplation that brackets stimuli and rational 
thought.  In seeking poetic inspiration, Ammons subjects himself to a 
controlled privation through a process that he describes in the long poem 
Garbage as akin to sitting “over a great blank.” In an analogous passage 
from Sphere, the ideal reader approaches the nothingness of being when 
reading a poem:   
  the poem keeps enough revelant variety going to interest 
 
  the mind from sleep but enough focus to disinterest it in 
  external matters: a hypnotic focus, then, that is awakening, 
  a focus of controlled fullness, not over-exclusiveness: but 
 





  awakened mind to no-motion, to a still contemplation of the 
  whole motion, all the motions, of the poem...   (40) 
 
As an unedited typographical mistake, “revelant,” functions as a 
portmanteau word combining “revel-atory” and “event”—a mistake-turned-
figure.  The motion of a poem emerges from a substrate of such events 
which the mind approaches through “a descent into the 
subconscious/(tentacles maybe into the unconscious).” The mind would 
remain conscious, yet “descend” by bracketing reason and sensation: 
...it permits itself to sink, 
to be lowered down the ladder of structured motions... (40) 
 
Even as a poem shows its motions to a reader who cedes himself, the wind 
shows its motions in the poem “Mansion,” when the speaker cedes his dust 
to it:     
  ...it needed all 
  the body it could get 
  to show its motions with  (41) 
 
“Motion” here is the motion of figures and the sound of a poem—a figural 
motion that even figures its own motion—“the motion of its motion.”   
However, Ammons implies that poetic imagination requires a sacrifice or 
privation—a body to show its motions with.   It is only through this sacrifice 





“The shapes nearest shapelessness awe us the most” (16) according to 
Ammons in “Sphere,” sounding like Edmund Burke on the sublime. For 
Ammons, the wind’s shapelessness is its potential to take on forms, and its 
invisibility is an imageless image of the Romantic imagination. The most 
significant component of imagination is its formlessness, which Ammons 
takes to be non-verbal. Imagination is like an iceberg whose cognitive 
dimension is on the surface. To identify with the depths—even minimally—
is surrendering something to the void. 
5.  Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Ammons: Viewless Winds 
 In Measure for Measure the Duke advises the condemned Claudio to 
“Be absolute for death”: 
…Thou art not thyself; 
  For thou exist’st on many a thousand grains 
  That issue out of dust… (3.1.19-21) 
 
Claudio does not listen. Instead he clings to life, fearfully imagining death in 
the more famous lines that follow: 
  To be imprison’d in the viewless winds, 
  And blown with restless violence round about 
  The pendant world… (3.1.125-7) 
 
The Duke tells Claudio that life is other to the dust that it “exist’st on,” but 
Claudio likewise imagines that in death he will be—and will not be—





motion while remaining an “I.” Claudio’s nightmare is what Ammons 
recuperates in “Mansion.” 
 The peculiarity in both the nightmare of Claudio and the fantasy of 
Ammons is that they retain the standpoint of an “I” after death.  Richard 
Howard notes that Ammons would “suffer or search out immersion in the 
stream of reality without surrendering all that is and makes one particularly 
oneself” (34). What Ammons retains after death is an American ego. The 
after-death conceit echoes differently in English tradition, assuming a Gothic 
cast. We might recall Christina Georgina Rossetti’s speaker in “After 
Death,” assuming the standpoint of her own corpse: 
  The curtains were half drawn, the floor was swept 
  And strewn with rushes, rosemary and may  
  Lay thick upon the bed on which I lay, 
  Where through the lattice ivy shadows crept. 
  He leaned above me, thinking that I slept 
  And could not hear him; but I heard him say...  (33)    
                                                           
When inverted as a spectral state, the “logic” of a figure insists as pathos and 
loss insist (Blake’s Urthona necessarily becomes Los (loss) at the moment 
this inversion occurs).  By the time we reach the conclusion of Rossetti’s 
poem— 
  He did not touch the shroud, or raise the fold 
  That hid my face, or take my hand in his, 
  Or ruffle the smooth pillows for my head: 
  He did not love me living; but once dead 





  To know he still is warm though I am cold. (34) 
 
—the equivocations of life and death, passion and loss are formally 
affective; i.e.,  their logical pathology is their pathos. 
 In the poetry of Ammons, we might imagine that such equivocations 
of life and death resolve into univocal death when the speaker learns how to 
assume his dust in silence and no longer insist on an “I.”  The result, 
according to Howard, is: 
...a region, a Death, to speak literally, where there is no poetry, no 
speech to one’s kind, no correspondence perceived and maintained, 
but only the great soft whoosh of Being that has obsessed our 
literature from its classical figures, as Lawrence saw so clearly, down 
to Roethke, Wright Morris, Thornton Wilder. (34) 
 
What do these fantasies have to do with imagination? Not much, if we 
conceive imagination as a present form of thought, desire and being; 
however, imagination, for both Ammons and Wordsworth, has a negative, 
disruptive or incomprehensible aspect.  Early readers of Wordsworth caught 
an echo of Claudio’s rumination on “viewless winds” in a famous passage of 
the Prelude that bears on “Mansion” by A.R. Ammons: 
Visionary power 
  Attends the motions of the viewless winds, 
  Embodied in the mystery of words: 
  There, darkness makes abode, and all the host 
  Of shadowy things work endless changes,--there, 
  As in a mansion like their proper home, 





  By that transparent veil with light divine, 
  And, through the turning intricate of verse, 
  Present themselves as objects recognised, 
  In flashes, and with glory not their own.  
(1850 5.595-605 W 205) 
 
Wordsworth’s repetition of “mansion” echoes in Ammons, along with the 
sense—via Claudio’s nightmare—that to identity with imagination is to cede 
our dust to the wind (although the dust in turn makes the wind visible, in the 
case of Ammons, who attempts a reconciliation).  In a rolling motion of 
deferral, the above lines displace the agency of visionary power, and through 
“the turnings intricate of verse” its effulgence ends up circumfusing 
Wordsworth’s own language.  In trying to locate a stable definition of 
visionary power in this poetry, the reader might sense that the point is rather 
to subject visionary power to its own operations, “circumfusing” it with its 
own transparent veil, so that it emerges with a glory not its own.  In the 
movement of these lines, power fails to grasp itself, maintaining its alterity 
as “the great Nature that exists in works/Of mighty Poets” (594-95).   
 These lines also echo the movement of “Lucy” in “A Slumber Did My 
Spirit Seal”: 
A slumber did my spirit seal; 
I had no human fears: 
  She seemed a thing that could not feel 
  The touch of earthly years. 
 





  She neither hears nor sees: 
  Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course, 
  With rocks, and stones, and trees. (LB 246) 
 
The dead girl is trapped in a motion that unsettles her identity with Nature—
returning the disquieting implications of Claudio’s nightmare.  With these 
implications in mind, Cynthia Chase has written: 
  Identification with natural objects, in an 
  evasion of temporality and death, instead 
  brings on or constitutes that very death-- 
  which is not a state of rest but a state of  
  constant motion, precisely like the endless  
  change and placeless place of words or the 
  imagination (76) 
 
Read through the impulse of Ammons to identify with natural objects and 
assume their cyclic motions as a transcendent temporality, this passage 
figures that motion as the “placeless place of words.” To identify with 
natural objects is already a tropological “motion” that appears—when troped 
by the motions of Lucy and Claudio—to be a form of senseless possession.  
Ammons, on the other hand, presents tropes of identity as annihilating, and 
physical annihilation as tropological. The mutual implication of imagination 
and death is what Ammons describes as a void of being, indexed by the 
contradiction implicit in metaphor.    
These notions are challenged in other ways by “A Slumber Did My 





narrative temporality. In particular, the instantiation of the girl as nature 
enters the narrative through the girl’s death.  In death, the girl seems claimed 
by nature all along, and never fully realized as a real girl. The subject 
pronoun that persists after the girl’s death as prosopopoeia proleptically 
haunted her in that same way when she was alive—as if there were already a 
“thingness” about her: “She seemed a thing that could not feel/The touch of 
earthly years.”  The girl’s death—marked by the cut between stanzas—
ironizes the speaker’s prior feeling that she was beyond the touch of time.1  
However, she was always beyond narrative time and irony, inasmuch as she 
is a semi-personification or a face imposed on nature—imposed by 
Wordsworth, from beyond the narrative.  The time of that figural imposition 
interferes with narrative temporality because the poem cannot register it.    
From the standpoint of narrative, “She seemed a thing...” is proleptic of the 
girl’s entry into a thing-world of nature; however, this prolepsis represses a 
sense in which the pronoun “she” was a prosopopoeia all along.  As a semi-
personification right from the beginning, the girl is an impossible object for 
Wordsworth, whose desire enters the poem from a higher narrative level, 
demanding that the girl die.  The poem registers this demand as a trauma, 
                                                
1 As de Man read “A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal” in “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” the 
girl’s death is proleptic of the poet’s own, as an impossible empirical knowledge beyond 






and thereby folds on itself to encounter figurality as though it impinged on it 
from the “outside.” 
 Prosopopeia in Ammons is similarly negative, and at times, bizarrely 
so. When Ammons turns to the dead, tropological identification crashes 
narrative time, disrupting the flow of process: 
…how 
    
quaint and sad the lives of those who have lived  
  but are gone, the vacant sadness of two eternities 
 
  pressed together, squeezing them dry to  
  nondegradable remnants—trash: the meaning, 
 
  the tears, loves, sweet handholdings, all 
  the fears, jealousies, hangings, burnings— 
 
  throwaways, obsolescences that plug up 
  the circulations today… (94) 
 
To take reality as process, everything must be recyclable—nothing is “non-
degradable.” In the lines above however, we get a hint of something non-
recyclable, or at least nondegradable: the dead who “plug up/the 
circulations.”  We might recall a dead brother, lost by Ammons at age four 
in an incident that marked him—another was stillborn.  As in the Lucy 
poem, death is a formal discontinuity, signaled in the lines above as a gap 
between the “two eternities” of before and after.  To borrow a favorite 





like imagination—no right angles.  However, Ammons was equally aware 
that the self-differing “now” is a paradox of loss.  Such paradoxes dog the 
poet of flux, even as they fascinate the (obsessional) poet of ruin and 
mutability; they put gaps in linear time, or suspend it through a turn to the 
dead.  From the standpoint of energy-cycles, invoked in “Corsons Inlet,” and 
now assimilated to movements of imagination, the dead are trash to be 
recycled—“burdening the living/with guilty obligations of memory,” as 
Ammons puts it in Garbage (94). However, there is also something 
structurally insistent about the dead, inasmuch as they are special cases of a 
loss implicit in any self-differing moment of “flux.” Mathematics employs 
formal defenses against foundational problems of calculus, but the process-
poet is exposed to a real of language famously anticipated by Zeno. The 
obsessional Ammons is formally obsessional.  He identifies with process, 
and therefore assumes a self-referential turn through which process points to 
itself as frozen aporia.  
 Ammons is a poet of flux dogged by related themes of mutability and 
death.  He invokes a material dwelling-place in “Mansion” and does the 
same in his long poem Sphere: “our skinny house perpetual where in total 
diminishment we will/last, elemental and irreducible, the matter of the 





This ground-state of matter, figured as the limit of the “fine,” is itself a limit 
of process (“so must we all approach the fine”) rather than a static 
destination (76).  For Ammons, the problem posed by a rhetoric of process 
(“everything is a rhetoric”) is the following: “can we make a home of 
motion?” (76) 
 When Ammons declares the atom “unsmirched,” we might recall that 
dust is similarly immune from mutability as a mansion for the dead. 
Ammons inherits this trope of mutability—but also its problems—from 
poetic tradition exemplified by the following lines from Shakespeare: 
Fear no more the heat o’ the sun; 
  Nor the furious winter’s rages, 
  Thou thy worldly task hast done, 
  Home art gone, and ta’en thy wages... (4.2, 358-61) 
 
The lines declare an end to suffering--but only by apostrophizing the dead as 
potential sufferers in the first place. “Golden lads and girls all must,/As 
chimney-sweepers come to dust,” but the dust retains a standpoint through 
prosopopoeia, and this standpoint is vulnerable. By conjuring a dead 
addressee, the speaker raises the possibility that others would also conjure 
her with ill intent. Thus, Shakespeare’s apostrophe defends against its own 
conjuring power by incanting to protect the dead: 
No exorciser harm thee! 
  Nor no witchcraft charm thee! 





  Nothing ill come near thee! (4.2, 376-79) 
 
As a “thee,” the addressee seems not quite consigned to the dust--the “thee” 
remains vulnerable.  The apostrophized dust is both self and other, and by 
trying to achieve that reconciliation, the apostrophe would reconcile the 
“logic” of a prosopopoeia, or metaphorical identification that grounds it.   
 When Ammons turns to the dead, they are unsettled by it, and the 
effect echoes Gothic tropes of being buried alive—as in these lines from 
Sphere: 
  ....though I am not enjoying the 
first day of spring very much, it is not with me as it is 
  with my friend George, spending his first spring in the grave...  
          (13) 
 
Ammons digresses from a meditation on flux and formlessness to reference 
“my friend George...” who is an instance of flux, degenerating into 
formlessness. Ammons repeats the move in Garbage, referring to the ashes 
of his friend as a “fact,” left alone in the cemetery after the speeches, poetry 
(and perhaps apostrophes)—“left alone to itself to have its first/night under 
the stars...” (38) 
“First spring in the grave” (Sphere) echoes “first night under the stars” 
(Garbage): the “fact” now faces eternity yawning before it, trapped in 
matter like someone who has moved into a too-small apartment (“our skinny 





to return.  After the funeral, “the people turn to each other and away,” 
undoing their turn to the dead.  What remains is a logical precipitate of 
prosopopoeia: the dead not at home in their dust.   
 Ammons faces the dead as four-dimensional sections of flux. Van 
Orman Quine claimed that we can step into the same river twice if that river 
is a process-object; i.e., when we point to objects, we are really pointing to 
sections of flux or space-time which remain self-identical (246). Ammons 
seizes on this notion, stating the principle in Garbage: 
...isness itself is just the name of a segment  
  of flow:   (48) 
By extension, people are segments of flow--with one caveat: somewhere in 
that flow is the “fact” of death.   
In Garbage, the speaker turns his attention to that fact in an abrupt 
digression:  
  I went up the road 
    
  a piece this morning at ten to Pleasant Grove  
  for the burial of Ted’s ashes: (37)  
  
Ted’s ashes are not Ted, and there are echoes of “Fear no More the Heat o’ 
the Sun”—it is a hot day: 
  those above  





terribly hot, and the words of poems read out 
 
  loud settled down like minnows in a shallows 
  for the moment of silence and had their gaps 
 
  and fractures filled up and healed quiet: into 
  the posthole went the irises and hand-holds of dirt: (37) 
 
The words do not heal, rather, the moment of silence heals. Then, we get an 
image of spring thaw, and Ted’s ashes leaching away from whatever they 
were.   
This shape-shifting is the non-self-identity of flux—which is what 
Ted is:     
…this one fact put down is put down 
  forever, is it, or for forever, forever to be a  
 
  part of the changes about it, switches in the  
  earth’s magnetic field, asteroid collisions, 
 
  tectonic underplays, to be molten and then not 
  molten, again and again: when does a fact end: 
 
  what does one do with this gap from just yesterday 
  or this morning to fifty-five billion 
 
  years to infinity… (38) 
 
As a segment of ongoing flow, “Ted” marks the absence of Ted, and gives 
him a peculiar sort of presence. Otherwise put: the geomorphic and cosmic 





the memory of reality as a non-local trauma: a non-degradable gap between 
before and after.   
 Elsewhere in Ammons, we will find this graving interrupting 
process—as in these lines from Sphere: 
  (the poem reaches a stillness 
which is its form): crush a bug and the universe goes hollow 
  with hereafter: in the cemetaries a shiver settles: sparrows 
  played down to speech in the cedar bunch into flowers: 
 
  across the valley a one-sided rim rises, highways like 
  caterpillars climb to the biting edge: the wings of red-ant 
  queens clamp flat macadam pools, the queens free-climbing 
 
  mirrored trees… (46)  
 
The dead bug rolls out “herafter” as a spatialized record of loss, frozen like 
the waving mussel in “Corsons Inlet.” When spatialized, process is a 
graveyard that you can step in twice (which is why it grounds Quine’s 
theory of logical identity): the universe registers the loss of the bug, and so 
does the poem—the latter through a visionary catalog of particulars whose 
caterpillars and red-ant queens pin “the event of change” in the collector’s 
display case. Why does Ammons connect the still-point of the poem with the 
death of the bug in the lines above? The stillpoint is where poet and reader 
touch the nonverbal void—but recuperate it through the “unity” of the poem; 





We might be reminded here of Eliot’s “still point of a turning world”—the 
stillpoint in flux that Ammons would recuperate as an eternal axis of 
imagination. For Ammons however, the stillpoint of imagination is a gap 
from the standpoint of linear time—a rupture between before and after that 
looks, from the outside at least, like death. 
At the conclusion of the funeral scene in Garbage, the mourners break 
up, and Ammons finally gives Ted a standpoint, abstracted now as a “fact”: 
…the shallows drift away, 
 
  the people turn to each other and away: motors 
  start and the driveways clear, and the single 
 
  fact is left alone to itself to have its first 
  night under the stars but to be there now 
 
  for every star that comes: (39) 
 
The cosmos purifies the standpoint of Ted with an austerity worthy of 
Christina Rossetti.  All that is left of him is a bare standpoint that bears 
witness to “hereafter.” 
 Why does Ammons put the world in motion as a “poet of process”?  Is 
it that he would find his brother there, assimilated to the “slow quiet turning” 
of energy, beyond mutability?  Or is it the contrary: with everything else in 
motion, it is only through non-degradable grief—the assertion of love as 





itself)—that Ammons would find respite from motion?  In his obsessional 
mode, Ammons imagines death as a gap between everything that comes 
before and everything after—an interruption of process.  However, such 
gaps are also integral to the self-differing of the “now,” and the place where 
continuous change tries—and fails—to grasp itself as discrete change.   The 
danger of the obsessional mode is that it would pull us back into the safety 
of the void, which heals such paradoxes through “the resolutions of 
nothingness.”    
6.   Paradox and Cyclicity   
 The cosmic swagger of Ammons owes something to Kerouac’s bop 
prosody in those moments when the speaker has his hand on the wheel, 
channeling the flux of reality between pulls on a Styrofoam bucket of coffee. 
Ammons refers to metaphorical agency with metaphysical names—such as 
“energy,” “burning” and “dispositional axis.”  He thereby tropes 
metaphoricity as a destructive-creative power of Nature, with a peculiar 
caveat: the use of metaphor is itself an example of  “energy,” “burning” and 
“dispositional axis.” Thus, a metaphorical use of “burning” is a literal 
manifestation of burning—burning references itself through an erasure of 
the quotation marks that mark metaphor. Ammons will speak more directly, 





Garbage, “I am the wind.” More typically (and originally), Ammons stages 
tropological identity as a slippage and confusion of levels, or an erosion of 
logic and sense. During long digressions, we are not sure exactly where 
physical waste ends and linguistic waste begins—what is physical energy 
and what is linguistic energy.   Comparisons established through analogy 
and simile blur into identity, as when the physical sense of energy turns into 
something spiritual. For this reason,  Ammons’ much discussed invocation 
of science is rarely straightforward in Garbage. Ammons revives the dead 
metaphor in science, and makes “scientific” the motions of metaphor. Thus 
he will claim that the “motion” of a poem is impersonal and “scientific”—
that he is only daubing its “dispositional axis” with a bit of ink here and 
there.  
In a mythical mode, Ammons depicts imagination stealing its power 
from the void, its motions minimally swerving from death. Through this 
motion, the unity of being fractures and grasps itself as other, now 
implicated in language, loss and materiality.   Such motions of imagination 
are guilt-ridden, and accompanied by an entropic pull back to unity.  In 
“Guide” (another poem from Expressions of Sea Level), Ammons warns: 
     You cannot come to unity and remain material: 






“In that perception is no perceiver” recalls the impersonal seeing of 
Emerson’s eyeball—here troping a mystical identification with spirit, 
perfection and stasis. However, the safety of the void is the safety of the 
grave, where a “you” still persists, occupying a cramped mansion that recalls 
the situation of the dead friends, George and Ted: 
you cannot 
           turn around in 
  the Absolute:   there are no entrances or exits 
       no precipitations of forms 
  to use like tongs against the formless: (26) 
 
“You cannot/turn around in/the Absolute” because there is no tropological 
turning. To get tropes moving requires an original sin—a symmetry-
breaking event that disrupts the stasis of “unity,” at least in this myth of 
origins, told by the wind:  
to be 
      you have to stop not-being and break 
  off from is to flowing and 
           this is the sin you weep and praise: 
  origin is your original sin: 
      the return you long for will ease your guilt 
  and you will have your longing: 
 
            the wind that is my guide said this:     it 
     should know having 
          given up everything to eternal being but 






The wind sacrifices “everything to eternal being,” but in the same moment, 
breaks away with minimal “direction,” or structure. We recall that in an 
analogous motion described in Sphere, the poet sacrifices to eternal being, 
and thereby releases its energy into “the sayable poem (41).”     
 In this pocket-myth, the speaker transmutes a wordless/timeless 
identification with the wind into dialog, as in “Mansion.” The swap of 
narrative for figural time gives the poem “tongs against the formless,” to tell 
a story about what poetry is and where it came from. The wind broke away 
from stasis and started to move, but thereby precipitated a death-driven 
longing for stasis--and guilt for having chosen materiality and flux over 
eternity and perfection. When the speaker tells us that the wind has “given 
up everything to eternal being but/direction,” he echoes the speaker in 
“Mansion,” who gave up everything to the wind but the standpoint of his 
own dust. These sacrifices of body to the wind, and the wind to non-being, 
pass along the nothingness of “eternal being,” and implicate metaphor in it.   
We might imagine that Ammons would identify with the original 
swerve that precipitated all motion, and that this would be the informing 
energy of his poetry (its “spirit”). Yet the “energy” of the wind’s originary 
break is what the swerve of Ammon’s tropes defer with a motion that is 





colon mark digressions into paradoxes of mutability, quasi-apostrophic turns 
to the dead, paens to the mysteries of process, or ironic undercutting.   These 
swerves trouble the story told by the wind, in that they are swerves with 
nothing to swerve from. 
 In “Guide” for example, colons break up the verse into units of 
paradox and tautology. The speaker is trying to recuperate eternal being 
(“unity and death”) as thought—but he does so by trying to “think” the void 
from the outside, and his language becomes rigid. He appeals to the wind 
because it is closest to the void, as an imageless image, near formlessness:     
how I said can I be glad and sad:  but a man goes 
           from one foot to the other: 
  wisdom wisdom: 
        to be glad and sad at once is also unity 
  and death: 
           wisdom wisdom (27) 
  
As the speaker’s language hardens and schematizes, the flowing wind 
departs, and the poem ends: “are these the thoughts you want me to think I 
said but/the wind was gone and there was no more knowledge then” (27).    
  
The void is “the one of grief and love” as Ammons puts it in Garbage, 
or as the speaker puts it here, the void is “to be glad and sad at once.”  The 
speaker tries to reconcile these paradoxes by oscillating from one pole to 





foot to the other” is to temporalize paradox in the way that a machine, 
choking on the self-reference of “This sentence is false,” oscillates from 
“true” to “false” in pursuing a vicious circle. Oscillation is a minimal 
defense against closure, as are the oscillations of nature—the movement of 
waveforms, cycles of birth and death--and their narrative analogs, 
beginnings and endings.  The distinction then, is between static paradoxes of 
self-reference that index the void, and a dynamic cyclicity that “solves” 
those paradoxes with oscillation.   
The “jump” from atemporal “unity” into oscillation figures the origin 
of natural cycles, but in these lines from Ammons’ Garbage, it becomes 
impossible to separate natural motion from motions of imagination: 
tissues and holograms of energy circulate in 
 us and seek and find representations of themselves 
 
 outside us, so that we can participate in 
 celebrations high and know reaches of feeling 
 
 and sight and thought that penetrate (really 
 penetrate) far, far beyond these our wet cells, 
 
 right on up past our stories, the planets, moons, 
 and other bodies locally to the other end of 
 
 the pole where matter’s forms diffuse and 
 energy loses all means to express itself except 
 
 as spirit, there, oh, yes, in the abiding where 






 until it turns into another pear or sunfish, (21-22) 
 
The mind, as personified energy, approaches “the other end of the pole,” 
dissolving into void.  What follows is a descent back into matter:  
that momentary glint in the fisheye having 
  been there so long coming and going, it’s  
  eternity’s glint: it all wraps back round, 
     
  into and out of form, palpable and impalpable, 
  and in one phase, the one of grief and love  (22) 
 
“The one of grief and love” echoes “sad and glad at once” from the poem 
“Guide.”  Nature temporalizes “the one” by “coming and going,” stuttering 
on paradoxical being or expressing it in cycles (“...a man goes/from one foot 
to the other”). “That momentary glint in the fisheye” is temporal 
synechdoche—the timeless in time, or eternity flashing through every 
moment of profane cyclicity.  Allen Ginsberg uses the fisheye to similar 
effect in his poem “The End,” from Kaddish:  
  I am I, old father fisheye who begat the ocean... (259) 
Here, as in Ammons, God is a unity of eros and thanatos, roiling in primeval 
chaos.    Ammons is not far from Ginsberg’s eastern sources when he 
describes this chaos as the void of Lao Tse. With a Romantic turn however, 
Ammons claims that the void’s capacity to “identify” opposites is also a 





 This notion hardens into doctrine in “A Poem is a Walk,”; an essay 
that begins with a quote from Lao Tse:    
   Nothing that can be said in words is worth saying. (38) 
Poetry is the exception to this rule according to Ammons, and he makes this 
claim by quoting a familiar passage from Coleridge’s Biographia:  
...the imagination--and I think poetry--“reveals itself in the balance or 
reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities." This suggests to me 
that description, logic, and hypothesis, reaching toward higher and 
higher levels of generality, come finally to an antithesis logic can't 
bridge. But poetry, the imagination, can create a vehicle, at once  
concrete and universal, one and many, similar and diverse, that is 
capable of bridging the duality and of bringing us the experience of a 
"real" world that is also a reconciled, a unified, real world. And this 
vehicle is the only expression of language, of words, that I know of 
that contradicts my quotation from Lao-tse, because a poem becomes, 
like reality, an existence about which nothing can be said in words 
worth saying. (13) 
 
This passage affirms New Critical notions, via Coleridge, of poetic language 
as autonomous form, taken here as a form of experience through which we 
know “a reconciled, a unified, real world” (13). The key to this claim is that 
both metaphor and the void share a paradoxical signature. From the 
“outside,” the nothingness of being—like the nothingness of metaphor—
looks like contradiction and a violation of the excluded middle. From the 
“inside,” what Ammons calls “poetry, the imagination” is the “vehicle” of an 





 On the face of it, this is a theory of positive imagination; i.e., 
imagination as the form of an experience antithetical to classical logic—
“Unlike the logical structure, the poem is an existence which can incorporate 
contradictions, inconsistencies,explanations, and counter-explanations and 
still remain whole...” (15)—however, there is a big problem with this 
statement when read against the poetry of Ammons. We have already seen in 
the poem “Guide” that an “experience” of “wholeness” is no experience at 
all, inasmuch as it puts us “in the mouth of death.”   We might take Ammons 
to mean that metaphoricity is analogous to the nothingness of being—or that 
metaphoricity is a reflection of that nothingness; however, models of 
“reflection” break down where the negativity of poetic agency is 
concerned—what is a “mimesis” or “reflection” of nothing?  In reading the 
poetry of Ammons carefully, we will instead find him relentlessly troping a 
metaphoricity (or metaphorical “thinking”) that achieves a partial 
identification with the void—recuperating something of the void.  This claim 
is implicit in the pocket myth of wind and its break from eternal being, and it 
is the meaning of Ammons’ statement that the motions of a poem bring the 
mind to “no-motion” or, as he puts it in “A Poem is a Walk,” that “poetry is 
a verbal means to a non-verbal source. It is a motion to no-motion… (20).  





death as its irrational dimension, while remaining tied to death as non-
meaning (i.e., logical pathology).  
 To identify with metaphorical identity is to identify with the void—
but swerve “in the same moment,” releasing the “energy” of non-being into 
“the sayable of the poem.”  We saw this movement in “Mansion” and 
“Guide,” and we can see it more didactically developed in extended 
passages of Sphere and Garbage. Imagination, in the guise of the wind, 
sacrifices to the void, but transmutes its “energy” into minimally structured 
motion, troped as “direction” or “vector.” Ammons calls this sacrifice 
“burning.”  
7. Burning  
In “A Poem is a Walk,” Ammons writes: “I can’t tell you what a 
poem is, nor can any other man.  The reason I can’t tell you is that the 
purpose of a poem is to go past telling, to be recognized by burning” (13). 
The poet precipitates poetry by burning—and the reader reads by burning. 
“Burning” sacrifices informing energy to the void, but precipitates new form 
in turn. Ammons has in mind a chemical reaction that releases energy as 
heat, precipitating a compound. Nuclear fission and fusion also serve as 
models, or vacuum fluctuations that borrow energy from the void and “in the 





would have us identify with burning itself—with the flame of chemical 
reactions that annihilate our physical bodies, “burning us free” in death and 
dissolution, as in “Regards Regardless,” a poem that I will read shortly, from 
a later collection of poetry, Brink Road: “freedom freely/enough allowed 
burns free, burns us free (16). 
Among these physical metaphors are scatological versions of the 
figure, notably in Garbage, when Ammons describes the creation of a poem 
as excretion, with the formulation “shit fire (and save matches)” (43).  The 
implication is that a poem, as a physical byproduct of burning, is no different 
than any physical byproduct.  A poem called Garbage is especially aware of 
this.  
  “Burning” is the way that a poem goes past telling to become an 
event.  The word “burning” wobbles between figural and literal senses per 
#1 and #2 below:  
1.  “Burning” dead language to create new metaphor (figural burning) 
2.  “Burning” dead matter to create new matter (literal burning) 
 
What makes Ammons difficult to read is his tendency to collapse #1 and #2.  
For example, in Garbage: “I spent every coin I/had into the good business of 
my own burning” (82). This is both a physical sacrifice and tropological 





metaphor that tropes a dynamic oscillation between living and dead form, 
energy and structure, metaphor and rational abstraction.  
Ammons takes the limit points of this oscillation to be center 
(abstraction) and circumference (energy), recalling a schema of “outward” 
pointing and “inwardly” figural language (readable as a distinction between 
a logic that would distinguish between sameness and difference, and a logic 
of “identity” in which both sides are asserted—described by Hazard Adams 
in “Synechdoche and Method” (Adams 46)).  Ammons more obviously 
echoes Coleridge’s dynamic theorization of the symbol as an oscillation 
between centripetal (literal) and centrifugal (associative-figural) poles: “In 
order to derive pleasure from the occupation of the mind, the principle of 
unity must always be present, so that in the midst of multeity the centripetal 
force be never suspended, nor the sense be fatigued by the predominance of 
the centrifugal force.” (318). These Blakean and Coleridgean dynamisms 
would replace the static term “symbol” with the dynamism of the 
“symbolic” (Adams 1-40). Ammons is a strange case, however, in that he 
also wants us to read “burning” physically. As with the terms “axis of 
disposition” and “energy,” when the literal and figural senses of “burning” 
collapse, physical energy points to itself as linguistic; a self-reference 





imagination that Harold Bloom took as a “darkness” internal to the poetry of 
Ammons, akin to a Blakean-spectral blocking agent (10-14). 
  In particular, “figural” and “literal” become adjectives describing 
states analogous to…and sliding into…physical states.  The pre-Socratic 
axis of disposition that transmutes “wind to stone” has as its special case, 
transmutations of linguistic energy (energy states whose vehicle is 
language): 
1. Figural: mutating, maximally energetic, light, irrational, in motion, 
inward-pointing, tending toward formlessness and the nothingness of the 
void 
2. Literal:  static, minimally energetic, heavy, rational-abstract, outward, 
tending toward a limit point of dead language that decays into the 
nothingness of the void 
 
In reading #1 and #2  we will find that they wrap around so that the limit 
point of the “light” and the “heavy” alike is the void—a claim that Ammons 
repeatedly makes in Garbage. “Burning” is the motion from literal to 
figural—but the word “burning” is neither literal nor figural. The word 
“burning” will not burn because it is the point where language consumes and 
recycles itself.  
 “Burning” is physical burning, generalizable to burning galaxies, 
“cellular brushfires” of the body, and the burning of garbage, through which 
matter passes out of form. However, “burning” is also linguistic process: 





  too, in the poet’s mind dead language is hauled 
  off to and burned down on, the energy held and 
 
  shaped into new turns and clusters...  (20)   
 
“New turns and clusters” are tropological turns and pockets of lyric order in 
the “flow” of the long poem.    
The garbage dump is a literal garbage dump, but it is also dead 
language, burned down, and recycled into new metaphors and new 
structures:   
  here is the gateway to beginning, here the portal 
of renewing change, the birdshit, even, melding 
 
  enrichingly in with debris, a loam for the roots 
  of placenta: oh, nature, the man on the edge 
 
  of the cardboard-laced cliff exclaims, that there 
  could be a straightaway from the toxic past into  
 
  the fusion-lit reaches of a coming time!  our 
  sins are so many, here heaped, shapes given to  
 
  false matter, hamburger meat left out (28) 
The garbage man wants to find a “straightaway” through the fire burning on 
the dump—a chance at rebirth.  Implicitly, he identifies himself with worn-
out language, as the speaker does in the following lines from an early 
Ammons poem, “I am Ezra”: 
  as a word too much repeated 





  so I Ezra went out into the night 
  like a drift of sand   
  and splashed among the windy oats 
  that clutch the dunes 
  of unremembered seas (25-26) 
 
Here, it is as though the wind might fling the speaker into sand drifts, 
absorbing him into an elemental language of nature.  For the man atop the 
dump, “burning” is an analogous re-absorption; a passage through the void, 
back into potential form whose special case is forms of language. This 
recuperation of the void should remind us of...    
1.  The poet transmuting the non-sayable into the sayable of the poem...  
2.  The wind, swerving from formlessness into minimally structured 
direction...  
3.  Metaphor recuperating the void as language about which nothing can be 
said...   
 
However, the recycling-myth of the dump is different than these prior 
schemas, inasmuch as imagination no longer grasps itself through paradoxes 
of loss and non-meaning. The sacrifice seems less frightening and the 
passage through the void promises to be smoother: 
…a straightaway from the toxic past into  
 
  the fusion-lit reaches of a coming time!  (28-29) 
This is a “straight shot” from dead to living form, through a portal 





language. Figurality, like matter, would be recycled into new forms without 
remainder.    
A version of this phantasmic recycling is Blake’s Golgonooza (E 154-
56), the city of art that tears itself down and rebuilds itself continually, 
where the qualifier “continually” ensures that there is never a moment when 
renewal gets stuck in a fetishization of ruin.  In a related figure, Ammons 
describes garbage trucks crawling up massive ziggurats to heave dead 
culture into the fire. For Blake and Ammons, the impulse to identify with 
ruin is decadence, and a symptom of passive imagination. The imperative is 
to keep creativity moving. In this trope of renewal however, there is anxiety 
surrounding the limit point at which waste turns into something new—it is 
not quite continuous. There is some doubt that there could be a 
“straightaway” through this recycling portal because “shapes” are stuck at 
the doorway, caught between nature and culture, animacy and inanimacy.  
What is the “literal” in language that gets stuck at the threshold, refusing to 
pass through and generate new metaphors—yet taking on shapes?  Integrity 
is “left out” of matter, transport is left out of metaphor, and meaning is left 
out of words; yet, there are “shapes given...” to ruined language—“shapes 
given to/false matter, hamburger meat left out” (3)—given by a negative 





 Pushed far enough, this is the territory of John Ashbery, and his 
framing of cliché and overheard fragments. However, we are always aware 
that the junk in Garbage is on the threshold of burning:   
…a crippled plastic chair: 
  a played-out sports outfit: a hill myna 
 
  print stained with jelly...  (9) 
 
The sports outfit, punningly “played out,” is played out language, and the 
jelly stain is an intrusion from the thing-world, disrupting the illusion of the 
Myna bird print. What haunts these fragments is absent humanity—or a 
synechdochical agency that, if it existed, is now gone and unremembered; an 
analog of the “unremembered seas” conjured by sand dunes in “I am Ezra.” 
Yet Ammons refuses ruin sentiment. The crippled chair, despite its pathos, 
will burn.   
“Burning” is among the “figurations of ongoing” that guarantee an 
ethical orientation toward becoming:  
...corruption, misconstruction pass through the 
  purification of flame) old deck chairs, 
  crippled aluminum lawn chairs, lemon crates 
  with busted slats or hinges, strollers with  
 
  whacking or spinningly idle wheels: stub ends 
  of hot dogs: clumps go out; rain sulls deep  
 
  coals; wind slams flickers so flat they lose  





  lingo—  (30-33) 
“White lingo” is abstract language, bleached of figurality. It is energy at its 
lowest potential, bound in “heavy” physical or linguistic material—univocal 
and literal language, pointing at its own inertia: 
  ...is a poem about garbage garbage 
  or will this abstract, hollow junk seem beautiful 
  and necessary as just another offering to the 
 
  high assimilations (that means on top where 
  the smoke is...  (30) 
 
Ammons declares all waste—linguistic and otherwise—recyclable. 
“Permanent” waste such as “disposable diapers, good to last/five hundred 
years” (61) will one day succumb to mutability. Even the planet earth, 
submitted to all manner of degradation, “is going to/be fine, as soon as the 
people get off.” (109) As used-up language, garbage burns with the 
following caveat: 
  ...but, of course, there  
  is some untransformed material, namely the poem 
  itself; the minute its transmutations end, it 
 
  becomes a relic sometimes only generations or 
  sets of countrywide generations can degrade: (109) 
 
The process-poem would become a “relic” after the poet dies. The reader 
would read Ammons by burning him—or the poem would burn itself—and 





However, the only way to “burn” process is to freeze it. The poem has to 
pass through the still-point of its own process, encountering figurations of 
ongoing that do not submit to “ongoing”: figures that freeze process and 
trope the void.   
8.  Passage Through the Void 
 In the poem “Motion” (Corsons Inlet) Ammons invokes the music of 
a poem, which— 
by the motion of 
  its motion resembles 
  what, moving, is— 
  the wind 
  underleaf white against 
  the tree. (54) 
 
The “motion of its motion” functions like a gerund to freeze process—like 
the waving of the waving barnacle in “Corsons Inlet”—and “the 
wind/underleaf white against/the tree” is another freeze frame.  How are 
they related?  The resemblance is obscure enough to move us past the notion 
that poetic music is somehow like the wind. We might notice, instead, that 
the whiteness of the leaf shows the wind’s motions, much as the speaker’s 
dust shows the wind’s motions in “Mansion,” and that this showing recurs in 
Ammons.  In the poem “Saliences” for example, we will find the wind 
“shaped and kept in the/bent of trees,” its “hiss” recurring in the poem 





catch the onomatopoeia of its own sound—trying to catch “the motion of its 
motion.”  
It is not the wind but the underside of blown leaves that are white 
against the tree; “the wind…/white against the tree” is a metaphor.   The 
motions of the poem resemble the motions of metaphor—they resemble 
themselves.  Moreover, the wind reads its own motion (turning leaves of the 
tree as leaves of a book) like the wind in “Grassy Sound”: 
The wind came as grassy sound 
    and between its 
      grassy teeth  
spoke words said with grass 
    and read itself 
        on tidal creeks as on 
 the screens of oscilloscopes  (56) 
 
The wind “read itself” as Wordsworth’s old man “read” the brackish water 
for Leeches, unsettling his reflection (and himself) by stirring it. The wind, 
in trying to “read” its influence on the shoreline reads itself in patterns that 
might be read; i.e., in patterns that are not in themselves meaningful, though 
they index a meaningless impulse to take them that way. The wind whirls, 
trying to grasp its own power like “elemental air in a spin” (16) in a line 
from Sphere, whirling from the stasis of “unity.”  






skiddling out among the sharp bush to gather 
  more sand, or just standing around idly spinning 
 
  like elegant women put off somewhere without 
  hats, but dusk’s blue called them off finally, 
 
  each to a separate valley, and by the time the 
  moon chipped the range line, all the conversation 
 
  of the day had become arroyo or talus stone… (83) 
 
The shift from wind to stone (and back) is linguistic energy spinning through 
its phase changes. Here, energy is low—and “idly spinning” is a chiastic 
reversal of the “spinningly idle wheels” of the strollers in the garbage dump 
(a link that Roger Gilbert has pointed out to me).  Figural motion passes 
through a limit of dead language (“petrification” or “stone”) to re-animate as 
figurality or “wind.” This is a passage through the void, facilitated by the 
morning sun, which awakens the whirlwinds again into motion.  
There is something discontinuous about the passage from day to night 
(and back), from wind to stone (and back), from figural to literal (and back).   
Plugging the hole of this discontinuity is the sun’s power to inaugurate 
cycles of motion:  
the next day, the red-shouldered rusty hills 
  woke the whirlwinds, first wobbly and vague, 
 
  but the sun, creaking the rocks…  (83) 





The rising sun gives the hills red shoulders, creaks the rocks into speech and 
sets the whirlwinds in motion—it inaugurates figural motion not unlike the 
sun in Paul de Man’s reading of Shelley’s “The Triumph of Life” (120).     
 It is worth situating Ammons’s model of language in more banal 
terms, by considering the well-worn catachresis “leg of the table,” whose 
figurality fades until “leg” literally denotes (retaining the ghost-connotation 
of a human leg). This dead and denoting metaphoricity is what Ammons 
tropes as an eroded mark (“arroyo”), “petrification” (stone) and “ruin” 
(talus)—a spent energy of metaphor that dulls the music of language: “all 
the conversation/of the day had become arroyo or talus stone” (82-83). 
However, the “time” of linguistic and geological erosion is distinct from the 
time of naming, when “leg of the table” picks out an object that is otherwise 
nameless.  Figural and literal meanings emerge at once in this naming. The 
sun figures this power by inaugurating motions of Nature and language 
alike—making the void’s power seem continuous as a passage from night to 
day. By appeal to cycles and oscillations Ammons figures a smooth and 
linear passage through a non-linear void.  
 What would it mean to identify with motion? Imagination, identified 
with creative energies of the cosmos, threatens to consume reality and itself. 





grasping itself as frozen curvature—but checks this static consummation in 
the poem “Sparklings” (Brink Road): 
The mind derives  
  from the manifold 
 
  concretions  and 
  motions of nature 
 
  motions of its own 
  reaching up into the 
 
  curvatures of unity 
  but is not 
    
  content to vanish, 
  extinguished, into the 
 
  resolutions of nothingness, 
  but precisely as the 
 
  world’s world fades 
  behind 
 
  projects structures of  
  design, 
 
  placements, 
  so that capability’s 
 
  entanglements can filigree 
  the very 
 
  freedom of nothingness…  (7-8) 
 
Between stanzas 2 and 3 is a mimetic mirror—“motions of nature/motions of 





nature toward an autonomous self-grasping.  However, the poem invokes a 
limit-point “precisely as the/world’s world fades/behind,” when the mind 
swerves, to “filigree/the very freedom of nothingness.”  What follows is: 
shining direction from 
  the void of unity 
 
  toward the enchantments 
  of what needs to be. (8) 
 
We recognize by now that the void is a logical gap into which Ammons 
heaves tropes, some of them good, and some of them clunking and didactic. 
Imagination defends itself from self-annihilation because it can “filigree” 
the freedom of nothingness—an word that suggests ornamentation, and by 
extension, neo-classical notions of tropes as ornaments rather than an 
essentially tropological language that contains the non-human and non-
verbal.  Ammons describes a passage through the apocalyptic core of 
imagination, but unlike William Blake (whose vortex-passage he inherits) 
the Ammons-imagination remains tied to an inhuman void that it minimally 
recuperates. 
 Imagination transmutes the void through a “knack” or “knackery,” 
and in this sense it is a “small,” “smallish,” “tiny” faculty—albeit persistent 





impersonal and “scientific,” and the speaker only claims to be daubing its 
“dispositional axis” with a bit of ink here and there:  
…the poem, 
  which is about the pre-socratic idea of the 
 
  dispositional axis from stone to wind, wind 
  to stone (with my elaborations, if any) 
 
  is complete before it begins, so I needn’t 
  myself hurry into brevity, though a weary reader 
 
  might briefly be done: the axis will be clear 
  enough daubed here and there with a little ink (20) 
 
The “axis” is a pre-Socratic metaphysical power, effecting phase changes.  It 
triggers shifts “from stone to wind, wind/ to stone,” recalling the 
discontinuous passage from wind to talus stone, effected by the rising sun.  
The mind of a reader passes through the void-axis “from stone to wind, 
wind/to stone” using poetry as its vehicle—collapsing phase changes of 
linguistic energy into physical changes.   
 Ammons surmises that a human being might similarly pass through 
death as a phase-change, as in “The Time Rate of Change” (Brink Road): 
You mosey around, idling here and 
  there for years, 






  out for you, and then one day 
  you feel a light hindrance 
  like a floating, cut-away spider web… 
 
With age, the hindrances increase: 
  …more years and a fine halter  
  of dense constraints bites in, 
 
  and a kind of speed breaks out, 
  not just speed but acceleration, and 
  you begin to look back and also, 
 
  and with equal alarm, forward, 
  and the speed picks up, the direction 
  narrows, and the speed is light (17) 
 
 
The constraints of physical decline accelerate the subject toward death, but 
this subjective speed becomes objective (or was it all along?) as the subject 
passes through death into pure energy.   
The abstract standpoint of energy should remind us of George and 
Ted, the two dead friends whose standpoint was that of the dust, but also, the 
standpoint of an observer approaching light-speed in famous gedanken 
experiments of Einstein. There is something formal about subject pronouns 
(“I,” “you,” “he-she,”) that survive death in the poetry of Ammons.  They 
are like a “filigree” or extraneous “ornament” that refuses to burn, as in 
Garbage: 
The heap of knickknacks (knicknackatery) 






 belt buckles, do-funnies, files, disks, pads, 
 pesticide residues, nonprosodic high-tension 
 
 lines, whimpering-wimp dolls, epichlorohydrin 
 eslastomotors, sulfur dioxide emissions, perfume 
 
 sprays, radioactive willwaws: the people at  
 Marine Shale are said to be “able to turn 
 
 wastes into safe products”: but some say these 
 “products are themselves hazardous wastes” (108)   
     
“Knickknacks” is an Ammon-term for the poetic faculty (a “knack”) now on 
the garbage heap of dead doctrine, while “nonprosodic high-tension lines” 
are lines of discarded poetry, reified as literal high-tension lines through the 
motif of declining energy, precipitating heaviness and thingness. The entire 
feeling of the passage is that of ungrounded and spectral energy that will not 
degrade; the passage ends by describing recycled waste that is waste—a 
figuration of ongoing that blocks ongoing—waste as a self-referential effect 
(“is a poem about garbage garbage?”). Is the grammatical fiction of the “I,” 
far from being an epiphenomenon of matter, also the material waste of a 
cosmos that cannot quite recycle itself?  
It is an obsessional fantasy of Ammons that the “I” survives death as a 
formal and spectral remainder—against the Ammons who upholds 





1996 collection, Brink Road stages this tension through a speaker who 
contemplates death: 
  We had something to do for a moment 
  with the eternity of things, we made 
  contact, the sweeps deeper than we 
 
  knew, moving in and out without regard, 
  we, bits, too little too brief to take 
  the awful informings in: age edges 
 
  us aside: we vacate offices (such as 
  listening for the loud, dull oriole 
  in May) to others whose earth earth’s 
 
  becoming: but, aside, we note clearly, 
  having them separate again, bit from  
  power, second from time’s springs: 
 
  look, there goes eternity, still astir: 
  here are roses seen before: nothing’s  
  to save us at last save loss itself: 
 
  even our gatherings, bits and pieces, 
  will with our central dissolving float 
  free, disordered, unaligned, the chairs 
 
  empty, our voices in none of the rooms: 
  well, it was enough, even if nothing  
  came of it, no, it was something even 
 
  if it becomes nothing, the show turned 
  full round: freedom freely 
  enough allowed burns free, burns us free. (16) 
     
The speaker says of life, “it was something even/ if it becomes nothing” 





rooms” puts our voices in the rooms, and this is the obsessional Ammons; 
obsessed with the presence of an absence, and hanging around after death as 
a spectral standpoint. To “vacate offices” makes “offices” or “duties” sound 
like actual rooms vacated: as though iterated actions were concrete 
universals that human beings pass through. Ammons emphasizes the effect 
by referencing actual rooms, and by implication, his university office.  What 
we “note” (notice) puns on the echoing note of the “loud, dull oriole/in 
May.” Both “note” a pattern of permanence in change: “look, there goes 
eternity, still astir.”  Deictic markers “look, there…” and “here …” point to 
Natural cycles—here now—in time, collapsing “eternity” (stasis) and “stir” 
(motion).  However, the note is “dull” and melancholic: “…others whose 
earth earth’s becoming” figures eternity as entropic pull (earth is becoming 
them, rather than vice-versa). In this poem we find Ammons as he was in 
“Corsons Inlet,” still fixed on the traumatic gap between cycles of energy 
and mutable humanity—and still trying to trope his way out of it.  The “bit” 
remains separated from “power,” the “second” from “time’s springs.” 
 All of this has a “natural” music—especially the “spontaneous” 
qualifications in the second to last and last lines. With the final line, we 
arrive at another ethical imperative, albeit obscure: “freedom freely/enough 





imagination in its complicity with death: imagination that burns us at the 
limit of its power. “Burning” is the state of a body releasing heat in the 
throes of chemical reactions, but it is also metaphorical identification —just 
as “cedes” was both annihilation and tropological identity in “Mansion.”  It 
is not that imagination is annihilation; rather, it points to itself as 
annihilation when the literal and figural senses of “burning” collapse.  As 
this study suggests, the agency of such a collapse is difficult to interpret.  
When we “allow” freedom to “burn us free” we identify with the flux of 
reality—but how does this identity become literal in death?   
Perhaps tropes of identity are partially annihilating, and physical 
annihilations are partially tropological, allowing us a smooth passage 
through the void: we get recycled in the way that dead language recycles 
into living language, or the way whirlwinds start moving again when the sun 
rises.  Such tropes of process require a still point where reality-as-process 
devours itself, uroboros-like, passing through death into new form.   What 
mattered to Ammons is that this still-point be an ecstatic moment that reason 









…does anyone know what’s at the core of their work?  I think probably that 
looking for the core is the core.   
       -John Ashbery (Ashbery 245) 
 
The process of writing poetry becomes the poem.     
       -John Ashbery (Ashbery 251) 
 
Most of my poems are about the experience of experience.    
       -John Ashbery  (Ashbery 254)1 
 
1.  Self-Reference 
 
In the last chapter I examined A.R. Ammons, and his materialist-apocalyptic 
identification with flux, “energy” or “burning”; an energy of metaphor that short-
circuits to reveal its intersection with an energy of nature—annihilating at the limit. 
Ashbery stages the poem’s identification with its own power—even 
apocalyptically (in Syringa)—when it folds onto itself in autonomous meaning. 
More typically, the poem encounters its own agency as alien. The two formal poles 
that animate the poetry of Ammons—performative short-circuit vs. self-indexing 
of power—are operative in Ashbery’s poetry as well. A tension between these 
poles creates a narrative “pull” in Ashbery’s poetry—the sense that that the poem 
is investigating its own power, and at privileged moments, manifesting the thing it 
is investigating. I present such a moment at the end of this chapter.   
                                       
1 All quotations from a 1983 interview in The Paris Review. 
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John Ashbery’s poetry forces us to explain its self-reference, and Ashbery 
himself gives more than one explanation. At times, he invokes the autonomous 
meaning of poetic form: “I think of my poems as independent objects or little 
worlds which are self-referential” (Shoptaw, 211)).  He also invokes the reflexivity 
of process-poetics, by analogy to Jackson Pollack and Willem de Kooning; the 
poem, like the action painting, records the history of its own making.  In a 1972 
interview with The Michigan Quarterly Review, Ashbery said that his poems 
present experience in abstract form as “the experience of experience.” To this, we 
could add the “post-modern” self-reference described by David Shapiro in 1979: 
“Ashbery’s poetry is humorously and melancholically self-reflexive and sees itself 
as a provisional, halting critique of naïve and degraded referential poetries” (1).  
Troubled by Ashbery’s reflexivity, Paul Breslin says that “…his relentless self-
cancellation takes away almost all that his lyrical genius gives.  …and every now 
and then, when he paroles himself from his prison of self-reference, he writes 
poems that belong among the best of our time” (50). 
As I read Ashbery’s self-reference, metaphor seems suspended between its 
cognitive and non-cognitive aspects: it no longer serves particular meaning, but 
signals its potential for meaning, and thereby refers to its power. Ashbery has 
thematized this power as a “cool non-being” in his poem, “The Other Tradition”; a 
void, whose potential to “surprise” us is a mystery.  Ashbery puts the reader on the 
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edge of understanding—but understanding what?  There is in Ashbery’s poetry—
as in a David Lynch film (one of his favorite directors)—a sense that missing 
information, context or ideas would make sense of things, and an equally strong 
sense that such context is formally excluded.  Missing context signals metaphorical 
power that does not serve communication, and for this reason, fragments of 
overheard conversation appear frequently in Ashbery’s poetry, and implicate 
metaphor in the present tense of coincidence and accident. 
Whether the present moment ever occurred and whose moment it shall be in 
the future is the problem of where and how to locate the time of metaphor.  Read 
through Romantic tradition,  the touch of metaphor is Wordsworth’s 
“unimaginable touch of time,” and the “gain and loss” of time is the “endowment” 
and “privation” of figures, to borrow the language of Paul de Man (“Language, as 
trope, is always privative” (de Man 80)). By taking on mutability as a theme, 
Ashbery takes on these Romantic problems. Ashbery’s poetry dramatizes a 
reflexive and personified metaphorical imagination, aware of its own temporality 
and its implication in “becoming.” There is in the telling of a story or the writing of 
a poem a contingency that makes it “other” to itself, “twisting the end result/Into a 
caricature of itself,” as Ashbery puts it in “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror” 
(80)—a necessary deviation, “randomness” or “otherness” implicit in “creativity” 
that also arises in the poetry of A.R. Ammons.  
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How can there be something outside of language that is also inside of it—
“too close to ignore, too far/for one to intervene” (81)? In “Self-Portrait in a 
Convex Mirror,” Ashbery thematizes this problem as the mystery of random noise 
that is constantly “tearing the matter/Of creation.../Out of our hands...” The speaker 
asserts--  
That the history of creation proceeds according to 
 Stringent laws, and that things 
 Do get done in this way, but never the things 
 We set out to accomplish, and wanted so desperately 
 To see come into being. (80) 
 
Ashbery affirms both the necessity of “accidents” and the lawless laws that unfold 
their aesthetic necessity. These laws take over when the poet turns away from her 
creation—a turn described in Ashbery’s poem “Syringa” through the myth of 
Orpheus. 
 As the poet turns away, the poem turns in on itself, oscillating between two 
poles of self-reference, described below:   
1.  The poem turns “inward” in autonomous meaning, or form.  
2.  The poem approaches its meaning from the outside.  
 
Cleanth Brooks took ambiguity and paradox as poetic form, and although Ashbery 
seems to have something more like formless form in mind, he imagines an 
“inward” turn for his poems—and also dramatizes an opposite pole of self-
reference.  At the opposite pole, the poem encounters its own meaning as “other”: 
it is “self-consciously” alienated from itself. The narrative hook is that the poem, 
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personified through its voice(s), struggles to grasp the mysteries of its agency, and 
this attempt becomes the poem. Thus, Ashbery can remark, in yet another reflexive 
short-circuit, that “poetry does not have subject matter, because it is the subject”—
a comment made to Kenneth Koch in a 1965 conversation (Ashbery). The poem is 
its own subject, and presents the self-consciousness of a human subject through 
this self-reference—the experience of experience.  
 The “fugue states” suffered by David Lynch’s heroines echo the 
predicament of Ashbery’s lyric subject, shattered by the poem’s “self-conscious” 
encounter with its own power.  There are hints of detective or mystery scenarios, 
but narrative and theme are subservient to what Ashbery calls “necessity,” “other 
sequences,” and “other times” manifested, for example, through suggestively 
broken grammar and jags of association. There is a sense of suspense, and urgent 
vectors of intent; missing information and context not only signify metaphorical 
power alienated from ideas and rational sense—they also function as a narrative 
pull.  
  The role of missing context or information emerges in these lines from 
“Fantasia on “The Nut-Brown Maid,” from Houseboat Days—a mid-period 
volume that I will consider in some detail:    
...you mention 
  The slamming of a door I wasn’t supposed to know about, 
  That took years.  Each of us circles  
  Around some vital piece of missing information, 
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  And, at the end, as now, finding no substitute, 
  Writes his own mark grotesquely with a stick in the snow,  
  The signature of many connected moments of indecision. 
  What I am writing to say is, the timing, not 
  The contents is what matters.  All this could have happened 
  Long ago, or at least on some other day,  
  And not meant much except insofar as the eye 
  Extracts a progress from almost anything. (85) 
 
Ashbery’s poetry more than once describes a shaping or visualizing eye that 
imposes a sense of “progress” or narrative on “becoming.” To impose meaning on 
a scrap of background noise—“the slamming of a closed door,” for example—only 
draws attention to the arbitrary nature of the event. Finding “no substitute” for 
“some vital piece of missing information”—i.e., no metaphorical substitute--each 
of us “Writes his own mark grotesquely with a stick in the snow.”   This is the 
signature of the present tense (“many connected moments of indecision”): “What I 
am writing to say is, the timing, not/The contents is what matters” (85). 
 “And at the end, as now” suggests that the timing under discussion is the 
timing of this very passage of poetry, and the mark in the snow is what this poem 
is marking now, somewhat grotesquely, through increasingly mixed metaphors and 
uncertain continuity. Without the salience of a now, “All this could have 
happened/...And not meant much except insofar as the eye/Extracts a progress from 
almost anything”— 
  ...But then 
  It wouldn’t have become a toy. 
  And all the myths, 
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  Legends and misinterpretations, would have scattered 
  At a single pistol shot.  And it would no longer know what 
      I know.  (85)            
    
What the speaker knows is tied up in a “now” that precipitates a “toy”—or tangible 
event— subjected to “myths,/Legends and misinterpretations.” “Timing” is “the 
slamming of a door” that snaps us awake, incorporated into our dream of 
meaning—nothing means anything without the discontinuity of the present tense.   
 This passage shows an aspect of Ashbery’s poetry that his imitators often 
fail to reproduce: the sense that the poem is operating at a high level of abstraction 
or meta-level—and the sense that this meta-poem is slipping back into the poem as 
muted epiphany. This slippage of levels is the essence of Ashbery’s self-reference. 
The poem, in talking about its “now,” bleeds into that “now,” and draws attention 
to a connection between metaphorical time and a present tense whose “stringent 
laws” of becoming are a mystery—the “missing information” around which 
Ashbery is always circling, as does A.R. Ammons.  Their poetry identifies with 
flux—and reflexively encounters it as the paradoxical, literalized metaphor that it 
is. Like Ammons, Ashbery has written poetry that articulates paradoxes of flow in 
a flowing style (a comparison of Garbage by Ammons and “Blue Sonata” by 
Ashbery would bring this out). Unlike Ammons, Ashbery situates creative form by 
abstracting it, and making the particulars aleatory. 
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 What is “abstraction” in Ashbery’s poetry?  In the 1965 conversation with 
Koch, Ashbery uses music as an example:   
Whenever I read a sentence, including a line of my own  
poetry, I am beset by the idea that it could have been written  
any other way.  When you are conscious of this while writing,  
it can often be very exciting.  I respond to works of art which  
express this idea, such as the music of Busoni, the main element  
of whose style is that it didn’t necessarily have to sound this way (Ashbery) 
 
“It didn’t necessarily have to sound this way” because potential form could always 
emerge otherwise.  Ashbery creates the sense that the poem could have been 
otherwise through qualifications, ambiguous grammar and undercutting; he 
detaches metaphor from the unfolding of ideas or narrative so that it can abstractly 
point to its own temporality, and its entanglement in what Wordsworth called (in 
the Essay Supplementary to the Preface to Poems (1815)) “endless fluctuations and 
arbitrary associations” (411)—or what the novelist Walker Percy called “mistake” 
(79-99). Ashbery incorporates fluctuations as style, by analogy to the “main 
element” of Busoni’s style.   
 Stylistically, Ashbery gives the sense that he is calibrating something 
between metaphorical cognition and noise—by analogy to music hovering between 
keys or incorporating tonal ambiguities. In certain of his longer poems, it is as 
though he is staging a public concert for an audience that might drift in or drift out, 
even as the reader might scan pages and move on, nonetheless having the 
experience of the poem. More radically, Ashbery abstracts a phantasmic “middle 
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ground” between signal and noise, like a musician presenting the moment when 
music emerges from noise, writing its mark “grotesquely” as “the signature of 
many connected moments of indecision.” Bracketing the context of music (John 
Cage, for example), the conceit has Romantic roots: when Wordsworth describes 
“sounds that are/the ghostly language of the ancient earth” (1805 2.327-28 W 92) 
the fantasy is also that there would be something between noise and meaningful 
sound—the muttering of crags or the distant voice of waters. Ashbery’s poetry 
seems to verge on meaning, and through this seeming, metaphor points to itself as 
something other than a form of sympathetic imagination. 
  Thus, time and the time of metaphor are connected in Ashbery’s poetry. The 
reflexivity of experience (“the experience of experience”) is that of metaphorical 
imagination, trying to grasp its own temporality, and in so doing, slipping back 
into it. The flicker between inside and outside is the edge of sleep, where 
overheard voices and obscure trains of association give us a glimpse into those 
“other times” that Ashbery takes to be the basis of an “other tradition” in poetry 
and the arts. In the Romantic thematization pursued in previous chapters of this 
study, metaphorical imagination grasps itself as “other,” opening up a gap between 
metaphorical power and cognition (metaphor is “other” to itself).  Another way to 
put it—Ashbery’s way, I suspect—is that metaphor has become “abstract.” The 
poem’s alien (or alienated) power posits a lyric subject, poetic voice or fragmented 
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voices in relation to it, located in the flicker between understanding and 
forgetting—or “attention and oblivion,” as Steven Knapp called this movement in 
his analysis of Wordsworth’s “Resolution and Independence” (106-29). Ashbery’s 
reader also slides in and out of understanding, sensing at charged moments that 
metaphor on the verge of meaning has bumped against her leg, like a house cat. 
What does it bring?   
In contrast to this self-alienated poem, Ashbery has described his poems as 
“independent objects or little worlds which are self-referential”—incarnating a 
self-reference that is “unconscious” rather than “self-conscious” (a poem turned 
inward as autonomous meaning).  The paradox and ambiguity of Cleanth Brooks is 
relevant here, but Ashbery is drawing more strongly on echoes of English poetic 
tradition rather than literary theory; notably, the bizarre refractions of Romantically 
reflexive form in the poem “Unread Pages,” by Laura Riding Jackson. What is 
“unread” or eludes “pagination” suggests meaning that exists whether someone 
reads it or not; a formal potential for meaning. In his interview with Peter Stitt 
Ashbery has said: “I think my poems mean what they say, and whatever might be 
implicit within a particular passage, but there is no message...  Many critics tend to 
want to see an allegorical meaning in every concrete statement...” (Ashbery). 
Against this concreteness, the reader allegorizes, and the poem also allegorizes its 
own becoming, abstracts its own meaning, or frames its own power. It tries to 
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explain what it is doing as it is doing it, and in failing to interpret itself, instead 
points to its power through a slippage of allegory into concrete statement, 
abstraction into particularity, and meta-language into object language.  In these 
cases, it is not just the poem’s meta-discourse slipping into poetry—the meta-
language of figurality is “slipping” into poetry, or succumbing to figural 
modification.  
As the poem probes itself, its encounter with power fragments the lyric 
subject into multiple voices, registers, and modes of address. Insofar as Ashbery’s 
poems struggle into self-awareness, I find a Romantic imagination in Ashbery, 
albeit an imagination that grasps itself as other. The poem struggles to present the 
navel of its dream, albeit not entirely in the language of the dream, hovering 
between ideas and a different kind of meaning that eludes the wakeful reader. 
Wordsworth’s love of the evening voluntary is relevant here: Ashbery likes 
to compose in late afternoon, and the gathering of dusk—the time of amphibious 
changes:  
 And last, perhaps, as darkness 
 Begins to infuse the lawns and silent streets 
 And the remote estuary, and thickens here, you mention 
 The slamming of a door I wasn’t supposed to know about... (85) 
   
2. As Stars Keep Off 
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“The Vermont Notebook” of Ashbery is a series of funny jottings illustrated 
by Joe Brainard, whose black and white silhouettes depict people and landscapes 
as banal archetypes.  Ashbery writes that “the horny grocery boy may be the god 
Pan in disguise” (60)), and the accompanying drawing is of a young man reclining 
in a pornographic pose.  However, Brainard erases a quarter of the boy’s face, 
suspending him between the particular and the generic.  Elsewhere, childhood 
memories bleed Polaroid color: “More seagull snapshots,” Ashbery writes.  “You 
know they reduce to brownish blobs like old Bible camp photos” (65). The 
blurring of particulars—like the effaced face of the grocery boy and the 
decomposing seagull photos—captures a suspension of particular and abstract.   
In one of his Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard (published as Other 
Traditions), Ashbery examines Laura Riding Jackson’s poem “Unread Pages” at 
some length. What draws Ashbery to Riding is her language, and the peculiar 
manner in which it blurs and even collapses the distinction between abstract and 
particular—or the difference between the subject of the poem and the poetry itself. 
Here is the ending of “Unread Pages”: 
Weird, pundit babyhoods  
  Whose blinking vision stammers out the past 
  Like a big-lettered foetus-future.  (qtd. in Ashbery 115)  
 
Ashbery describes the last line as “breathtakingly ugly,” and the hints of 
monstrosity index a power that mostly eclipses whatever Riding is trying to get 
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across about poetry—but also collapses into it (monstrates, rather than 
demonstrates). What Riding has to say about poetry collapses into poetry, and this 
slippage puts her on the same (unread) page as Ashbery.  Regarding “Unread 
Pages,” Ashbery says that “The poem as a whole anticipates a statement about 
poetry that Riding would make years later in The Telling: ‘Poetry is a sleep-maker 
which sits up late in us listening for the footfall of the future on today’s doorstep” 
(117).  In contrast, the infantile pundit “stammers out the past/Like a big-lettered 
foetus-future.”  The latter line is weird enough to have sat up late in the tradition—
late enough for Riding to have become an “other tradition” (minor tradition) by the 
time that Ashbery acknowledged her as an influence. It is “ugly” in a way that 
Ashbery finds usable—in the way that he uses Auden’s peculiar mode of 
personification, ripped from context. It is a statement about poetry that collapses 
into poetry—or what Ashbery calls “concrete” meaning—and functions as 
“sleepmaker” by staging that collapse. 
At its inward-turning limit, the poem realizes its meaning on its “Unread 
Pages”:   
Have sleep and midnight warmth, 
  Where your scant eyes see failure, 
  Numbering the wakefullest page 
  The dark and frosty last. 
 
  An end is a happy end only. 
  And first the book’s end comes,  
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  The printed public leaves off reading. 
 
  Then open the small secret doors, 
  When none’s there to read awrong. 
  Out runs happiness in a crowd (Jackson)  
 
 
There is a similarity between Riding’s formulation— 
 
  Where your scant eyes see failure, 
  Numbering the wakefullest page 
  The dark and frosty last (Jackson) 
 
—and Ashbery’s formulation in “Daffy Duck in Hollywood” 
  …last perhaps 
  The pattern that may carry the sense, but 
  Stays hidden in the mysteries of pagination (34) 
 
Ashbery was especially intrigued by the notion that, after the reader’s numbering 
of the “wakefullest page,” there “open the small secret doors,/When none’s there to 
read awrong.”   
The numbering of wakeful pages happens by daylight in Laura Riding 
Jackson’s poem— 
  As stars keep off, or to short minds 
  Night seems a less real time than day, 
  Not to be measured with or counted to 
  That quick self-evident sum of sun… (Jackson) 
 
—and Riding used a similar formulation in her poem, “A City Seems”:  
 …we stand separate and wakeful 
 Measuring death in miles between us… (Jackson) 
 
The measuring or numbering that occurs by day represses desire realized in sleep: 
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Sleep is a single heart 
  Filling the old avenues we used to know 
 With miracles of dark and dread 
 We dare not go to meet 
 Save as our own dead stalking 
 Or as two dreams walking 
 One tread and terrible… (Jackson) 
   
Dreams meet when lovers cannot.  Along similar lines, “small secret doors” open 
to eros on the poem’s unread pages “when none’s there to read awrong.”   
In his essay on Riding, Ashbery interprets her to be saying that “the reading 
or some related kind of activity keeps on happening ‘when none’s there to read 
awrong.’”  But what is an activity “related” to reading, or beyond it?  Regarding 
the lines, “Then open the small secret doors…/…“Out runs happiness in a crowd” 
Ashbery writes: 
  A crowd of what or whom?  And what are these doors? 
  In any case, another situation, beyond reading perhaps… (114) 
 
Ashbery says: “The pages that come after the numbered, wakefullest one remain 
unread, but that is our loss, not theirs: they live on in starlit integrity, ‘happiness in 
a crowd.’ They do not communicate, leaving that falsifying task to their numbered 
predecessors” (117).   
“As stars keep off” is a formulation that Ashbery called “beautiful.” The 
“starlit integrity” of poetic meaning echoes “the silences of the soul, picked out 
in/Diamonds on stygian velvet”—another line from “Daffy Duck in Hollywood.” 
Ashbery invokes those silences as the basis of an “other tradition” of poetry; a 
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background drone of existence, foregrounded, or “picked out in/Diamonds” (32). 
The temporality of mistakes, free-association, and the sudden foregrounding of 
background noise makes up “‘other times’” mentioned in “Daffy Duck in 
Hollywood”: “…those ‘other times’/Are in fact the silences of the soul…” (32) 
The phrase “other times” recalls Ashbery’s poem, “The System”:    
But there was a time for others, that were to  have got under way, sequences 
that now can exist only in memory, for there were other times for them.  Yet 
they really existed.” (54) 
 
The above passage explains how this temporality fixates the subject 
painfully: 
For instance, a jagged kind of mood that comes at the end of the day, lifting 
life into the truth of real pain for a few moments before subsiding in the 
usual irregular way as things do. These were as much there as anything, 
things to be fumbled with, cringed before: dry churrings of no timbre, 
hysterical staccato passages that one cannot master or turn away from. These 
things led into life.  Now they are gone but it remains, calm, lucid, but 
weightless, drifting above everything and everybody like a light in the sky, 
no more to be surmised, only remembered as many things that remain at 
equal distances are remembered. The light drinks the dark and sinks down, 
not on top of us as we had expected but far, far from us in some other, 
unrelated sphrere. This was not even the life that was going to happen to us.  
          (54) 
 
Bare existence gets displaced into “life,” but “This was not even the life that was 
going to happen to us.” The passage describes the displacement of life through 
figures that drift as spatial ambiguities—“equal distances,” “not on top of us,” 
“unrelated sphere”—relating “other times” and the “otherness” of figural agency.  
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In the myth of origins that Ashbery outlines in the beginning of “The 
System,” “Truth” represses raw temporality and merges with “life” to form an 
apparently invisible medium.  A severe “Truth” assimilated “life”—but then life 
separated from it: “the life uncurled around it in calm waves, unimpressed by the 
severity and yet not paying much mind, also very much itself” (55).  Life splits 
from “truth,” even as it splits from abstract meaning, becoming strangely 
personified.  In “The System” the speaker says: “it is this ‘other tradition’ which 
we propose to explore. …happenings that form a kind of sequence of fantastic 
reflections as they succeed each other at a pace and according to an inner necessity 
of their own…” This “inner necessity” is Ashbery’s myth of emergent form, now 
tied to a cosmic emergence:    
It was all life, this truth, you forgot about it and it was there. No need to 
collect your thoughts at every moment before putting forth a hesitant feeler 
into the rank and file of their sensations: the truth was obstinately itself, so 
much so that it always seemed about to harden and shrink, to grow hard and 
dark and vanish into itself anxiously but stubbornly, but this was just the 
other side of the coin of its intense conviction. It really knew what it was. 
Meanwhile the life uncurled around it in calm waves, unimpressed by the 
severity and not paying much mind, also very much itself. It seemed as 
though innumerable transparent tissues hovered around these two entities 
and joined them in some way, and yet when one looked there was nothing 
special to be seen, only miles and miles of buoyancy, the way the mild blue 
sky of a summer afternoon seems to support a distant sailing bird. (55) 
 
This “summer afternoon” echoes more than once in Ashbery’s poetry.  “Daffy 
Duck in Hollywood” ends “Always invoking the echo, a summer’s day,” and 
“Syringia” ends by describing the “hidden syllables/Of what happened so long 
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before that/In some town, one indifferent summer” (71). “The ultimate lightness” 
in “The Vermont Notebook” recalls the “buoyancy” of life in the passage above, 
and across all of these examples, there is a sense of truth coinciding with existence. 
Summer is unselfconscious existence and lightness of life—sometimes figured as a 
lost world. However, Ashbery has also said in interviews that “there’s something 
death-like about summer.” In contrast to the buoyancy figured by a summer sky, 
there is a different kind of “life” that does not know what it is, encountering itself 
as “silences of the soul.”  The “other times” that emerge from these moments have 
the “inner necessity” of “sequences” (free associations?) arising from “not-being-
us.”    
The poem folds on itself in the way that the subject encounters life, and this 
reflexivity takes two forms.  Firstly, there is the inward turn of the poem into its 
own life so that the poem is “very much itself” as an autonomous world of 
meaning—doing just fine without a reader per Laura Riding Jackson (or at least 
Ashbery’s reading of her).  Secondly, the poem encounters itself in in its alterity—
as potential meaning that can only be communicated as missing context, wobbles 
of grammar, and discontinuous narrative transitions. What happens on the poem’s 
unread pages is a limit of “concrete” meaning that communicates obscurely if at 
all, around which voices form in Ashbery’s poetry: the voice of Ashbery 
interviewed in poetry journals, the voices of unnamed characters in the poem, 
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voices overheard in coffee shops, and personifications of the poem’s agency that 
bleed into concreteness. In an Ashbery poem, the fragmented lyric subject can 
speak from the standpoint of antithetical form, or from outside of it—but most 
often, from the liminal zone between. As the speaker states in “Daffy Duck in 
Hollywood”: “Life, our/Life anyway, is between.”  
3. Daffy Duck in Hollywood 
 Ashbery claims to be abstracting “experience” in his 1972 interview with A. 
Poulin Jr. in The Michigan Quarterly Review: 
Most of my poems are about the experience of experience.  As I said before, 
the particular occasion is of lesser interest to me than the way a happening or 
experience filters through to me. I believe this is the way it happens with 
most people. I’m trying to set down a generalized transcript of what’s really  
going on in our minds all day long.  We’re sitting here, presumably  
having a nice discussion about somebody’s poetry, and yet the occasion is 
something else also.  First of all, I’m in a strange place with lots of lights 
whose meaning I don’t quite understand, and I’m talking about a poem I 
wrote years ago and which no longer means very much to me.  I have a 
feeling that everything is slipping away from me as I’m trying to talk about 
it—a feeling I have most of the time, in fact. (245)     
 
Ashbery draws attention to this slippage as a form of universal aphasia; the cusp of 
an abstract dream that reader and poet would share.  
Ashbery has said in interviews: “I am always impressed by how difficult and 
yet how easy it is to get from one moment to the next of one’s life—particularly 
while travelling…” (Stitt, 30)   “The Vermont Notebook” takes up the form of this 
experience:   
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  Sometimes the weary traveller suffering from jetlag prefers 
  to be shown directly to his hotel to be sewn in the sheets 
  from which no dream ever befalls.  Weary and heartsick, 
  emotionally battered by the voyage, the eyes overcome with  
fatigue, unable to read the newspaper thoughtfully provided  
for him he teeters on the hem of sleep, disrobing this way or  
that, clenching in his teeth all those distraught objects of the  
recent past—the way someone looked at him, seeming not  
seeing but just seeing.  The sandwich the way it was.  The 
coffee, how much better or how much worse than the last 
time.  The clerk peeping at his papers.  These collect and 
dissipate like gnats on a screen door—some penetrate the 
holes in the screen, others move on outside and are  
replaced by new shoals and whorls, but the movement 
is the same, grudging giving and giving back.  So many 
marvelous empty mountains.  So much eye, such frivolity. 
The ultimate lightness. (35) 
       
We might expect the speaker to say that no dream befalls the weary traveller—
instead, no dream falls out of the sheets into which he is sewn.  A sewing motif 
develops and dissipates: “sewn in the sheets,” “hem of sleep, disrobing this way or 
that,” “seeming [seaming] not seeing…”  The traveller, “clenching in his teeth all 
those distraught objects of the recent past” is struggling, along with the objects 
themselves, against a slide into the generic—struggling to maintain particular 
memories.  However, generic and particular blur as “So many marvelous empty 
mountains”—the unbearable lightness of the generic particular, manifested in the 
American landscape.  In “The System,” Ashbery will give this “ultimate lightness” 
the name “life,” and construct a myth of its emergence from the background drone 
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of existence—the collection and dissipation of gnats on a screen door, figuring the 
flux of recent memory and associations.    
Ashbery has said that he is trying to transmit an abstract form of experience: 
“What I am trying to get at is a general, all-purpose experience—like those stretch 
socks that fit all sizes.” (250- 251)  Those stretch socks are already slipping back 
among “distraught objects of the recent past”—sandwich, coffee, hotel clerk, 
stretch socks.  It is a mild version of the aphasia he would dramatize in poetry by 
using slightly innapropriate figures.  More ambitiously, Ashbery wants his poetry 
to be “the openest possible form” of experience or the “openest possible” dream; 
he wants to capture something universal in the passage to oblivion—the slamming 
of a screen door and voices overheard on the way to sleep.  
The passage from wakefulness to sleep and vice-versa is an experience that 
we share.   On closer examination however, Ashbery is not trying to abstract a 
common experience, but a common form of experience, in which metaphor no 
longer serves this or that meaning, but signals its abstract potential for meaning.   
Dramatized this way, metaphor is a mysterious quarry, manifested through a lack 
of narrative transitions, ambiguous pronouns and absent context.   To a certain 
extent, the poetry re-captures metaphor as communication, but abstractions re-
particularize, dead language re-animates, and meta-poetry slips into poetry.     In 
his 1983 interview in The Paris ReviewAshbery sais that “many critics tend to 
 241 
want to see an allegorical meaning in every concrete statement…” (34); in contrast, 
“I think my poems mean what they say...” (35)  He added that he would like his 
poems to be “what Stevens calls a completely new set of objects” (35).  Allegory is 
either fading into a welter of poetic objects—or re-asserting its control over those 
objects.  What matters for Ashbery is not one side or the other of this dichotomy, 
but the fact that neither side has the upper hand.  Allegory might make some 
headway in trying to interpret a cascade of concrete poetic “objects,” but emblem 
and idea are always threatening to collapse into something concrete.  It is then that 
the poem stages time as the opening and closing of allegory—which is something 
that the poem performs.   
Here, for example, are lines from “Daffy Duck in Hollywood”—a comic 
poem that stages the tension between “concreteness” and allegory: 
Something strange is creeping across me. 
  La Celestina has only to warble the first few bars 
  Of “I Thought about You” or something mellow from 
  Amadigi di Gaula for everything—a mint-condition can 
  Of Rumford’s Baking Powder, a celluloid earring, Speedy 
  Gonzales, the latest from Helen Topping Miller’s fertile  
  Escritoire, a sheaf of suggestive pix on greige, deckle-edged 
  Stock—to come clattering through the rainbow-trellis 
  Where Pistachio Avenue rams the 2300 block of Highland 
  Fling terrace.  He promised he’d get me out of this one, 
  That mean old cartoonist, but just look what he’s  
  Done to me now!  (31) 
 
Daffy speaks from a Hollywood apartment, bunkered in with flop sweat and a 
strange condition: a few bars of Handel’s Amadigi sends a catalog of objects 
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“clattering through the rainbow trellis.”  This violence transfers to Pistachio 
Avenue, which “rams the 2300 block of Highland Fling Terrace.”  Ashbery tells us 
that this avalanche of things is impervious to allegory. Here, the struggle between 
allegory and concreteness is comic: the tension between “opposing forces” arises 
from the poem’s extended attempt to control, explain and aestheticize the alien 
principle usurping it. 
In the lines below, the allegory is in large part a sucker’s game, but 
nonetheless invites interpretation:    
… “Up 
  The lazy river, how happy we could be?” 
  How will it end?  That geranium glow 
  Over Anaheim’s had the riot act read to it by the  
  Etna-size firecracker that exploded last night into 
  A carte du Tendre in whose lower right-hand corner 
  (Hard by the jock-itch sand-trap that skirts  
  The asparagus patch of algolagnic nuits blanches)  Amadis 
  Is cozening the Princesse de Cleves into a midnight 
  micturition spree 
  On the Tamigi with the Wallets (Walt, Blossom, and little 
  Skeezix) on a lame barge “borrowed” from Ollie 
  Of the Movies’ dread mistress of the robes.  Wait! 
  I have an announcement!  This wide, tepidly meandering, 
  Civilized Lethe (one can barely make out the maypoles  
  And chalets de necessite on its sedgy shore) leads to Tophet, 
  that 
  Landfill-haunted, not-so-residential resort from which 
  Some travellers return!  This whole moment is the groin 
  Of a borborygmic giant who even now 
  Is rolling over on us in his sleep.  Farewell bocages, 
  Tanneries, water-meadows.  The allegory comes usnarled 
  Too soon; a shower of pecky acajou harpoons is 
  About all there is to be noted between tornadoes. (32) 
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 “Up the lazy river” is a Mills Brother’s reference, and their silky harmonies segue 
into a different voice asking: “How will it end?”  The poem stands outside of its 
chaotic energy, before jump-cutting to “That geranium glow.” This suggests the 
glow of Disneyland in sky of Anaheim, lit up with its nightly airburst of 
fireworks—“the/Etna-size firecracker that exploded last minute into/A carte du 
Tendre…”  
With the allusion to the carte du Tendre, “Up the lazy river” now anticipates 
an allegorical 16th century map whose waterways resemble a woman’s 
reproductive organs—pathways to love.  References to the Handel-scored Amadigi 
di Gaula blur into Gasoline Alley (Walt, Blossom and little Skeezix) a comic from 
the early decades of the 20th century whose characters aged in “real time” over the 
decades, blurring reality and fiction somewhat.  “Wait!/I have an announcement!” 
seems like another interjection from the poem, likening itself to “This wide, tepidly 
meandering,/Civilized Lethe.”  The “announcement”—all cartoon sweat and fever 
dream—answers the original question, “How will it end?”  The river-journey leads 
past maypoles and portable toilets (“chalets de necessite”) and ends in “Tophet,” 
in the valley of Hinnon near Jerusalem, where rubbish heaps smoldered and 
parents sacrificed children to Moloch: “that/Landfill-haunted, not-so-residential 
resort from which/Some travellers return!”   The “allegory” may have finally have 
reduced itself to some sort of statement; for example, “we are sacrificing our 
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children to a garbage heap that collapses high and low culture.” Alternately, 
“Tophet” is an arbitrary punctuation mark.  Either way, “The allegory comes 
unsnarled too soon” implies some sort of closure, and all that is left of the 
autonomous poetic objects that constituted it is a shower of harpoons. 
Ashbery has commented on a dynamical war between allegory and concrete 
statement in his interview with the Paris Review, with reference to “Daffy Duck in 
Hollywood”: 
  “The allegory comes unsnarled too soon,” that 
  might be my observation of poetry and my 
  poetry in particular.  The allegory coming unsnarled 
  meaning that the various things that make it up are 
  dissolving into a poetic statement, and that is something 
  I feel is both happening and I don’t want to happen. 
  And, as so often, two opposing forces are working to  
  cancel each other out.  (34) 
 
What Ashbery means by “two opposing forces” is allegory opposing concrete 
statement and threatening, at the limit, the chaotic catalogs unleashed by Daffy 
Duck. As an example of “objects” resistant to allegory, Ashbery offers the 
beginning of “Daffy Duck in Hollywood:  “…all these strange objects avalanche 
into the poem.  I meant them to be there for themselves, and not for some hidden 
meaning.” (Ashbery 34) 
 At times, the poem seems to be allegorizing or figuring its becoming—but 
instead, there is a blurring of vehicle and tenor, emblem and idea—and a return to 
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the word hoard or primal chaos. At other times, we hear from a more sober and 
“self-aware” voice that I take to be that of metaphor, free-association—or even the 
voice of a particular mental association, latent in the unconscious: 
 …I have 
 Only my intermittent life in your thoughts to live 
 Which is like thinking in another language.  Everything 
 Depends on whether somebody reminds you of me. 
 That this is fabulation, and that those “other times”  
 Are in fact the silences of the soul, picked out in  
 Diamonds on stygian velvet, matters less than it should. (32) 
   
“My intermittent life in your thoughts to live” suggests the intermittent recollection 
of an image by association “Which is like thinking in another language.” Along 
these lines, whatever calls up the mental association is a personified “somebody” 
who “reminds you of me”—a something that calls up the association.  
John Shoptaw quotes Ashbery from a poetry reading, associating the 
struggle of opposing forces in “Daffy Duck in Hollywood” with the struggle of 
Satan against God in Paradise Lost: “I seemed to have somehow associated Satan 
with Daffy Duck…  They are somewhat alike” (203).  Daffy’s mode of creation 
steals from the abyss—a pastiche of discarded cultural detritus, or  juxtaposed 
castoffs. His cartoon energy is anti-lyric, moreover he is not entirely in control 
over it (“Something strange is creeping across me…”). Daffy molds what he steals 
from the landfill of Tophet-Los Angeles; he pancakes high and low culture—or 
creates collage-effects reminiscent of Ashbery’s own art-collages.  Inasmuch there 
 246 
are lyric swells amid the chaos, they float to the surface with the vague sense of 
childhood memory, pasted onto the “geranium glow” of an old painting.  These 
effects are flat and formal, but they have a melancholy feeling explored elsewhere 
in Ashbery’s poetry: vanishings, displaced meaning and absent context.  
As “prodigies of timing” (33) Ashbery’s catalogs emerge from the white noise of 
culture at a particular time (the 1940’s in many of the poem’s references), placed 
where they are in the catalog because that is where they belong at that particular 
moment in the poem—as though pointing to emergent form with its own laws and 
principles.  
Ashbery is awash in mysteries of emergent form—emerging from fortuitous 
coincidence, mistakes and other forms of “randomness”—as these lines from 
“Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror” suggest: 
...Is there anything 
  To be serious about beyond this otherness 
  That gets included in the most ordinary 
  Forms of daily activity, changing everything 
  Slightly and profoundly, and tearing the matter 
  Of creation, any creation, not just artistic creation 
  Out of our hands, to install it on some monstrous, near 
  Peak, too close to ignore, too far for one to intervene? (80-81) 
 
The alien and inhuman element of creation tears poetic material from the poet’s 
hands—and this force takes the form of something that is not us, and a reflection:   
  ...This otherness, this 
  “Not-being-us” is all there is to look at 
  In the mirror... (80-81) 
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Inasmuch as “the history of creation proceeds according to/Stringent laws” they are 
lawless laws that put poet and reader almost entirely outside of them. “Daffy Duck 
in Hollywood” suggests that the poem itself is outside of this creative principle, 
facing it as an “avalanche of objects.”  This “self-consciousness” self-reference of 
the poem is in tension with its “unconscious” self-reference—the poem as “little 
world”—turned inward into the navel of its dream.    
In its self-awareness, “Daffy Duck in Hollywood” resists closing onto 
autonomously meaningful form, like a nightflower.  Poetic form that “may carry 
the sense” is like an occulted or withdrawn God, hidden in the marine-layer smog 
of Los Angeles:  
  Low skyscrapers from lower-hanging clouds reveal 
  A turret there, an art-deco escarpment here, and last perhaps 
  The pattern that may carry the sense, but 
  Stays hidden in the mysteries of pagination. (34) 
 
What are “the mysteries of pagination”?  These are the pages described by Laura 
Riding Jackson, that cannot be numbered—or read wakefully.        
“Daffy Duck in Hollywood” embraces the manifold of pop cultural 
sensation and pitching its tent in the middle of a highway: “…vague people on this 
emerald traffic-island—no,/Not people, comings and goings, more: mutterings, 
splatterings…” (31-32).  This is the poem talking, and trying to frame the event 
that buried Daffy Duck in an avalanche of objects. We might get the sense that the 
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poem is finally catching up to its own event and reflecting on it—building toward 
the sense of an ending in lyrical flashes:  
  …Therefore bivouac we  
  On this great, blond highway, unimpeded by 
  Veiled scruples, worn conundrums.  Morning is 
  Impermanent.  Grab sex things, swing up  
  Over the horizon like a boy  
  On a fishing expedition.  No one really knows 
  Or cares whether this is the whole of which parts 
  Were vouchsafed—once—but to be ambling on’s 
  The tradition more than the safekeeping of it.   This mulch for 
  Play keeps them interested and busy while the big, 
  Vaguer stuff can decide what it wants—what maps, what 
  Model cities, how much waste space.  Life, our 
  Life anyway, is between.  We don’t mind 
  Or notice any more that the sky is green, a parrot 
  One, but have our earnest where it chances on us, 
  Disingenuous, intrigued, inviting more, 
  Always invoking the echo, a summer’s day. (34) 
 
“Life, our/Life anyway is between” recalls “I have/only my intermittent life in your 
thoughts to live/Which is like thinking in another language.”  The lines play with 
linguistic material through the device of the crypt phrase; “this mulch for/Play” 
(this much foreplay) and “worn conundrums” (worn condoms).   
 “Daffy Duck in Hollywood” revels in linguistic found-objects that carry an 
opaque metaphorical charge, and the eros of fishing for them: “Grab sex things, 
swing up/over the horizon like a boy/On a fishing expedition.” That boy is, in part, 
Tom Sawyer or Huckleberry Finn, and the latter’s journey down the Mississippi 
returns us to the lazy river of the Mills Brothers, “the little/White cardboard castle 
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over the Mill Run” and amorous mysteries of the carte du Tendre. The poem will 
live on a traffic island, amid the comings and goings of the freeway, trafficking in 
cartoon energies “while the big,/vaguer stuff can decide what it wants—what 
maps, what/model cities, how much waste space.” The “vaguer stuff” could be the 
impulse of critics to map the tradition, designate waste space, and valorize model 
poems—or it could be an organizing tendency in the poem itself.  But, the map and 
the “waste space” collapse back onto the carte du tendre and the landfill of 
Tophet—the map becomes the territory. The poem has turned “inward,” to borrow 
a formulation of Ashbery from “Syringa,” mapping onto itself as concrete 
“statement.”  
The collapse of allegory into concreteness is also a flattening effect: a 
collapse of high and low culture, idea and copy that suggests a simulacrum.  
However, the poem never frames itself as a post-modern manifesto, nor does it 
convincingly figure change as a Romantic horizon of possibility, a return to 
boyhood innocence or the ephemerality of a summer’s day.  The boyhood fishing 
expedition is a metaphor of the poem that slips back into the poem—pasted on to it 
in the way that Ashbery pasted a young boy and a fish against the background of a 
dark forest in a 1972 art collage, “Poisson d’Avril.” (N.Y. Times, AR1)  To 
whatever extent we read Ashbery as “Romantic” or “post-modern,” the more 
fundamental point is the poem’s relation to its power.  The personified poem 
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hovers between “self-consciousness” and an “unconscious” collapse into 
autonomous poetic meaning beyond any reading—including the poem’s attempt to 
read itself. 
4.  Syringa 
 “Syringa” is another poem in Ashbery’s “mid-period” volume Houseboat 
Days; a beautiful poem that reads loss through the myth of Orpheus and his 
misguided attempt to retain Eurydice (“Of course Eurydice vanished into the 
shade;/She would have even if he hadn’t turned around”). Orpheus sings his loss 
this way:  
  …Singing accurately 
  So that the notes mount straight up out of the well of 
  Dim noon and rival the tiny, sparkling yellow flowers 
  Growing around the brink of the quarry encapsulizes 
  The different weights of the things… (70) 
 
These flowers are “syringa”—from “syrinx” in the Greek, meaning hollow reed, 
and recalling a Greek myth.  When Pan chased Syrinx through the river Ladon, she 
appealed for help to the nymphs, and they changed her into river reeds.  Grasping 
those reeds instead of Syrinx, Pan became transfixed by the way they transmuted 
his agonized breath into music, and he made pipes.  The name of Syrinx thereby 
migrated through language, dismembered into syllables and injected into 
Ashbery’s poem as the echoing of syringe/syringa/syrinx/sphinx.   
 251 
Syrinx is caught in the flow of the river—and the flow of language takes up 
the syllables of her name.  The singing of Orpheus is also caught up in the flow of 
numbers (meter), and the loss implied by it.  The speaker speculates that this might 
have frustrated the Bacchantes who tore Orpheus apart: 
Some say it was for his treatment of Eurydice 
  But probably the music had more to do with it, and 
  The way music passes, emblematic 
  Of life and how you cannot isolate a note of it 
  And say it is good or bad.  (70) 
 
Singing and music are metaphors for poetry, and therefore, metaphors of metaphor, 
and the temporality of metaphor.   
 The concluding lines of “Daffy Duck in Hollywood” announce that “we 
greet him who announces/The change as we would greet the change itself” (34) 
and “Syringa” clearly aligns poetic agency with change and the impossibility of 
arresting it:         
…For although memories, of a season, for example, 
  Melt into a single snapshot, one cannot guard, treasure 
  That stalled moment.  It too is flowing, fleeting. (70) 
 
The reference to “memories of a season” and “a single snapshot” should remind us 
of the generic memory of summer on the beach, and the seagull photos in “The 
Vermont Notebook.” The mutability of all such snapshots is a fact: 
  ...to ask more than this 
  Is to become the tossing reeds of that slow, 
  Powerful stream, the trailing grasses 
  Playfully tugged at, but to participate in the action 
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  No more than this. (70) 
 
The “tossing reeds of that slow,/Powerful stream” is a reference to Syrinx, 
passively caught in the river’s flow, and “playfully tugged at” by benignly 
personified forces that are no less external and relentless than her would-be 
rapist—the play of language, tugging at her name.  To ask for something beyond 
flux (“to ask more than this”) or to identify consciously with flux (“to participate in 
the action”) amounts to the same thing: to be passively in its thrall like Syrinx. 
 The poem ends, however, with a third option.  Instead of identifying with 
temporality—or trying to freeze it—the poem encounters its own power: 
…no matter how all this disappeared, 
  Or got where it was going, it is no longer 
  Material for a poem.  Its subject  
  Matters too much, and not enough, standing there helplessly 
  While the poem streaked by, its tail afire, a bad 
  Comet screaming hate and disaster, but so turned inward 
  That the meaning, good or other, can never 
  Become known. (71) 
 
The theme of regret, loss and mutability has either disappeared or “got where it 
was going” but “no matter” because “it is no longer/Material for a poem.” “Its 
subject/Matters too much” because it is too important (and not enough) but also 
because it “matters” in an ungrammatically verbal sense of being resistant poetic 
material, and not material (antithetically poetic) enough.  We might be reminded of 
“Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” in which “otherness” is always “tearing the 
matter/Of creation, any creation, not just artistic creation/Out of our hands [my 
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italics].”  Thus, the poem that “streaked by” is a poem “so turned inward/That the 
meaning, good or other,/can never/Become known.” “Good or other” clearly 
echoes the speaker’s earlier remarks about the temporal nature of music, and how 
“you cannot isolate a note of it and say it was good or bad.”  
The temporality of metaphor, or metaphorical imagination is at stake here.  
Wordsworth’s famous lines from the Simplon Pass segment of The Prelude bear 
on Ashbery’s language as the passage builds to a climax: 
…The singer thinks 
  Constructively, builds up his chant in progressive stages 
  Like a skyscraper, but at the last minute turns away. 
  The song is engulfed in an instant of blackness 
  Which must in turn flood the whole continent 
  With blackness, for it cannot see. The singer 
  Must then pass out of sight, not even relieved 
  Of the evil burthen of the words. Stellification 
  Is for the few, and comes about much later 
  When all record of these people and their lives 
  Has disappeared into libraries, onto microfilm. 
  A few are still interested in them. “But what about 
  So-and-so?” is still asked on occasion.  But they lie 
  Frozen and out of touch until an arbitrary chorus 
  Speaks of a totally different incident with a similar name 
  In whose tale are hidden syllables  
  Of what happened so long before that 
  In some small town, one indifferent summer. (71) 
 
The singer turns away from the song, and leaves it to turn on itself—reversing the 
turn of Orpheus.  Without the singer, the song effectively dies—“engulfed in an 
instant of blackness.”   “For it cannot see” recalls Emily Dickinson’s “I could not 
see to see—” from “I heard a Fly buzz—when I died.” Wordsworth wrote that “the 
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light of sense/Goes out in flashes” (extinguishes-propagates) (1805 6.134-5 W 
240), but Ashbery makes the poem—rather than the poet—suffer “visionary” 
blindness.    
For Ashbery, this is a moment in which metaphor no longer communicates 
the subject of the poem or any other idea—it streaks past the poem’s dumbfounded 
subject like a bad comet.  The poem is “so turned inward” that “the meaning” now 
“can never be known,” and the conceit undoubtedly recalls Ashbery in interviews 
and his interest in Laura Riding Jackson: “I think of my poems as independent 
objects or little worlds which are self-referential” (Shoptaw, 211).   Thus in 
“Syringa,” reflexive discontinuity and reflexive meaning are linked—the “going 
out” (extinction) of light is also the going out (“propagation”) of “blackness” in the 
way that William Empson read “goes out” in Wordsworth’s lines from the Prelude, 
as both extinction and propagation of light (Empson 28). The personified poem 
folds onto the meaning of its form, but loses consciousness in that moment. The 
poem’s subject was loss, and by declaring that its subject is “no longer/Material for 
a poem,” it stages what it is talking about.   
Although “Stellification/Is for the few” is readable as “fame is for the few,” 
there is an echo of Laura Riding Jackson here. The vulgar majority read poetry “as 
stars keep off,” but what lives on in “starlit integrity,” “picked out in/Diamonds on 
stygian velvet,” is the “life” transmuted by form that enters the tradition by 
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streaking past rationally communicable meaning.  As the speaker of “Syringa” puts 
it: “Only love stays on the brain, and something these people,/These other ones call 
life” (69). Although “other ones,” “other times” and “other tradition” are generic 
terms, I think that together, they constitute an echo that signals the movement of an 
irrational and renovating power of language. What brings dead poets to 
“intermittent life” are “hidden syllables” that they bequeath to the tradition; in 
Ashbery’s poem, this would include the name “Syrinx,” but also, the motif of 
stellification, and markers of style, such as the “over-particularized” 
personification of Auden examined in Chapter 2.     
The last words of “Syringa”— “In some small town, one indifferent summer 
(71)”—invoke a traditional figure of mutability and loss: the beauty of a summer’s 
day, or the ephemerality of something that happened long ago, “one indifferent 
summer,” leaving its trace in “hidden syllables.”  Elegy situates loss by “looking 
back” as Orpheus did in trying to retain Eurydice, and “looking back” constitutes 
loss or linguistic “lack” through a purely formal reflexio (bending back).  By 
turning away from his song and losing it, the singer allows it to turn inward into 
autonomous meaning.  Thus, the poet loses metaphor that communicates, but the 
poem gains metaphor “so turned inward/That the meaning, good or other, can 
never/Become known (71)” (the alterity of metaphor, or metaphorical 
imagination).  
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5.  “The Other Tradition” 
 “The Other Tradition,” recalls the title of Ashbery’s book of literary 
criticism and the phrase also comes around at the beginning of Ashbery’s prose-
piece, “The System,” from Three Poems. It is also a poem in Houseboat Days that 
begins with evening descending on a meeting in the forest: 
  They all came, some wore sentiments 
  Emblazoned on t-shirts, proclaiming the lateness 
  Of the hour, and indeed the sun slanted its rays 
  Through branches of Norfolk pine as though 
  Politely clearing its throat, and all ideas settled 
  In a fuzz of dust under trees when it’s drizzling (2) 
 
The settling of ideas threatens closure—ameliorated somewhat by the “fuzz of 
dust” or the “fuzz” of a saving ambiguity, protecting poetic power. The poem will 
pick the line up later, when “the idea of a forest had clamped itself /Over the 
minutiae of the scene (3),” and its subject is this closure and its attendant oblivion.   
 The threat that ideas pose to poetry is a recurring concern for Ashbery; for 
example, in “What is Poetry?”—another poem in Houseboat Days: 
  …Trying to avoid 
  Ideas, as in this poem?  But we 
  Go back to them as to a wife, leaving 
 
  The mistress we desire? (47) 
 
By avoiding ideas, the poem opens up a dimension of metaphor that does not serve 
them, “hidden in the mysteries of pagination” and their invagination (fold or 
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inward turn). “The Mistress we desire” is seduced, rather than rationally grasped, 
and emerges as half-felt sense.   Ideas are not rationally apprehended or imposed 
on the poem; rather, they emerge through a practiced inattention, as Ashbery 
indicates in an interview with Daniel Kane:   
When one goes at ideas directly, with hammer  and tongs as it were, ideas 
tend to elude one in a poem. I think they only come back in when one 
pretends not to be paying any attention to them, like a cat that will rub 
against your leg. (Ashbery) 
 
“The Other Tradition,” is a poem about ideas that “settle” with a vaguely sinister 
and supernatural sense of night falling. There are hints that the “settling” or 
“clamping” of ideas onto the darkening forest marks the twilight of poet’s career 
and the decline of his power—at least according to the “troubadours” who gather 
there to meet.  
The poem addresses an abstract “you,” who may also be the reader, or a  
personified aspect of the poem. This “you” encounters temporality—and by 
extension, the touch of metaphor—as a moment of forgetting and 
incomprehension, roaring “As with the might of waters” (1805 6.616 W 286):   
The roar of time plunging unchecked through the sluices 
  Of the days, dragging every sexual moment of it 
  Past the lenses: the end of something. 
  Only then did you glance up from your book, 
  Unable to comprehend what had been taking place, 
  Or say what you had been reading.  More chairs 
  Were brought, and lamps were lit, but it tells  
  Nothing of how all this proceeded to materialize 
  Before you and the people waiting outside and in the next  
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  Street, repeating its name over and over, until silence 
  Moved halfway up the darkened trunks, 
  And the meeting was called to order. (2) 
 
“You” had been reading or having an experience, but now “you” encounter the 
time of that reading or experience from the outside, as a voice of many waters, 
“dragging every sexual moment of it/Past the lenses” (past your eyes). “You” were 
unable to “say what you had been reading” because it was not wakeful reading, and 
recall nothing of the origins of the meeting (“nothing of how all this proceeded to 
materialize”) because “you” had been living the event that inaugurated it. This 
event now turns outside of you before you as “the end of something”: 
“silence/moved halfway up the darkened trunks.”    
 People are naming this event—“…waiting outside in the next/Street, 
repeating its name over and over.”  However, they disperse, disappointed:  
 …Dispersing, each of the  
Troubadours had something to say about how charity 
Had run its race and won, leaving you the ex-president 
Of the event, and how, though many of those present 
Had wished something to come of it, if only a distant 
Wisp of smoke, yet none was so deceived as to hanker 
After that cool non-being of just a few minutes before, 
Now that the idea of a forest had clamped itself 
Over the minutiae of the scene… (3) 
 
The “you” could be a poet whose stock just dropped; he is losing his avante garde 
credentials, accused by his followers (the “troubadours”) of failing to live up to his 
potential. Perhaps the poem has addressed the poet as a “you”—a poem in revolt 
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against its author or itself, darkening with fading inspiration.  It has lost its contact 
with “that cool non-being of just a few minutes before.”  An “idea” has clamped 
down on the “minutiae of the scene,” or the poem’s minute particulars. The poem 
is losing its subject, as “Syringa” did—headed toward a collapse of map and 
territory (“Daffy Duck in Hollywood”), or a moment when blackness engulfs it 
(“Syringa”).    
This is “the end of something” because the poem can no longer read itself 
(“only then did you glance up from your book”), nor apprehend its power, even as 
“a distant wisp of smoke.”  The poem accuses the poet of precipitating closure, and 
he responds by turning away, as in “Syringa”: 
   
  …You found this 
  Charming, but turned your face fully toward night, 
  Speaking into it like a megaphone, not hearing 
  Or caring, although these still live and are generous 
  And all ways contained, allowed to come and go 
  Indefinitely in and out of the stockade 
  They have so much trouble remembering, when your 
  forgetting 
  Rescues them at last, as a star absorbs the night. (3) 
 
The last words of this poem—“as a star absorbs the night”—recall those 
“Diamonds on stygian velvet” that absorbed “silences of the soul” (“Daffy Duck in 
Hollywood”)—an echo of Laura Riding Jackson.   
Laura Riding Jackson wrote: “Then open the small secret doors…/Out runs 
happiness in a crowd,” and we recall Ashbery’s remark, quoted earlier: “A crowd 
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of what or whom?  And what are these doors? In any case, another situation, 
beyond reading perhaps…” (114). The “crowd” is a multitude contained by the 
poem—contained in the “stockade” that Ashbery describes above. These 
multitudes recur in different Ashbery poems, linked to forgetting and 
remembering. When the poet composes wakefully, he imprisons the poem’s 
meaning, but when he forgets, he frees it. The poet abandons his poem to its 
inward turn, accepting criticism that he is now “the ex-president/Of the event”:  
  …You found this 
  Charming, but turned your face fully toward night, 
  Speaking into it like a megaphone… (3) 
By turning “fully” toward night, the poet forgets, and the poem responds by 
turning inward onto its “life.” Perhaps poet and reader retain an amphibious zone 
of connection, half caught in forgetting and antithetical meaning. When the poet 
composes or the reader reads the least consciously, the life of the poem bursts out 
as a personified multitude:“these still live and are generous.” This should remind 
us of similar formulations in Houseboat Days: “those other times  (“Daffy Duck in 
Hollywood”), “something these people,/These other ones call life” (“Syringa”).  
Through its inward turn, the poem becomes self-identical: it knows what it is, just 
as the personification knows its idea (Knapp, 34)—and at this pole of reflexive 
closure, there is meaning that intersects with “cool non-being,” or the void. Thus, 
the poet who turns from the poem and speaks directly into the night—“speaking 
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into it like a megaphone”—accepts the implication of his speech in oblivion and 
the loss of the poem.    
6. Emergent Order 
The void, for Ashbery, may be a religious notion—as it was for A.R.  
Ammons. Richard Howard has noted that Ashbery “has never dismissed the 
religious possibility of emptiness—affectlessness, abjection—as the condition of 
fulfillment,” and “what he would call the necessity of emptiness—boredom, 
confusion, irritation, even torment.” In this view, Ashbery accepts loss to “reach a 
world…where experience is…‘presented and released’” (47). I take this to mean 
that Ashbery accepts paradoxes of loss and gain, memory and forgetting—“We 
live in the sigh of our present” (67), as he puts it in “Blue Sonata.” Accepting flux 
and loss is the end-game of A.R. Ammons as well—albeit through an ultimately 
apocalyptic identification with change.  For both poets however, time is not just 
existential, spiritual and psychic.  Time is the time of metaphor, and the negativity 
of time is the underside of metaphor, looming under sympathetic identity (“my 
love is a rose”) like the hidden part of an iceberg.  
 “Blue Sonata” is a poem in Houseboat Days that examines time--only to 
read it as the time of metaphor: 
 …It would be tragic to fit 
  Into the space created by our not having arrived yet, 
  To utter the speech that belongs there, 
  For progress occurs through re-inventing 
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  These words from a dim recollection of them, 
  In violating that space in such a way as 
  To leave it intact.  Yet we do after all 
  Belong here, and have moved a considerable 
  Distance; our passing is a façade. 
  But our understanding of it is justified. (67) 
 
“Re-inventing/These words” is metaphorical renewal, which keeps the space of 
arrival open rather than closing it; i.e., “re-inventing” checks the arrival of 
meaning—“violating that space in such a way as/To leave it intact.” Although it 
“would be tragic” to “utter the speech that belongs there” (the speech of arrival and 
closure), metaphor violates closure by partaking in ongoing flux. “Yet we do after 
all/Belong here” the speaker asserts; we belong here by uttering speech that never 
arrives here, thereby keeping the present moment open. 
 The speaker asserts that we “have moved a considerable/Distance”—then 
abruptly declares: “our passing is a façade.” The poem then ends with the words: 
“But our understanding of it is justified.” “Our passing” implies Zeno-like 
paradoxes of space that undermine the continuity of the present moment. Put 
another way, the continuous present and the flowing line are dead metaphors that 
baffle comprehension—surprising us with the antithetical underside of metaphor. 
Although its facade is musically continuous, “Blue Sonata” harbors a kernel of 
incomprehensibility that touches the void:     
  ...It is  
  The present past of which our features, 
  Our opinions are made.  We are half it and we 
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  Care nothing about the rest of it.  We  
  Can see far enough ahead for the rest of us to be 
  Implicit in the surroundings that twilight is. 
  We know that this part of the day comes every day 
  And we feel that, as it has its rights, so 
  We have our right to be ourselves in the measure  
  That we are in it and not some other day, or in 
  Some other place.  The time suits us  
  Just as it fancies itself, but just so far 
  As we not give up that inch, breath 
  Of becoming before becoming may be seen, 
  Or come to seem all that it seems to mean now. (66) 
 
We are implicated in becoming, and by extension implicated in the attempt of 
becoming to figure itself, so that “becoming may be seen,/Or come to seem all that 
it means now.”  This “seeming” or “seeming meaning” is a façade.  Our 
understanding of it “is justified” because the passage resolves on a self-referential 
“now” that is the “now” of the poem and the final note of a “sonata.”  In this way, 
the poem presents time by collapsing into its own moment. 
 When read quickly, the passage is something like a sonata played with 
fluidity and precision. Ashbery achieves the effect through a syncopated unfolding 
of spatial metaphors that presents its own temporality while frustrating rational 
understanding. For example, the speaker tells us that our right to occupy the 
present moment is relative to a personified time, which “has its rights.” These 
rights are not staked out on the ground of the continuous present, however, but the 
simple present tense: “this part of the day that comes every day.” The rights of 
time and our rights to “this part of the day” are in a law-like relation—or so “we” 
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feel. The qualifications pile up and the personification intensifies: in what sense 
can it be said that time “fancies itself”?   
 Time’s self-fancy recalls the auto-erotic closure of the poem as “music,” 
suggesting that the temporality of the poem is temporality, per se. We are reminded 
here of the speaker in “Syringa,” who said that the singing of Orpheus probably 
inflamed the Bacchants, who ripped him apart because they could not isolate a 
single note. Ashbery’s poem itself wrestles with the paradoxes of its own 
temporality: the poem investigates its “now” from the outside, and then collapses 
into it, in an incomprehensibly performative self-reference.  
 What worries Ashbery, here and throughout his poetry, is that the half of us 
that is “present past” (in present past tense) might extrapolate from what it can “see 
far enough ahead” to foreclose the uncertainty of the present: 
  We could re-imagine the other half, deducing it 
  From the shape of what is seen, thus 
  Being inserted into its idea of how we 
  Ought to proceed. (67) 
 
Given that a “shape” is a figure in the lines above, we are implicated in 
“becoming,” and produce figures of becoming that are “seen” or “can come to 
seem to mean”—albeit at the risk of submitting to a “shape” that would capture us, 
would leave us “inserted into its idea of how we/Ought to proceed.” 
 Like A.R. Ammons, Ashbery is trying to write poetry about time that keeps 
time open, and the lines below sound a lot like Ammons:    
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  …There is a grain of curiosity  
  At the base of some new thing, that unrolls 
  Its question mark like a new wave on the shore. 
  In coming to give, to give up what we had,  
  We have, we understand, gained or been gained 
  By what was passing through, bright with the sheen 
  Of things recently forgotten and revived. (67) 
 
Line 4 reads “We have, we understand, gained or been gained” [my italics]; i.e., 
we understand that we have gained something from time—or time has gained from 
us. The cost of experiencing “the new thing” is the possibility that the new thing 
might feed on us (literally, in the case of A.R. Ammons, contemplating Darwinian 
nature).  In the case of the above lines, however, our understanding of loss and 
gain is entangled in the dream-like figure of the wave, whose face is “bright with 
the sheen/Of things recently forgotten and revived.” These things could be 
memories, but they are also the entities that pass in and out of the stockade in “The 
Other Tradition”: “They have so much trouble remembering, when your 
forgetting/Rescues them at last.”  “Things forgotten and revived” are “things 
forgotten so that they can be revived.”  In “Blue Sonata,” these things are dead 
metaphors: 
   For progress occurs through re-inventing 
   These words from a dim recollection of them, 
   In violating that space in such a way as 
   To leave it intact. (67) 
 
 “That space” is the space in which an idea arrives, threatening closure. To violate 
that space--to prevent the arrival of an idea—is to keep it open (“intact”), as a 
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mysterious potential for meaning. Along these lines, the alternative to “Ideas” is 
not “No Ideas” (with the possible exception of long stretches of Ashbery’s 
collection, The Tennis Court Oath), but something between metaphorical ideas and 
an incomprehensible agency of metaphor.  
   One way of experiencing this middle ground is to occupy the continuous 
present tense--only to have the facade drop away, as the impossibility of the 
present moment turns our minds around with the might of waters. In “The Lament 
Upon the Waters” from Houseboat Days, carnal desire (“Sex was part of this…”) 
seems to open a vista onto the present—a buoyant atmosphere, “clear and 
shapeless,” as we have seen Ashbery describe it before:  
 And we made much of this sort of materiality 
 That clogged the weight of starlight, made it seem 
 Fibrous, yet there was a chance in this 
 To see the present as it had never existed, 
 Clear and shapeless, in an atmosphere like cut glass. (42) 
 
The façade of a “clear and shapeless” present abruptly falls away, and the opacity 
of the present descends: 
  At Latour-Maubourg you said this was a good thing, and 
     on the steps   
  Of Metro Jasmin the couriers nodded to us correctly, and the 
  Pact was sealed in the sky.  But now moments surround us 
 
  Like a crowd, some inquisitive faces, some hostile ones,  
  Some enigmatic or turned away to an anterior form of time 
  Given once and for all.  The jetstream inscribes a final  
     flourish 
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  That melts as it stays.  The problem isn’t how to proceed 
  But is one of being: whether this ever was, and whose 
  It shall be.  To be starting out, just one step 
  Off the sidewalk, and as such pulled back into the glittering 
  Snowstorm of stinging tentacles of how that would be  
     worked out 
 
  If we ever work it out. (42-43) 
 
The poetry alternates between figures of becoming and its spatial conundrums, and 
in this sense, it is not just describing experience, but hovering between a facade of 
“our passing” and an abyss beneath it—between a facade (face), and the thing it 
covers.   
 The speaker declares that “The problem isn’t how to proceed,” and this 
echoes a notion from “Blue Sonata,” that in shaping, or figuring the present, we 
risk “Being inserted into its idea of how we/Ought to proceed”; i.e., into the 
figure’s “idea.” Ashbery defends against figures of becoming that insert us into 
their ideas—not because he is deferring meaning (“my poems mean what they 
say”), but because ideas repress the temporality of those “other times” that 
constitute   the “otherness” of metaphor, and by extension, the connection of 
metaphor to “life.” These “other times” exist between the pure potential of starting 
out, and actually taking the first step (“To be starting out, just one step/Off the 
sidewalk...”)—between the potential for meaning and the closure that results when 
metaphor inserts us into its idea.  
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The idea of “how to proceed” is especially ominous for Ashbery, since it 
locks in narrative structure. Thus Ashbery’s figures (above) have a “sequence,” 
without giving us a way to proceed. Taking a first step jerks us back into the 
problem of the present: “pulled back into the glittering/Snowstorm of stinging 
tentacles.” Metaphorical imagination becomes “self-conscious” enough to stumble 
on its own power, hit with the opacity of its own moment. As Ashbery stages this 
moment in “The Lament Upon the Waters,” the subway crowd bleeds into a crowd 
of personified moments—and the jet stream emblematizes time as a moving 
snapshot that “melts as it stays.” These are austere “snapshots” of “becoming” and 
Ashbery lets the gaps between these images stand: there is no larger context to 
synthesize them—although we might sense, obscurely, how they might be related. 
Motifs function similarly in Ashbery’s poetry, not as patterns or symbolic “short-
hand” reducible to an overall idea, but as repeated images that bend each time like 
notes in an improvisation. Such as they might exist in Ashbery’s poetry, image-
ideas are caught in motion--decomposing like those seagull photos of last summer, 
melting like a jet contrail, or blurring like an old man’s memory in Ashbery’s more 
recent poetry (Chinese Whispers).    
Recurring images undergo a dream-slippage in Ashbery’s poetry—and along 
these lines, the image of the “picnic” crops up in “A Driftwood Altar,” from Hotel 
Lautreamont, and “Daffy Duck in Hollywood.” The basic idea might be that a 
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picnic has the temporality of the present, figuring a pastoral scene, caught forever 
in the passing moment of a summer’s day. However, this notion is considerably 
complicated by the lines below from “Daffy Duck in Hollywood”: 
  …the tiny 
  Tome that slips from your hand is not perhaps the  
  Missing link in this invisible picnic whose leverage 
  Shrouds our sense of it.  (34) 
 
The tiny tome called Houseboat Days (that slips from our hand as we fall asleep?) 
is not the “missing link” that could make sense of Houseboat Days. Instead, the 
poem’s “life” is an “invisible picnic” that “bivouacs” on a freeway meridian, 
partaking in flux. The flux of traffic, billboards and overheard conversation is 
where the poem finds its “leverage,” but this leverage “shrouds our sense of it” 
(shrouds its meaning).   
Picnics also leave trash, and a recurring image in Ashbery’s poetry is the 
piling up of driftwood, detritus, or the material remains of becoming to give it 
temporary “shape” (or figure it).  Thus, Ashbery writes in “A Driftwood Altar,” 
from Hotel Lautreamont:  
…a great deal of action 
scrapes what we are doing into shape, for the time being. Though I am lost 
I can see other points on the island, picnics nearer 
than one had thought, and closer still, the one who comes 
to resolve it all, provided you sign a document (82)  
 
Through these visible picnics, “Becoming” is “taking shape” (figuring itself).  
From his vantage point, the speaker is lost, but notices “other points on the island, 
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picnics nearer/than one had thought” and this suggests a sinister closure: “the one 
who comes to resolve it all.”  “To resolve it all” is to end the story--perhaps by 
signing a contract between writer and reader and precipitating a weird image: 
“airplanes in their spotted plumage were seen to waver, and sink, drifting/on the 
wind’s tune that gets in cracks here, the same/old bore, the thing already learned” 
(82). 
 Metaphorical drift—drifting like “airplanes in their spotted plumage”—gets 
its lift from the “tune” of the invisible and antithetical present. This must end at 
some point, and Ashbery has said that his poems have an implicit timer in an 
interview with Mark Ford: “…what ‘urges’ (rather too strong a word) me to stop is 
a sudden feeling that it would be pointless to continue. I’ve often described this as 
a kind of timer that goes off to tell me the poem is done and I must remove it from 
the oven” (67). “A Driftwood Altar” ends this way: 
 For it is indecent to last long: 
 one shot of you aghast in the mirror is quite enough; fog mounts 
 gnarled roots of the trees and one could still 
 stop it in time.  There has to be no story, although it is 
 bedtime and the nursery animals strike expectant, sympathetic poses. 
 And then in a quiet but tense moment the crossed  
 identities are revealed, the rightful heir stands in the doorway. 
 True, it is only a picture, but someone framed and hung it; 
 it is apposite.  And when too many moods coincide, when all windows 
 give on destruction, its curfew anchors us 
 in logic, not reprehensible anymore, nor even exemplary, 
 though emblematic, as some other person talking in an old car would be. 
           (82) 
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The overheard voice of “some other person talking in an old car” is emblematic of 
estranged metaphorical meaning—and by extension, metaphor that points to its 
own intersection with the void. The ending of this poem is emblematic in that 
way—but how?  The ending of “A Driftwood Altar” is an example of performative 
self-reference: by talking abstractly about the sense of an ending, the poem ends, 
and the effect is smooth as a rope trick.   
 “One shot of you aghast in the mirror” could be the poem facing itself, and 
“fog mounts/gnarled roots of the trees” recalls the sinister closure that descended 
on the forest in “The Other Tradition”: “silence/ moved halfway up the darkened 
trunks...”  Here, however, “one could still stop it time.” The speaker is anxious not 
just about the end of the story, but about the notion that there would be a story to 
end: “There has to be no story.” Nonetheless, “it is/bedtime and the nursery 
animals strike expectant, sympathetic poses.” Peripety descends: “And then in a 
quiet but tense moment the crossed/Identities are revealed.” This is not just an 
imposed ending; the speaker clearly states that an organizing principle is 
emerging—the sense of an ending is coming from somewhere: “True, it is only a 
picture, but someone framed and hung it; it is apposite.”  Who or what framed this 
picture and why is it the right one?  This is a mystery—and the narrative hook of 
the passage.   
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 The picture emerges when “too many moods coincide”—when the 
proliferation of Ashbery’s “mental climates” is no longer a liberation or 
openness—when “all windows/give on destruction.” At that point, a picture freezes 
time: “its curfew anchors us/in logic.”  This picture resembles a stock moment of 
closure from the Aristotelean cookbook—“the crossed identities revealed”—but it 
is “not reprehensible anymore, not even exemplary”; i.e., it is not a dead rule.  The 
ending of the story is “emblematic, as some other person talking in an old car 
would be,” and the conceit of overheard voices is very much emblematic in 
Ashbery, as I noted in beginning this chapter. Overheard voices foreground 
ambient noise when overheard in reality, and at the border of sleep, they are 
hallucinatory: they exemplify the “otherness” that is constantly, subtly, “tearing the 
matter/Of creation…/Out of our hands” (77), as Ashbery puts it in “Self-Portrait in 
a Convex Mirror.”   
 By talking about peripety or discovery the poem stages a discovery about 
what it is doing: it has been talking about ending in order to end, thereby staging 
the timing of an ending.  “What I am writing to say is, the timing, not/The 
contents, is what matters (85)” is how Ashbery puts it in “Fantasia on ‘The Nut-
Brown Maid.’” We are free to wonder what dictates the timing of an ending—or 
punctuates a free-association. Is it the unconscious, an inhuman principle of 
emergent order, or an obscurely religious void? The poetry has nothing to say 
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about this, for it operates at a high level of abstraction. The poem ends because the 
cooking timer on an oven went off—the poem is done. Such an ending is 
“emblematic” of time—it arrives from somewhere else, with a strange necessity: 
although it is “only a picture,” it is “apposite.” The form of such an ending 
surprises us with its feeling of quiet legitimacy, as the endings of so many Ashbery 




     CHAPTER 6 
              CONCLUSION 
1. Deferral in The Prelude 
Talk about figurality is a “saying” that occurs “outside” of figurality, 
in a meta-language. Such talk assumes distinctions (between tenor and 
vehicle, literal and figural, difference and sameness) that rationalize 
figurality. In this study I have argued that reflexive figures modify those 
constraints to signify power. Power might be construed in many ways, and I 
have focused on two main interpretations in this study:  
1. Power that is meaningless and extra-linguistic 
2. Power that is antithetical, but proper to tropological imagination and 
language 
In concluding I want re-examine the forms of reflexivity examined in this 
study—and generalize them further. Along these lines, we might imagine a 
reflexive figure that attacks assumptions underlying notions of “power.” 
In his reading of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology (“Freud 
and the Scene of Writing”) Jacques Derrida analyzes the notion of “power” 
as a mark of force, or depth of an impression. Derrida examines Freud’s idea 
of neurons “which would oppose contact-barriers to the quantity of 
excitation” (201). Such neurons, by resisting force, register and “defer” its 
power. Derrida calls Freud’s theory a “metaphor” (“this hypothesis is 
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remarkable as soon as it is considered as a metaphorical model and not a 
neurological description” (200)) and makes a conceptual move that is 
“reflexive” in the sense of modifying the notions that rationalize Freud’s 
metaphor of “breaching.” Firstly, Derrida conceives force as a difference in 
forces (the difference between the resisting substance and the force that 
breaches), and secondly, this difference would be passed along or repeated 
from the beginning (201). 
In Derrida’s words: 
  
1. “There is not pure breaching without difference.” 
2. “Repetition adds no quantity of present force, no intensity; it 
reproduces the same impression—yet it has the power of breaching.” 
(201) 
 
 In Wordsworth’s doctrine of imagination we find binaries that 
rationalize the idea of impressive power—and a reflexive imagination that 
modifies them. “Accidents” impress images on the mind, and do so through 
an impression called an “archetype” (1799, 1.280-87, W 15). From this 
angle, a cut/graving/impression—whether an archetype, a cut in the 
mother—or the Gondo gorge (ostensibly cut by a primal deluge)—has an 
imaginary depth that cannot be assimilated to a mark of force. In the Bless’d 
Babe sequence of The Prelude, for example, the babe who “Does gather 
passion from his mother’s eye” appears to inaugurate a figural movement “to 
combine/In one appearance all the elements/And parts of the same object” 
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(1799, 2.267-79, W 28). Yet the mother was moving (figural) from the 
beginning, she was already removed from the pure order of experience, her 
body functioning as the prop of a narrative. “Passion,” in short, is not a naïve 
origin.  
In The Prelude there is activity that, while not situated in a vital order, 
is nonetheless distinguished by a lack of thought and self-consciousness. In 
Tintern Abbey, for example, the narrator had once experienced “An appetite: 
a feeling and a love,/That had no need of a remoter charm,/By thought 
supplied, or any interest/Unborrowed from the eye” (81-84, N 68).  In 
retrospect, this activity seems to prop his growing love of nature so that 
when the narrator has fallen off from sensual pleasure gathered by the eye 
and ear he finds “The props of my affections were removed,/And yet the 
building stood, as if sustained/By its own spirit” (1799, 2.325-26, N 29).  
What sustains the building is an imaginary depth, described in Tintern Abbey 
as the depth of “something far more deeply interfused” (97, N 68) or as 
Geoffrey Hartman’s “subsistent,” “continuing spirit,” rhetorically 
manifested as “incremental redundance”—“through which the quality of a 
thing redounds upon the thing it qualifies and is perceived as its very cause”  
(Unmediated Vision 22-23). It figures a “deepening” of the mind (22), as in 
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Wordsworth’s lines: “…I behold these steep and lofty cliffs,/That on a wild 
secluded scene impress/Thoughts of a more deep seclusion” (5–7, N 66). 
Calling incremental redundance a “figure,” Hartman sees an 
impression redounding on the source of that impression with a greater depth 
than either the impression on the mind, or the mind’s on the natural scene. A 
depth gets “superadded,” having come from neither external nature or the 
mind. Hartman deliberately transmutes depth into something other than 
phenomenal depth or its analogs—“incremental redundance” indexes power 
that is impossible to rationalize or localize: it is a reflexive figure that does 
not quite dispense with depth-as-power, although it disrupts any rational 
notion of what depth could be, or what Wordsworth could mean by 
“impress.”  
 What Wordsworth calls “the impressive agency of fear” (436) might 
be rationalized as force (fear stamps impressions in the memory); yet this 
analogy dissolves in certain passages of the Prelude. In the passage below, 
for example, “boyish sports” are an impressive agency, and fear is bound up 
in characters impressed on natural forms: 
  Ye powers of earth, ye genii of the springs, 
  And ye that have your voices in the clouds, 
  And ye that are familiars of the lakes 
  And of the standing pools, I may not think 
  A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed 
  Such ministry—when ye through many a year 
! 278!
  Thus, by the agency of boyish sports, 
  On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills, 
  Impressed upon all forms the characters 
  Of danger and desire, and thus did make 
The surface of the universal earth 
  With meanings of delight, of hope and fear, 
  Work like a sea. (1799, 1.186, W 13) 
 
“Character” carries an archaic (verbal) meaning of graving (engraving), but 
also, the sense of a readable letter or character. The word “charactered” is a 
reflexive figure when we read it as referring to its own status as a 
charactered mark—as though it were indexing the force that charactered it. It 
suggests something caught between force and meaning. Put otherwise, a 
“character” creates meaning with force (because it seems impressed upon 
forms), but it is not a phenomenal force, and not a meaning that is 
necessarily graspable. 
In the quotation above, an apostrophe posits the ministry of the place 
spirits who, through the agency of boyish sports, impressed characters on 
natural forms that then made the surface of the earth swirl with meanings. 
The apostrophe is a Prospero-like conjuring of the genii—so that the naming 
of genii realizes the genii. This naming power not only fulfills the ministry 
of the genii through the exercise of Wordsworth’s poetic vocation in the 
present tense, but retroactively posits it. 
2. Reflexive Trope and Logic  
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Reflexive figures are illuminated by comparison (and contrast) to 
paradoxes of logic. To effect paradoxical self-reference, the strong and weak 
liar paradoxes employ the words “I” and “this,” respectively: 
1.  I am lying 
2.  This sentence is false. 
 
Quine wrote a paradoxical sentence that does not refer to itself directly, as 
the above sentences do. It refers to itself indirectly:  
3.  “Yields falsehood when preceded by its quotation,” yields falsehood 
when preceded by its quotation.  
 
Quine’s sentence defines a condition under which a sentence is false, but 
(surprise!)—this sentence is Quine’s sentence. In connecting this paradox to 
the non-paradoxical self-reference employed by Kurt Godel, Douglas 
Hofstadter notes: “The Quine construction is quite like the Godel 
construction, in the way that it creates self-reference by describing another 
typographical entity which, as it turns out, is isomorphic to the Quine 
sentence itself” (499).  Hofstadter describes “the processing required for 
understanding” (499) such a sentence; the reader must navigate the inside 
and outside of quotation marks (use and mention), syntax and possessive 
grammar to understand how it produces self-reference. Are there tropes that 
require a reader to step outside of figural form in order to read their self-
reference?    
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In this study I argued that there are—reflexive tropes point to their 
power by blurring or otherwise operating on the dichotomies that rationalize 
their function (as I argued in Chapter 2). The Quine sentence entangles use 
and mention, although a logician would not say that figurality did the 
entangling (or that the paradox “indexed” linguistic power). Thus there is a 
difference between a self-referential trope and a self-referential paradox of 
logic—reflexive tropes, unlike self-referential propositions, point to their 
own agency, and in this way, create a cognitive blind spot of reflexive form: 
in propositional logic, a sentence refers to itself, and in rhetoric, figurality 
refers to itself. 
Figures can manifest a self-reference reminiscent of logical regress. 
Ironic “self-consciousness,” for example, can itself be ironized, disrupting 
the stability of an “inside-outside” dichotomy, and a stable standpoint, 
“outside” of irony: 
1. …the irony(of irony(of irony(irony)))  
When we grasp infinite irony, we abstract a reflexive regress that 
generalizes:  
2….is true that (is true that (is true that (“a” is true)))  
The moment we jump to the infinite case, we are confronting the “self-
reference” of irony:   
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This sentence is ironic. 
 
If the sentence is ironic, then it speaks ironically about its irony, but if it is 
not ironic then it speaks non-ironically about its irony. The above sentence 
resembles the strong liar paradox, considered at the beginning of this 
chapter… 
    This sentence is false. 
 
…and it has a dual form: 
    This sentence is true. 
We cannot determine whether this sentence is true or false. Taken 
rhetorically, rather than logically, the sentence looks like a reflexive trope; 
the “self-mentioning” of the sentence, and its indeterminable truth or falsity, 
are an index of power—thematizable as the power of a claim.  
This quick, naïve tour through the liminal zone between rhetoric and 
logic should alert us to some important differences. The rhetor takes 
reflexive form as an index of power, but the logician does not. Moreover, to 
use and mention the word “Boston” is not reducible to the notion of using 
and mentioning a metaphor. To use a figure is to be inside of its transport or 
to put an audience inside of it, barring which, the figure can short-circuit, or 
fall flat as a incongruously literal statement. We are “inside” of good figures 
and “outside” of bad ones—the latter seem like affronts to sense, or 
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unpleasant assaults. Imagination, from this angle, is the figure of the 
“inside” of figurality, conceived as a form of understanding, desire, and 
experience. Reflexive imagination entangles its “outside” and “inside,” 
interrupting understanding and experience, and motivating us to interpret the 
disruption.  
Although my focus has been on imagination and figural language, the 
influence of logic on literary theory might be taken into account where the 
theory of Romantic rhetoric and self-reference is concerned. This influence 
has been the subject of “science wars” in which literary theory was accused 
of appropriating and trivializing mathematical logic (Jacques Derrida and 
Paul de Man adapted the term “undecidability,” made famous by Kurt 
Godel’s famous paper on logic; a history of ideas traced by David Bates in 
“Crisis Between the Wars: Derrida and the Origins of Undecidability” (1-
27)). The impulse to submit the poem to logic is present in William 
Empson’s analysis of reflexive imagery, or his analysis of the word “sense” 
in the Prelude. I.A. Richard’s distinction between tenor and vehicle is in 
some degree an attempt to submit metaphor to logical form. 
Without evaluating the influence of logic on rhetorical theory (much 
less make any claims of my own about logic or math), I would note that that 
certain literary forms of self-reference naively resemble logical form. In 
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Laws of Form, the logician G. Spencer Brown begins his presentation of 
logic with the command to “Make a distinction!” The sign of distinction is a 
circle—which separates its inside from its outside—and therefore is the 
distinction that it signifies; the mathematician Louis Kauffman has called it 
“a sign of itself” (borrowing a formulation of Charles Saunders Peirce). In 
literary texts, a similar kind of self-reference arises. The word “written,” 
when written, refers to its own writtenness and its signification drew Paul de 
Man’s attention in “Hypogram and Inscription” (42). Reflexive form draws 
attention to a distinction between marks on a page, and readable marks, by 
highlighting the former. In reading Wordsworth’s “Inscription Intended for a 
Stone in the Grounds of Rydal Mount” Cynthia Chase has noted of this 
stone that “it is the marker of an intention that it be the marker of an 
intention” (76). 
As I have shown in this study, a reflexive turn of trope can seem to 
signal the potential of language to mean, per se (John Ashbery), 
“symbolicity,” per se (Thomas Weiskel), the impulse to allegorize, per se 
(Steven Knapp), or writtenness, per se (in the case of the word “written,” 
when written). In the case of the dynamical vision of Blake, consummation 
of the “outward” world in “inward” (visionary) form indexes visionary 
activity, per se—or points to the irrational principle of its dynamism, 
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mythically situated as the darkness of “dark Urthona” or the creative 
principle of unfallen imagination (“And now he came to the Abhorred world 
of Dark Urthona/By Providence divine conducted…” (74.30-32, E 344)).  
Performative self-reference is distinct from the above examples: 
power takes the form of a reflexive short-circuit in order to do something or 
manifest something. Such short-circuits most characteristically collapse talk 
about a thing and the thing itself. Pope, for example, said that Longinus “is 
himself the great Sublime he draws,” and in the poetry of A.R. Ammons, the 
energy of his digressions or identifications collapses into the natural energies 
it is describing—as in Shelley’s Ode to the West Wind. At the end of my 
chapter on Ashbery, I cite lines in which talk about the timing of a poem’s 
ending slides into an ending. I also noted that Ashbery describes his poems 
as “self-referential worlds” that close off in autonomous meaning with a 
joyful inner life.  
This is perhaps strange, since autonomously creative power has a long 
tradition of being sinister, frightening or suspect, as in the opening to 
Shelley’s “The Triumph of Life”: “the Sun sprang forth/Rejoicing in his 
splendour…”—or, “So came a chariot on the silent storm/Of its own rushing 
splendour…” Geoffrey Hartman has emphasized the privation implicit in the 
self-inaugurating power of voice. Reading this privation in Wordsworth 
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through allusions to blindness (Oedipus, Milton’s Sampson and 
Shakespeare’s Gloucester), Hartman finds a trauma implicit in the notion of 
poetry as “inner voice”: “The inner voice has a traumatic resonance that 
evokes the exchange of eyes for ears as if a blinding of that kind could 
restore Voice to its most powerful mode, that of Logos or fiat” 
(Unremarkable Wordsworth 127). Hartman claims that voice arrests time—
seizing the poet with its own temporality (126-27): “Hearing voices implies 
a backward journeying, through mourning or mania… For what comes back 
with those voices is the dream of divinity of our unmediated, or self-
inaugurated power” (127).   
3. Wordsworth and Blake, Ammons and Ashbery 
 “Self-inauguration” is performatively self-referential, and Hartman 
invokes it to figure autonomous power, manifesting itself. In The 
Unmediated Vision Hartman highlights a “paradox of imagination,” evident 
when imagination is “‘vexing its own creation,’ hiding itself or its 
generating source like mist” (13). In the crossing-the-Alps section of the 
Prelude, Wordsworth’s apostrophe to imagination begins: “Imagination—
lifting up itself” (1805, 6.525, W 240). Here, imagination’s disruption is 
situated at the level of plot, in contrast to the reflexive figures I have situated 
elsewhere.  
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Wordsworth and his travelling companion had missed their crossing 
of the summit of the Alps, and after recounting his disappointment, 
Wordsworth is interrupted by a power that he names “imagination”—in the 
narrative now of composition— in lines that Hartman describes as 
“rapturous” and “almost self-obscuring” (40). Here is the 1850 version:  
Imagination--here the Power so called 
  Through sad incompetence of human speech, 
  That awful Power rose from the mind’s abyss 
  Like an unfathered vapour that enwraps, 
  At once, some lonely traveller. (1850, 6.562, W 241) 
 
Wordsworth transmutes his past disappointment into a realization that 
nothing in this world can satisfy our infinite longing. Warminski takes his 
past disappointment as proleptic of the moment when it is read as proleptic 
(990). Read this way, a reflexive figure produces a reflexive stutter, but we 
might also read imagination interrupting linear narrative by identifying past 
and present—an “apocalyptic” identification. This too is an index of power, 
“experienced” as a disruption or blocking agent that demands to be 
interpreted.  
The natural order is that of time and continuity (per Hartman), but 
imagination interrupts linear time, and by extension, linear narrative. The 
“unfathered vapour” arises from Shakespeare’s “dark backward and abysm 
of time” as “the past flowing into the present” (Hartman 40) or “an 
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apocalyptic moment in which past and future overtake the present” (46). As 
Hartman puts it, Wordsworth realizes that imagination is independent from 
nature (47), and there is a threat of discontinuity in this: “The song’s 
progress comes to a halt because the poet is led beyond nature” (46).  
Nature is on the side of temporal order. In order to continue, as 
narrative, Wordsworth’s poetry must transmute the notion of self-obscuring 
imagination into an image proleptic of the soul’s “return to nature” (41): 
“Strong in herself and in beatitude/That hides her, like the mighty flood of 
Nile” (1850, 6.613-14)—“the imagination hides itself by overflowing as 
poetry, and is compared to the Nile which overflows its banks…” (Hartman 
68-69). 
Regarding Wordsworth, Hartman emphasizes “the link in him 
between self-consciousness and imagination”—against Blakean imagination, 
which is the annihilation of selfhood (344).  Hartman’s Wordsworth binds 
imagination to nature in a dialectical relation that both liberates and 
constrains it, regulating its potential for temporal rupture and violent 
autonomy. On the “apocalyptic tendency” of Wordsworth’s imagination, 
Geoffrey Hartman wrote that “it remains in conflict with the social or 
socializing principle in human life,” and furthermore, that “Nature is at the 
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center of this conflict because it both binds and liberates imagination—binds 
it to forms that are not reducible to human meanings or purposes” (78). 
Wordsworth’s poetry expresses “faith that self-renewal is possible 
without the violence of apocalypse” (Hartman 68), and from a rhetorical 
angle, this is an attempt to figure “renewal” as something other than a 
discontinuous break. Hartman’s Wordsworth is trying to smooth the shock 
of a “self-renewing,” “re-generating,” “renovating” imagination—terms that 
recur in Wordsworth’s Poetry, especially in Hartman’s analysis of crossing-
the-Alps. “Regeneration” is a key Blakean term, and “renovation” is a notion 
that arises in Blake’s Milton:   
  There is a Moment in each Day that Satan cannot find, 
  Nor can his Watch Fiends find it; but the Industrious find 
  This Moment & it multiply: & when it once is found, 
  It renovates every Moment of the Day, if rightly placed (135) 
 
Wordsworth famously invokes “renovating virtue” in the Prelude: 
 
There are in our existence spots of time, 
  Which with distinct preeminence retain 
  A renovating virtue, whence, depressed 
  By false opinion and contentious thought, 
  Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight 
  Of ordinary intercourse, our minds 
  Are nourished and invisibly repaired…   
(1805, 11.257-78, W 478) 
 
The Blakean Moment “renovates every Moment of the Day” and 
Wordsworth’s spots of time “retain/A renovating virtue.” In the O.E.D., to 
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“renovate” is “to cause to be spiritually reborn” or “to invest with a new and 
higher spiritual nature.” Thus we have J. Bale in 1546 writing “To thys full 
knowledge shall we come after thys life, beyng renouated in Christ,” J. 
Smith in 1616, “None is renovated but such as fell away,” and Chalmers in 
1817, “The Gospel…will renovate the soul” (O.E.D., 1356). As trope, 
renovation poses the problem of the logos in time or timeless in time—a 
discontinuity. 
Diction is a defense against violent renewal—Hartman’s “incremental 
redundancy” (in which “the quality of a thing redounds upon the thing it 
qualifies”) is reflexive, but not disruptive: “…I behold these steep and lofty 
cliffs,/That on a wild secluded scene impress/Thoughts of a more deep 
seclusion” (5–7, N 66)). The figure entangles cognition and perception to 
signal a supplemental “depth” that is elusive and not localized. Along 
similar lines, Hartman highlights passages of Wordsworth that make it 
impossible to decide whether “the poet’s imagination [is] participating in or 
striving to break with nature” (67).  
“Reflection, in Wordsworth, becomes reflexive” (Hartman 65)—but 
the reflexivity is not “sudden” or disruptive as in the figure of 
“Imagination—lifting up itself.” In referring to Wordsworth’s ascent of Mt. 
Snowden, Hartman stresses that “the meaning of Snowdon is not changed in 
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the retelling by a sudden, reflexive consciousness” (64). In contrast, Blake 
embraces the discontinuities of self-inaugurating power, and usurpation by 
voice that arrests time.  
Blake claimed to have taken dictation from spirits, which incarnate 
the alterity of imagination as a principle interior to it. In an 1803 letter to 
Thomas Butts, Blake writes of one of his poems, “I may praise it since I dare 
not pretend to be any other than the Secretary the Authors are in Eternity” (E 
730). In a recent study of Blake, John H. Jones notes of such remarks: 
“Although these spirits with whom Blake claims to have conversed may 
have appeared to him only in his imagination, his rhetoric externalizes them, 
particularly when he gives them names and refers to them as others (1). 
“Inspiration” originates through voices that Blake represents as “outside of 
himself and speaking to him” (Jones 1).  
Such inspiration might be figured as auto-address, or auto-apostrophe. 
Allen Ginsberg; for example, had been reading Blake’s poem, “Ah! 
Sunflower,” and heard Blake “reciting in earthen measure”: 
the voice rose out of the page to my secret ear that had never heard  
   before— 
I lifted my eyes to the window, red walls of buildings flashed outside, 
  endless sky sad in Eternity (126) 
 
Later in life, Ginsberg claimed that the voice that he heard was his own 
mature voice—proleptic of his vocation (xiv)—a reflexive figure.   
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Mary Jacobus says of Wordsworth that “calling the self into being 
through apostrophe becomes rather a matter of calling another into being.” 
This includes those “haunting, threatening, nightmarish, or apocalyptic 
voices heard throughout The Prelude” (152). Yet when “subsumed into 
transcendental Nature, the poet’s voice becomes orphic rather than 
bacchic”—through “Eolian visitations” (1805, 1.104, W 42) (Jacobus 153-
54).    
 Self-inaugurating power is what Hartman translates as self-wounding 
and a god-like power of self-realization. Wordsworth signals the problem in 
“Resolution and Independence” when the speaker remarks of himself and his 
fellow poets (and especially Chatterton): “by our own spirits are we deified” 
(47, N 398). Yet the reflexivity of invocation is, in other ways, implicit in 
the poet’s vocation: in his analysis of apostrophe, Jonathan Culler writes that 
“Voice calls in order to be calling. It calls in order to dramatize voice: to 
summon images of its power so as to establish its identity as poetic and 
prophetic voice” (78).  
In different ways, all of these examples situate power by invoking 
performative self-reference, and in the case of Blake and Wordsworth, a 
common theme is the disruptiveness of power. In Chapter 3, I described 
A.R. Ammons defending against the reflexive short-circuit of voice—
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opening up the time of an identification by reporting his apostrophe to the 
wind. Elsewhere, he apostrophizes the power motivating his apostrophe 
(Sphere, 40-41), again giving himself time to report from “inside” of it. 
Roger Gilbert has alerted me to an example of this technique in the later 
poem “Aubade”: “you, you are the one, the center, it is around/ you that the 
coming and goings gather…” After noting that “space travel and gene 
therapy” have displaced this “you”—“out of the woods and rocks and 
streams”—Ammons says that: 
…what is out 
there dwells in our heads now as a bit of  
 
yearning, maybe vestigal, and it is a yearning 
like a painful sweetness, a nearly reachable 
 
presence that nearly feels like love… (23-24) 
 
A “you” that Ammons had addressed as “outside” (“I’m personifying the 
contours/of the onhigh, the ways by which the world works”) turns “inside” 
(“there dwells in our heads”).  
 We can bracket the question of whether apocalyptic experience is or is 
not “really” an experience (A.R. Ammons did not really speak to the wind, 
from the standpoint of his annihilated body). The point, rather, is that 
accounts of such experience take the standpoint of an annihilating 
identification, or in the case of Ammons, claim death as the limit case of 
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identification. In his account of poetic inspiration in his letter to Thomas 
Butts, Blake is effectively split into two Blakes. Blake was raptured out of 
time into a timeless creative “moment, but he also remained in linear time, 
composing a poem: 
“I have written this Poem from immediate Dictation, 
  twelve or sometimes twenty or thirty lines at a time, 
  without Premeditation & even against my Will; the  
  Time it has taken in writing was thus renderd non-Existent…” 
          (E. 697) 
Wordsworth deploys a famous figure of the timeless-in-time in his lines on 
his experience in the Gondo Gorge: 
  …The immeasurable height 
  Of woods decaying, never to be decayed, 
  The stationary blasts of waterfalls… (1805, 6.56-58, W 240) 
 
The disruptive ingress of the timeless into mutability (which I take, also to 
be a formal effect in Wordsworth’s “Mutability”) is not reducible to the idea 
of Dauer im Wechsel, or permanence in patterns of change.1 Wordsworth’s 
description puts the timeless into time as a discontinuity that indexes 
imagination (and its unimaginable moment).  
Recounting his descent into the Gondo gorge following his missed crossing, 
Wordsworth anticipates a time when “characters of the great Apocalypse” 
are—as Hartman puts it—“intuited without the medium of nature.” Yet 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!This idea may be relevant in the poetry of A.R. Ammons, which describes living things 
as segments of flow, and often finds pattern in motion.!
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Hartman insists that the episode is, finally, an encounter with nature (45), 
and notes of Wordsworth that: “unless he can respect the natural (which 
includes the temporal) order, his song, at least as narrative, must cease” (46).  
In contrast, Blake describes Los in Jerusalem, walking up and down 
through the totality of time (named “6,000 years” via Biblical convention): 
“For Los in Six Thousand Years walks up & down continually/That not one 
Moment of Time be lost nor one revolution of space” (228). Los is moving, 
timelessly in time, and this seemingly impossible action defends against 
mutability by liberating the form of time from rational notions of cause and 
effect, and linear flow. In Milton, Blake states that “Every Time less than a 
pulsation of the artery/Is equal in its period and value to Six Thousand 
Years/For in this Period the Poet’s Work is done…” (28-29.62-64, E 126). 
The figure implies that “the Poet’s Work” is not in time, rather time is in the 
“Poet’s Work,” emanating from it as “a pulsation of the Artery.” “Every 
Time” is “equal” in “period and value,” where “Every Time” means every 
part of linear time: a minute, an hour, a year…  
For Blake, the discontinuities of reflexive figurality do not index a 
power “outside” of imagination; rather, they signal a dynamical principle of 
“regeneration,” as in Jerusalem: “& all the tremendous unfathomable Non 
Ens/Of Death was seen in regenerations terrific or complacent 
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varying/According to the subject of discourse…” (4.33-35, E 255). In 
Chapter 3, I consider rebirth of form in the poetry of A.R. Ammons 
(especially in Garbage) as an analog of regeneration in Blake. This 
comparison is complicated by the fact that Blake would have taken the 
recycled forms of Ammons for “generation,” or the destruction and creation 
of natural forms. I have argued that Ammons takes the creation and 
destruction of linguistic form as the special case of nature’s dynamism (the 
odd mixture of the visionary and the materialistic suggesting an imagination 
in Ammons that operates on attempts to frame it).   
As I read Ammons, there is nothing outside of energies of nature, 
which contain imagination, and might be continuous (in some way) with its 
productivity. For Blake, it is the other way around: nothing is outside of 
imagination—our sense of an “outside” is a delusion of self-limiting 
imagination. Put otherwise, there is nothing outside of imagination—
although imagination does (via Gnostically-inflected reflexive trope) 
withdraw outside of itself to precipitate “a void outside of existence.”  
In telling a story about self-limitation, Blake borrows from Jacob 
Boehme and Christian interpretations of Kabbalistic doctrine to construct a 
reflexive figure. As a first premise, Blake names existence as imagination in 
Milton: “The imagination is not a state: it is the Human existence itself” 
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(32.32, E 131).  Near the end of Milton, however, the Virgin Ololon asks: “Is 
this the Void Outside of Existence, which if enter’d into/Becomes a 
Womb?” (41-42.37-8, E 142)  In more detail, Blake elaborates the passage 
in the opening lines of Jerusalem: “There is a Void, outside of Existence, 
which if entered into/Englobes itself & becomes a Womb” (143). The void 
that “englobes itself” is the womb-tomb of nature, forming “outside” of 
imagination. This “outside” echoes the creation of Lurianic Kabbalah 
(“Tzimtzum”), in which God’s contraction from Himself into Himself, 
precipitates a void. Jurgen Moltmann writes: “Only when God withdraws 
himself to himself, and restricts and concentrates himself within himself, can 
he call into existence something other than himself and outside himself” 
(282). Gershom Scholem takes Luria’s fundamental question to be: how can 
God create the world out of nothing, if there is no nothing? “God was 
compelled to make room for the world by, as it were, abandoning a region 
within Himself… He withdrew in order to return to it in the act of creation 
and revelation” (261). 
Lurianic creation poses the problem of self-negating power—which 
Blake interprets as self-limiting imagination. Along these lines, imagination 
becomes other to itself by deforming its own form—falling from visionary 
identification into outward-pointing language, and contractito precipitate a 
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“selfhood,” separate from the “outside” world. Instead of the unified 
Lurianic God who voluntarily withdraws, an integral humanity shatters, and 
the divided parts narrate the event. This is how Luria’s story echoes in The 
Book of Urizen: 
Lo, a shadow of horror is risen 
 In Eternity! Unknown, unprolific! 
 Self-closd, all-repelling: what Demon 
 Hath form’d this abominable void 
 This soul-shudd’ring vacuum?—Some said 
 “It is Urizen,” But unkown, abstracted 
 Brooding secret, the dark power hid. (1.1-7, 69) 
 
The void that Urizen forms recalls the void created by the Lurianic God’s 
withdrawl “from himself into himself.” It is a void or “vacuum” outside of 
prolific power, and the speaker—who transmits the “winged words” of “the 
Eternals”—names as a “Demon” the entity that abstracted itself from 
Eternity. The name “Urizen” echoes in “Lo! a shadow of horror is risen!” 
[my italics], and by nominating the void and its creator, the Eternals reify 
both. The Eternals are effectively feeling around in the dark, sensing a 
“brooding secret” or something that broods in secret—but their point of view 
is implicated in the fall. We cannot get an authoritative account of self-
differentiation from narrative standpoints that dramatize self-differentiation.  
In Blake’s myth, the self-limitation of power is a dangerous repose—
but confined (unsuccessfully) to the space that he names “Beulah,” where 
! 298!
the illusion of an “outside” world is a rest from visionary activity—a respite 
from the “wars of eternity.” The ironic awareness of this “outside”  falls into 
a false belief that nature is external to imagination. Both Geoffrey Hartman 
and Harold Bloom understood “Beulah” as the site of agreement—and 
tension—between Blake and Wordsworth. In the state of Beulah, at least, 
Blake seems to acknowledge the need to explain the relation between 
imagination and nature. Beulah is a defense against the unbounded “too-
muchness” of “joy”—the “Wars of Eternity” whose productively dynamical 
contraries, such as energy and reason, love and hate, are the ground of 
reality. In contracting to rest, visionary power reflexively modifies those 
contraries, as we learn in the first lines of Milton: Book the Second: “There 
is a place where Contrarieties are equally True/This place is called Beulah” 
(128). Dynamical opposition gives way to mutual generosity and concord 
between “inside” (vision) and “outside” (idealized nature)—figured as a 
relation of masculine and feminine. However, “equally true” opens up the 
possibility of the passive, feminine contrary (nature) usurping imagination 
and becoming more than illusion. It is in this sense that Beulah is a 
“reflexive” trope: vision deforms its own form to create Beulah—it allows 
the creative, autonomously visionary opposition of contraries to slide into a 
more rational notion of “equality,” and anticipates a further fall into 
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“negations” (the binaries of good/evil, body/soul, inside and outside). In 
Blake’s revision of the Luriancally-inflected trope of self-limitation, power 
begins to obstruct itself with its own, reified production. 
Beulah is a protectively external illusion—“a little lovely moony 
night.” In 1938, Milton O. Percival wrote a lyrical analysis of Beulah, noting 
that “Its finite forms are merciful and temporary circumscriptions of the 
infinite for those who can no longer endure the infinite” (56). There is a 
reflexive paradox buried in the above formulation: the infinite circumscribes 
itself. In Milton, “the Eternal Great Humanity…/ Walks among all his awful 
Family seen in every face/As the breath of the Almighty, such are the words 
of man to man” (2.15-18, E 128). The mirroring of the Eternal Man in every 
face is a metaphor of metaphorical identification—achieved through the Old 
Testament sublimity of its power: 
…the wrath of God breaking bright flaming on all sides around 
His awful limbs: into the Heavens he walked clothed in flames  
Loud thundering, with broad flashes of flaming lightning & pillars 
Of fire, speaking the Words of Eternity in Human Forms (95.6-9 252) 
  
Blake invokes the Old Testament Jehovah to figure the awfulness of 
imagination—and help us to understand why the emanations, in Milton cried 
out that “the life of Man was too exceedingly unbounded/His joy became 
terrible to them” (30.21-22 E 128). More tellingly, they ask: “Give us a 
habitation & a place/In which we may be hidden under the shadow of 
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wings” (30.24-25 E 128).  Milton O. Percival noted of the line, “hidden 
under the shadow of wings” that is an allusion to “the wings of the caduceus 
as the activity of the mind…When…the pure wings of the mind are folded, 
the appearances of Beulah are accepted as real” (53). The result is a “selfish 
cold repose” in The Four Zoas: “Forsaking Brotherhood & Universal love, 
in Selfish clay/Folding the pure wings of his mind” (133. 14, E 386). 
The myth of Beulah acknowledges nature as a check on imagination, 
and Blake takes Wordsworth to have been one of the sleepers of Beulah, for 
whom the veil of power—the protective illusion “natural” objects—became 
a fetish, blocking a return to direct identification with visionary form in “self 
annihilation.” Despite misgivings, Blake had always admired Wordsworth, 
but the latter’s preface to The Excursion shook him. Blake told Crabb 
Robinson that it had “caused a stomach complaint that nearly killed him,” 
and remarked: “…what does he mean by the worlds to which the heaven of 
heavens is but a veil? And who is he that shall pass Jehovah unalarmed?” 
(45).  Blake was shocked by Wordsworth’s line in his preface: “Jehovah—
with his thunder, and the choir/Of shouting Angels, and the empyreal 
thrones—/I pass them unalarmed.” For Blake, thunder is the divine principle 
of voice and sympathetic identity. He is also alarmed about Wordsworth’s 
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aspiration to “breathe in worlds/To which the heaven of heavens is but a 
veil…” (N 445). 
Blake interprets Wordsworth to be figuring imagination as a veil—a 
parodic inversion of his own figure, in which nature is the veil upon 
imagination. Wordsworth is rending imagination, and “ascending” into an 
abstract void outside of it. In his annotation, Blake refers to 1 Kings 3.1 and 
11.1.8, in describing Solomon’s conversion to “heathen Mythology” and 
notes that “Jehovah dropped a tear & followed him by his Spirit into the 
Abstract void…” (Adams, 169) Hazard Adams says that Wordsworth’s 
passage may well have reminded Blake of his own treatment of the travels of 
Urizen in a natural world in Night Six of The Four Zoas (168), and I drew 
heavily from this section in Chapter 1, in comparing Urizen to the narrator 
of “Resolution and Independence.”   
By figuring “the heaven of heavens” as a veil, modifying and 
obstructing the potential capacities of the human mind, Wordsworth’s lines 
could only have recalled to Blake his own, highly developed figure of the 
veil. For Blake, the veil figures the perverse self-obstruction of imagination. 
Blake’s feminine figure of nature is “Vala”—a pun on “veil,” and Nelson 
Hilton shows that Blake’s engravings and sketches also associate the veil 
with female genitalia, as a “curtain of flesh” or veiling “hood”—the “hood” 
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of self, or selfhood (146). Hilton notes that “The veil of the body epitomizes 
the other veils and their common function of dividing inside from outside, 
mind from brain and body, I from us, good from evil, woman from man” 
(145).  
In Chapter 1 I analyzed the trembling of the emanations in Milton, and 
Blake echoes their resistance to visionary power in Jerusalem: “We Women 
tremble at the light therefore: hiding fearful the Divine vision with Curtain 
& Veil & fleshly Tabernacle” (134). In Milton, Blake indirectly issues a 
warning to Wordsworth when he attacks those— 
 Who pretend to poetry that they may destroy Imagination; 
 By imitation of Natures images drawn from Remembrance 
 These are the Sexual Garments, the Abomination of Desolation 
 Hiding the Human Lineaments as with an Ark & Curtains 
 Which Jesus rent… (41.23-27, E 141)  
 
Nature is veiled power, and the pull of nature is a perverse pull of mystery. 
Hilton notes that the veil hides us “from the ecological and social reality that 
we are one body” (146), and by reflexive trope, it is the curtain that hides the 
apocalyptic body from itself. This reflexive turn is, for Blake, the essence of 
religions that curtain a sacred object, or mystery—as in the “Ark & 
Curtains” above. 
 Blake figures the “body” as the “living form” of imagination or 
unfallen figurality. The veiling of imagination (the body) is therefore the 
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repression of the productive contraries “that Joseph may be sold/Into Egypt 
for Negation, a veil the Saviour born & dying rends” (55.15-16, E 202). The 
veil, from this point of view, signals a shift from metaphorical identification 
to outward-pointing language that projects the fallen world. Northrop Frye 
has noted of the above quotation that the “veil” or “garment” has become 
Joseph’s coat of many colors, and a reference to the “Covering Cherub” of 
the fallen world: “the monstrous dragon who glitters in gold and precious 
stones.” Foster Damon had earlier noted that in Blake’s account, Joseph, as 
an infant, was “wrapped in needlework of emblematic texture” (224).  In 
Fearful Symmetry, Frye describes the power to dispel veils, curtains and 
garments:  
This is the power of seeing the physical appearance as the covering 
of the mental reality, yet not concealing its shape so much as 
revealing it in a fallen aspect, and so not the clothing but the body or 
form of the mental world, though a physical and therefore fallen body 
or form. If we try to visualize this development of the “clothing” 
symbol we get something more like a mirror, a surface which reveals 
reality in fewer dimensions than it actually has. (370) 
 
  Why does Frye “visualize” the metaphor of “veil-garment-curtain-clothing” 
as a “mirror”? Imagination sees itself in the distorted mirror of the fallen 
creation—it recognizes a parody of its form in the mirror of nature. Yet the 
figure of the mirror rationalizes the reflexive figurality of veil and garment: 
the veil signifies a deformation of imaginative form—and the idea that 
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imagination has somehow deformed itself (or been co-opted into doing so). 
The blindspot of this “self-limitation” is the very “veil” or blindspot that 
Frye is situating.  Human existence has deformed it own form—and this is 
the thing veiled. Imagination’s “regeneration” or “renovation” has become a 
perverse form of self-relation under the influence of a malign 
rationalization—but the “cause” in some sense, must also come from 
imagination itself, which is the human existence, as Blake asserts.  
When A.R. Ammons rends the veil, the veil is not nature. The veil is a 
selfish standpoint or scope—an loose analog of Blakean selfhood—blown 
open in reading nature as apocalyptic signs: 
…there is only meaning, 
only meaning, meanings, so many meanings, 
 
meaninglessness becomes what to make of so many 
meanings: and, truly, everything is real, so 
 
 real, the climbing cloud-towers this morning, 
 each in its individual space so white-heighted, 
 
 silent, slow; the squirrel hide still lined here 
 and there with dried curls of meat, legbones 
 
 nearly outlined still in place, this out on the 
 lawn, tossed there perhaps from the road… (Garbage, 86) 
 
The implication of nature’s meaning is that it might be contained within the 
“widening scope” of Corsons Inlet—formal analog of an expanding Blakean 
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circumference. The speaker in Corsons Inlet finds himself “enjoying the 
freedom that/Scope eludes my grasp” (8).  
 In these lines, the body of the squirrel does not elude meaning, and 
Ammons invokes the imperative to understand ourselves as energy 
involved—before and after death—in energy exchanges. Yet the imperative 
to stay with the dead is a check on meaning, and an obstacle to identifying 
with energies of nature as a form of meaning. In Chapter 3 I read a passage 
from Garbage, in which a buried body is subducted into the geological 
layers and reared up again as “tectonic underplays, to be molten and then 
not/molten, again and again” and yet remains a fact: “when does a fact end?” 
(38)  The impulse to stay with the dead and stay with mourning is an 
obstacle to identification with nature, and thus, what Blake called “the 
vegetated body” remains a “veil” or blocking agent—an index of power 
beyond meaning.   
In his poem “Easter Morning,” A.R. Ammons refers to the death of 
his brother at an early age: 
  I stand on the stump 
  of a child, whether myself 
  or my little brother who died, and 
  yell as far as I can, I cannot leave this place, for 
  for me it is the dearest and the worst, 
  it is life nearest to life which is 
  life lost… (21) 
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The poem turns abruptly from staying with the dead, to the present tense of 
an Easter morning: 
  though the incompletions 
  (& completions) burn out 
  standing in the flash high-burn 
  momentary structure of ash, still it 
  is a picture-book, letter-perfect 
  Easter morning… (21) 
 
In my chapter on Ammons, I made the case for “burning” as something of a 
master-trope of his process-poetics; an energy that often turns back on itself, 
as it does in the lines above, to “burn out” and stand frozen—the 
“momentary structure of ash” suggesting cremation, loss, and the odd 
tendency of process to freeze in a snapshot. 
 The burning of the poet—via chemical reactions that release heat and 
precipitate language—is implicit in every line of Ammons, and suggests 
something more than a figure of motion. To identify with motion is easy 
enough, but in the case of burning, we embrace annihilating energy: 
  I have sought for a joy without pain, 
  For a solid without fluctuation 
  Why will you die O Eternals? 
  Why live in unquenchable burnings? (2.10-13, E 70) 
 
Spoken by Blake’s Urizen in The Book of Urizen, these lines are voiced by 
the “spectre” or blocking agent that hesitates before identification with 
energy. Energy for Ammons is “the residual and informing energy” 
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(Garbage, 38)—a spiritual energy—but it is also the “E” in Einstein’s 
famous equation. Burning is the energy literally released in metaphor’s death 
and renewal, the gain and loss of meaning, and the movement from 
particular to general and back to particular.  
After a description of two great birds, circling back, perhaps catching 
an updraft, and moving on, Ammons ends the poem by invoking— 
  …the having  
  patterns and routes, breaking 
  from them to explore other patterns or 
  better ways to routes, and then the 
  return: a dance sacred as the sap in 
  the trees, permanent in its descriptions 
  as the ripples round the brooks 
  ripplesone: fresh as this particular 
  flood of burn breaking across us now 
  from the sun. (22) 
    
The lines invoke pattern (the flight of birds, ripples in a creek), but compares 
it to “burn” which leaves no pattern—not even ash. The burn is “fresh” by 
way of pointing to the leap of an ungrounded simile—a release of energy in 
the brain of Ammons, anticipating his return to energy (and his brother).  
In the quotation below, from an interview in The Paris Review, 
Ammons invokes energy in contrasting himself with John Asbhery: 
John Ashbery says that he would never begin to write a poem under  
the force of inspiration or with an idea already given. He prefers to 
wait until he has absolutely nothing to say, and then begins to find 
words and to sort them out and to associate with them. He likes to 
have the poem occur on the occasion of its occurrence rather than to 
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be the result of some inspiration or imposition from the outside. Now 
I think that’s a brilliant point of view. That’s not the way I work. I’ve 
always been highly energized and have written poems in spurts. From 
the god-given first line right through the poem. And I don’t write two 
or three lines and then come back the next day and write two or three 
more; I write the whole poem at one sitting and then come back to it  
from time to time over the months or years and rework it. (2) 
 
I have noted that Ammons invokes the void in his creative process and in his 
philosophical fragments (“everything/is theater and eternity is nothing 
at/all…” (Garbage 41)), and in lines that I examined from Garbage, he 
describes himself “sitting with an unwelcome touch of exasperation/ over a 
great blank” (42)—by allusion, perhaps to Milton’s God who “Dove-like 
sat’st brooding on the vast Abyss (9).”  
Ammons transmutes “non-verbal energy” into a power of invocation 
in Sphere—an apostrophe to his own power of apostrophe (41). Non-verbal 
energy would be the essence of the “veil” for Blake: there is nothing 
“outside” of language. Harold Bloom, as an early reader of A.R. Ammons, 
took his insistence on the materiality of nature to be a darkening or 
obstruction of his vision, but it sets up a tension between performatively 
reflexive figures (identification with “burning” or motions of nature), and 
self-indexing power.  
Ammons and Ashbery both invoke a void, but Ammons touches it and 
steals away with meaning, whereas Ashbery allows it to flood the gap 
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between figure and meaning as a creative, but aleatory power. The void, for 
Ashbery, is meaningless—but the other face of the void is the poem, folded 
on itself in autonomous meaning that is beyond any reader.  In tension with 
this performative self-reference is the self-alienated poem: 
Christmas decorations were getting crumpled in offices 
by staffers slumped at their video terminals, 
and dismay articulated otherness in orphan asylums 
where the coffee percolates eternally, and God is not light 
but God, as mysterious to Himself as we are to Him. (ATSWS, 76) 
 
The office-drone banality, suspended institutional temporality, and 
“otherness” of the “orphan asylums” not only articulates “dismay,” but the 
distance of God from Himself. This is also the distance between the poem 
and its own power—which dilates to give the sense that context is slipping 
away.   
In a 1983 interview with The Paris Review, Ashbery remarks: “I can 
concentrate on the things in this room and our talking together, but what the 
context is is mysterious to me.  And it’s not that I want to make it more 
mysterious in my poems—really, I just want to make it more photographic” 
(32). The feeling of “everything slipping away from me” is the feeling of 
language slipping away—and this slippage is what Ashbery’s poetry tries to 
“make...more photographic,” sometimes with flashes of a bottomless 
Chandleresque mystery or a David Lynch movie whose heroine is caught in 
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a dissociative and amnesiac fugue state—not unlike Ashbery’s lyric subject. 
Thematically, the poem is folding on itself to find the ground of its being, 
and for this reason, can take on the feeling of a detective story.  
 “Forties Flick,” from Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, begins with 
an establishing shot from a Chandlerlesque noir, and sets up a version of a 
structure I have brought out with longer poems: 
 The shadow of the Venetian blind on the painted wall, 
Shadows of the snake-plant and cacti, the plaster animals, 
Focus on the tragic melancholy of the bright stare 
Into nowhere, a hole like the black holes in space. 
‘In bra and panties she sidles to the window: 
Zip! Up with the blind. A fragile street scene offers itself, 
With wafer-thin pedestrians who know where they are going. 
The blind comes down slowly, the slats are slowly titled up. 
 Why must it always end this way? 
A dais with woman reading, with the ruckus of her hair 
And all that is unsaid about her pulling us back to her, with her 
Into the silence that night alone can’t explain. 
Silence of the library, of the telephone with its pad, 
But we didn’t have to reinvent these either: 
They had gone away into the plot of a story, 
The “art” part—knowing what important details to leave out 
And the way character is developed. Things too real 
To be of much concern, hence artificial, yet now all over the page, 
The indoors with the outside becoming part of you 
As you find you had never left off laughing at death, 
The background, dark vine at the edge of the porch. (5) 
     
The scene begins with shadows on a wall and then blurs background, 
bringing the woman into focus. The woman is a stock cipher who bears the 
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tragedy of the noir heroine, and her melancholy is a feminine “black hole” 
that will threaten to swallow everything.   
With the shift to “Why must it always end this way?” we are aware 
that the poem is “consciously” moving toward its ending. The woman who 
reads is la liseuse—stock subject of painting—and sealed off as cipher, 
turned inward on herself in mysterious self-containment. Her silence is in 
league with the background details—the shadows, the telephone pad, the 
pedestrians—as things that exceed the “art” part of narrative and threaten to 
swallow it. That these things are “too real/To be of much concern hence 
artificial” makes them set dressing. The dark vine at the edge of the porch 
was put there by an art director—and threatens to overwhelm the narrative 
form that would impose order on reality (albeit in a highly provisional 
way—“laughing at death”).  
That these objects are “yet now all over the page,/The indoors with 
the outside becoming part of you” should remind us of the explosion of 
objects in “Daffy Duck in Hollywood,” analyzed in Chapter 2 (“the allegory 
comes unsarled too soon”). What is “all over the page” is the manner in 
which Ashbery’s metaphors are often threatening to insist as objects that 
“veil,” or index power. Narrative is being overtaken by the objects it would 
frame as background—and the status of these “objects” becomes mysterious. 
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We might also be reminded of allegory, sliding into concrete description or 
myth—and the thematization of that collapse as a window onto power. By 
staging a collapse of narrative and allegory, the poem explores its power, 
and through the metaphor of cinema, its final tracking shot moves in on a 
reflexive blind-spot—the “dark vine,” in the above poem.  
I have taken “Resolution and Independence” (Chapter 1) and “There 
was a boy…” (Chapter 2) as examples of reflexive poems in Wordsworth’s 
canon. Wordsworth’s impulse to identify with inanimate objects furnishes 
another example in his 1802 poem, “These chairs they have no words to 
utter…”: 
These chairs they have no words to utter 
  No fire is in the grate to stir or flutter 
  The ceiling and floor are mute as stone (Wu 528) 
        
Wordsworth gives the chairs a lightly personified capacity for speech by 
saying that they lack words to utter (if they had words, would they utter 
them?).  He compares the muteness of ceiling and floor to the muteness of 
stone—comparing things to things—and thereby short-circuiting the simile 
(as though comparisons no longer work in the logic of the thing-world). The 
poem is not about objects; it is about Wordsworth’s impulse to identify with 
them. 
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The speaker feels a solidarity with things that detaches him from 
human companionship and life, and this is a problem. The poem folds onto 
itself to amend that problem, and as in Ashbery’s poem (above), a blank 
marks the speaker’s self-conscious turn:  
   Half an hour afterwards 
  I have thoughts that are fed by the sun, 
       The things which I see 
       Are welcome to me, 
       I do not wish to lie 
       Dead, dead, 
  Dead, without any company. 
      Here alone on my bed…  (Wu 529) 
    
The phrase: “Half an hour afterwards” recalls a line from “There was a 
boy…”:  “A full half-hour together I have stood/Mute…” Rather than 
choosing a death that resembles life, the speaker chooses the inverse: 
“Sweetness and breath with the quiet of death.” The word “sweet” recurs in 
Dorothy’s account of Wordsworth’s notion “That it would be as sweet thus 
to lie so in the grave [my italics]...” when they are prone in the trench.  In 
Wordsworth’s brief, late poem “Come Gentle Sleep…” from the Latin of 
Thomas Warton, we get the following description of sleep: “How sweet thus 
living without life to lie/Thus without death how sweet it is to die. [my 
italics]” (Curtis, ed. 330). Thematically, the impulse is to identify with a 
state between life and death; however, the formal stakes are elsewhere: 
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figural imagination identifies with its own suspension of opposites—reified 
as an ontological state.  
I examined this reflexive turn in Chapter 1, and in Romantic 
identifications with the petrified statue of vocal Memnon. In such 
identifications, imagination externalizes its operations as something to be 
read—but externalization cannot be read. There is a blindspot of reflexive 
form in the production of the liminal state, which emerges in The Prelude as 
a basal existence common to all things, alive or dead:  
Hush’d, meanwhile, 
 Was the under soul, lock’d up in such a calm, 
 That not a leaf of the great nature stirr’d.  
(1805 3.539-41, W 132) 
 
The “under soul” promises the sleep of vulgar sense and passion at the 
threshold of the invisible world—an opening onto what Wordsworth called 
“the life of things” in Tintern Abbey. On the other hand, “lock’d up” has 
negative connotations. In The Prelude, Book I, the speaker, “Baffled and 
plagued by a mind that every hour/Turns recreant to her task” (1850, 1.257-
58 W 51) detects a “subtile selfishness; that now/Locks every function up in 
blank reserve” (1850, 1.245-46 W 51). This in turn echoes Pope’s translation 
of Horace: “So slow th’ unprofitable moments roll,/That lock up all the 
Functions of my soul” (7).  
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The echo also arises in the sleeping horse passage—“his functions 
silently sealed up.”  Wordsworth signals an ambivalence about identifying 
with the border state between life and death—why?   
With one leg from the ground the creature stood 
 Insensible and still,--breath, motion gone, 
 Hairs, colour, all but shape and substance gone, 
 Mane, ears, and tail, as lifeless as the trunk 
 That had no stir of breath; we paused awhile 
 In pleasure of the sight, and left him there 
 With all his functions silently sealed up 
 Like an amphibious work of Nature’s hand, 
 A borderer dwelling betwixt life and death, 
 A living statue or a statued life. (57-73, Wu 200-1) 
 
“A living statue or a statued life” recalls the stonified statue of Memnon, and 
“Like an amphibious work of Nature’s hand” (Wordsworth) echoes “even so 
did nature’s hand” in Akenside’s description of the statue (the source of the 
metaphor of the Aeolian harp). Wordsworth responds to poetic tradition here 
by naturalizing the stonified giant—who is an amphibian, suspended 
between life and death. He put the passage in the analogy section of the five-
part Prelude—but cut it: the horse has long been recognized as a close 
cousin of the Leech Gatherer, Cumberland Beggar and other of 
Wordsworth’s borderers—and these are not “analogies” of imagination.  
Wordsworth notes that he and his companion “paused in pleasure of 
the sight.” What is the source of the pleasure?  
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1. Imagination externalizes its operations, and reads them as nature’s 
work… 
2. …but “externalization” cannot be read. 
 
An activity of nature that resembles the power of the imagination to suspend 
opposites produces an artifact that suspends opposites through its state of 
existence. Pope writes that the unprofitable moments “keep me from 
Myself,” and perhaps the horse keeps Wordsworth from his imagination by 
presenting too passive a scene, placed among “…these appearances which 
Nature thrusts/Upon our notice, her own naked work.”  Wordsworth 
emphasizes that Nature’s work here appears to be “Self-wrought, unaided by 
the human mind” (224).  
The passivity or perversity that might be vexing Wordsworth here, is 
the usurpation of imagination by its own reified product. This would seem to 
be a paradox: Mont Blanc was a real object that “had usurped upon a living 
thought/That never more could be.” How could imagination be “usurped” by 
its own creation? Geoffrey Hartman notes, in Wordsworth’s Poetry, that 
“The Romantics, in England as in Germany, see nature as circumscribing 
imagination or as the product of a self-blinded imagination... [my italics]” 
(200) Imagination blinds itself with its own reified product (nature), and in 
my introduction, I gave Virgil’s Atlas as an intersection of personification 
and myth that poses a blindspot of reflexive form—an anomalous 
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entanglement of myth and personification that seems to substantialize Atlas 
as a man-mountain.  
In Wordsworth’s Poetry, Hartman invokes the punishment of Virgil’s 
Atlas as a mythical analog of the Leech Gatherer’s “dire constraint.” 
Inasmuch as Virgil’s Atlas is “at once mountain and man” he differs from 
Ovid’s Atlas who is first a man, and then changes into a mountain: “He is 
both at once, and it is the blended image, the stonified (to use a Blakean 
term) humanity that affects us” (199). By stressing the spatial metaphors of 
“boundary,” “between” and “blend,” Hartman sets up a gentle fall of the 
imagination into nature. The man-mountain also suffers a privative and 
unreconciled yoking of opposites, already suggested by the catachresis “face 
of the mountain,” and suggesting the state of Urizen’s children. In the 
amphibian, there is a tension between a reconciliation of opposites vs. 
figurality that insists (unreconciled) as contradiction or equivocation—a 
tension between Wordsworthian spatial metaphors of blending, bordering 
and betweeness, and harsh or bizarre contradictions, passively “seen” out 
there in the landscape. 
What matters here is the connection of reified personification to the 
punishment of Atlas; Atlas stands between heaven and earth to prevent a 
primal and erotic collapse of the two; thus, his suffering is not just a personal 
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punishment, but a necessary suffering. Someone has to stand between earth 
and sky, maintaining a difference, but only by suspending the difference 
between life and death and becoming a man-mountain. Atlas pays for his. 
hubris, but also bears “sin” formally: he produces difference by incarnating 
a state in which the same and the different co-exist irrationally (he bears the 
“sin” of a repressed poetic “logic,” in which the same and the different co-
exist). Inasmuch as this “logic” is that of metaphor, Atlas incarnates it: he is 
a thing with the “logic” of a figure—supporting rational, cosmic order on his 
shoulders. Atlas is an index of imagination, rather than a figure of 
imagination: the rhetorical effect of “stonification” signals a tropological 
agency that cannot be given an intelligible shape (a figuration that cannot be 
figured). As a man-mountain, Atlas is an impossible object, serving as a 
plug in the mythico-cosmic order.  
4. William Rowan Hamilton, Wordsworth and Lewis Carroll 
 As uncanny, or antithetical entities, “amphibians,” such as Atlas, the 
stonified Albion, and the sleeping horse of Wordsworth, index an 
antithetical power named “imagination.” Such an imagination is disorienting 
and alien (or alienated from us, as William Blake would have it, because we 
are outside of its autonomous form). Along similar lines, “imaginary 
numbers” were of interest in the nineteenth century as “impossible numbers” 
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or “meaningless symbols,” nonetheless extensively used by mathematicians. 
Leibniz said of them in 1702: “The imaginary numbers are a fine and 
wonderful refuge of the Divine Spirit, almost as an amphibian between 
being and non-being” (Agarwal, Ravi P, Kanishka Perera, Sandra Pinelas 
323). William Rowan Hamilton invented new imaginary numbers, and took 
his power of invention as the discontinuous leap of an “abstract” 
mathematical imagination.    
The remarks of Paul de Man, from his essay on Pascal, concern the 
function of zero in Pascal’s system and give a different angle on 
“impossible” numbers. In the quotation below, de Man naively articulates 
paradox of zero, and its relation to trope: 
There can be no one without zero, but the zero always appears in the 
guise of a one, of a (some)thing. The name is the trope of the zero. 
The zero is always called a one, when the zero is actually nameless, 
“innominable.” (59) 
 
 As “the trope of the zero,” “one” is a naming of something nameless—
reminiscent of a catachresis. Through this naming, the zero is being 
“assimilated to the one and thus being reinscribed into a system of cognition 
in which it does not belong” (69). De Man is viewing a formal system as the 
special case of a tropological system; moreover, the idea of formal systems 
seems to have influenced the idea of tropological systems. In what follows, I 
am not presuming to interpret math, nor endorsing the interpretation of 
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others; rather, I am noting the influence of mathematical logic on our notions 
about Romantic rhetoric and the reflexivity of language. 
The introduction of negative and imaginary numbers in the eighteenth 
century—and the subsequent controversy surrounding their status—
exemplifies the naïve (non-formal) notion of an alien element “reinscribed 
into a system of cognition” and this sets up an analogy between mathematics 
and tropological language in the story that de Man is telling. The symbol 
“i,” for imaginary number, standing for the square root of negative one, was 
taken to be meaningless, but i (and –i) were used to solve equations (Nahin 
25).   
By a (very) loose analogy, the impossible number is like an 
impossible concept that functions in a doctrine of imagination. What 
Wordsworth calls “imagination” (“through sad incompetence of human 
speech”) is often situated through use of the word “sense” in Wordsworth’s 
poetry—used in ways that are ambiguous and anomalous, as William 
Empson showed (25-45). The “light of sense/Goes out in flashes” (1805, 
6.534-35 W 240) has the double sense of extinguishing and propagating in 
Empson’s reading—a pun that troubles the distinction between privation and 
illumination to index imagination’s “strength of usurpation.” Such words 
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effectively function as “plugs” in a system of tropes—the naïve analog of 
impossible numbers that function in a system.  
What then, is an imaginary number? Squared numbers are positive; 
thus, the square root of -1 is impossible to imagine as a quantity:    
1.  1 x 1 = 1 
2.  -1 x -1 = 1 
3.   √-1 = ? 
 
Named as “i,” the square root of -1 can be used to solve equations; notably, 
the equation that reads “x squared equals -1” (Brown 1-5).  
George Berkeley in the Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher of 1732 
noted that “the algebraic mark, which denotes the root of a negative square, 
hath its use in logistic operations, although it be impossible to form an idea 
of any such quantity” (qtd. in Pycior 229). Berkeley said that in natural 
language as well, we reason with signs that signify no idea: “...what is true 
of algebraic signs is also true of words or language, modern algebra being in 
fact a more short, apposite, and artificial sort of language...”  (qtd. in Pycior 
229). As Helena Pycior notes in Symbols, Impossible Numbers, and 
Geometric Engagements, by accepting “idealess” and arbitrary signs, 
Berkeley developed the “philosophy of early modern algebra as a science of 
signs” (210) and anticipated “the symbolical reasoning and later semiotics 
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that would in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries so change not only 
mathematics but logic, philosophy and language studies as well” (7).    
“Idealess” signs turn our attention from meaning to form, and the 
literary scholar will recognize in Hamilton’s philosophy of algebra a broader 
tension between an emerging linguistic structuralism and Romantic 
imagination. Hamilton invented hypercomplex numbers, which model 90-
degree rotations in three-dimensional space; albeit, by suspending the 
commutative law of multiplication—the law stating that 2 times 3 and 3 
times 2 both equal six. In Hamilton’s algebra, a times b does not equal b 
times a, but as Hamilton saw it, this non-commutativity—far from being an 
anomaly or pathology of mathematical logic—is forced on the mind by an 
imagination in concert with deeper laws beyond convention. It reveals the 
laws of the laws, the laws of the laws of the laws, and so on, up the tower of 
metalanguages to reveal the living laws of nature: “the Deity himself, acting 
according to rules and habits which human minds are permitted to 
discover…” (LHv.1  412).  Hamilton had a gift for generalization and 
abstraction, and he saw it not only as an intellectual impulse, but an impulse 
to beauty, remarking in an 1832 lecture: “Be not surprised that there should 
exist an analogy, and that not faint nor distant, between that of the workings 
of the poetical and of the scientific imagination; and that those are kindred 
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thrones whereon the spirits of Milton and Newton have been placed by the 
admiration and gratitude of man” (245).  
By “relaxing” or “suspending” a law that every schoolchild knows, 
Hamilton detached algebra from laws of arithmetic, and the shock-effect was 
analogous to that created by non-Euclidean geometry. When Hamilton’s 
friend John Graves discovered Octonions two months later, Hamilton 
noticed that the algebra violated the associative law, stating that a x (b x c) = 
(a x b ) x c—another rule that schoolchildren know by heart.  Graves had 
earlier expressed doubts about quaternions, which extend the notion of an 
imaginary number (the square root of negative one):  
There is still something in the system which gravels me.I have not yet 
any clear views as to the extent to which we are at liberty arbitrarily to 
create imaginaries, and to endow them with supernatural properties.  
If with your alchemy you can make three pounds of gold, why stop 
there. (233) 
 
Graves is concerned that nothing constrains mathematical imagination—that 
the plasticity of law has no law. “Why stop there” implies endless systems, 
justified by their internal consistency—and gives us a glimpse into an abyss 
of nonsense, sensed by Lewis Carroll, who was disturbed by the symbolical 
school of algebra.  
Hamilton’s invention of complex and hypercomplex numbers 
accelerated algebra’s abstract turn, inasmuch as it detached algebra from 
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quantities or numbers, dropped familiar laws of arithmetic, and suggested to 
some a meaningless game of letters manipulated according to arbitrary, but 
self-consistent laws. This was not Hamilton’s view however. Hamilton felt 
that mathematical creativity emerged from an impulse to truth and beauty, 
and upon inventing/discovering the fundamental equations of hypercomplex 
numbers, or “quaternions,” he carved them into the Brougham Bridge, in 
what the commemorative plaque still describes as a “flash of genius.” 
Quaternions broke the arithmetical law of commutativity stating that a x b = 
b x a, and Hamilton cut this violation into stone, framing the new numbers 
as an inscription poem, and marking a “moment” when imagination left its 
logical signature in time and space. 
Helena Pycior notes that Hamilton’s account of his breakthrough to 
quaternions on October 16, 1843 is “one of the classic descriptions of 
illumination in mathematics” (135). Hamilton was walking with Lady 
Hamilton to Dublin, and was approaching the Brougham Bridge when he 
conceived the equations relating the three imaginary numbers in his system, 
i, j and k: 
…I then and there felt the galvanic circuit of thought close, and the 
sparks which fell from it were the fundamental equations between i, j, 
k exactly such as I have used them ever since. I pulled out on the spot 
a pocket-book…and made 
an entry… (134) 
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Hamilton puts himself inside the power that posits these numbers: “the 
galvanic circuit of thought” closes, along with the circuit of three-
dimensional spatial rotations that quarternions model. The event, moreover, 
is localized in time and space—he not only marks it in his notebook, but 
inscribes it on the bridge, which thereafter is known as “quaternion bridge.” 
Hamilton had again made a leap from mathematics to the mathematics of 
mathematics—this time, “molding” the laws of arithmetic by appeal to the 
metaphor of poeisis.  
In a letter to Coleridge that I will cite shortly, Hamilton describes his 
intention to “remould” the mathematics of optics. The brilliant 
mathematician Augustus de Morgan wrote about Hamilton after his death, 
emphasizing this “moulding” or “making”: 
The moving power of mathematical invention is not reasoning, but 
imagination. We no longer apply the homely term maker in literal 
translation of poet; but discoverers of all kinds, whatever may be their 
lines, are makers; or, as we now say, have the creative genius. (LHv.3 
219) 
 
When Hamilton’s friend, Francis Edgeworth (brother of the novelist Maria 
Edgeworth), took mathematics to be dead law, Hamilton drafted the 
following response on November 20, 1829:    
…I believe myself to find in mathematics what you declare you do 
not—a formable matter out of which to create Beauty also; and that, 
to my particular constitution of mind, a mathematic theory presents 
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even more of “the intense unity of the energy of a living spirit” than 
the work of a poet or an artist. (Hv1 348) 
 
For Hamilton, mathematical imagination is forming or making and 
mathematics is “formable matter.”  Hamilton tells Edgeworth: “you...would 
not so far degrade the comparative beauty of mathematical science (in 
comparison, I mean, with beauties of art and poetry) if you did not possess 
less natural or acquired powers than I do in respect to mathematical thought, 
and did not thereby find it a less plastic and formable material [my italics]” 
(Hv1  348).  Hamilton’s friend and Victorian biographer, Robert Perceval 
Graves, echoed Hamilton’s metaphor in noting that Hamilton’s generalizing 
impulse “makes mathematics to him a region over which...imagination can 
successfully exercise her creative and combining energy, in devising new 
relations and higher laws”  (Pycior 113).  
Following a brilliant undergraduate career at Trinity College, Dublin, 
Hamilton became Astronomer Royal of Ireland in 1827 at age 22, meeting 
Wordsworth shortly thereafter, and noting to his sister Eliza that they spent 
“the evening--I might almost say the night--of yesterday, for he and I were 
taking a midnight walk together for a long, long time, without any 
companion except the stars and our burning thoughts and words” (262).   A 
close friendship developed.  Hamilton gave Wordsworth a passionate and 
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poetic account of science as something other than murdering to dissect. He 
argued to both Wordsworth and Coleridge that his leaps of abstraction were 
motivated by mathematical aesthetics, and an impulse to unity, invoking 
Newton: 
Then Newton came; he felt that power not less than beauty was an 
object of intellect, that the unity of law, as well as that of form, could 
make the Infinite, One; he framed therefore a universe of energies; or 
rather, as the mind of an artist calls up many forms, he meditated on 
many laws and caused many ideal worlds to pass before him: and 
when he chose the law that bears his name, he seems to have been half 
determined by its mathematical  simplicity, and consequent 
intellectual beauty, and only half by its agreement with the 
phenomena already observed. (LH.3 502) 
    
For Hamilton, the theory of theory, the laws of the laws, and the laws of the 
laws of the laws, is a progression: by unifying nature’s phenomena into ever 
simpler laws, mathematical imagination reveals the fit between laws of 
thought and laws of nature. Hamilton claimed that theoretical science is 
motivated and guided by faith in a harmony between mind and nature that 
would not be a mere contingency (per Kant). Hamilton’s mathematical 
imagination has a moral and sympathetic dimension, bringing it closer to the 
“plastic power” that Wordsworth invoked in the Two-Part Prelude.   
In Hamilton’s view, the fit between mathematics and laws of physics 
is not just a “miracle of appropriateness” as Eugene Wigner famously put it 
in his 1959 lecture, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics” (1), 
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nor, as Kant claimed, is the systematicity of Nature a regulative principle for 
the faculty of judgement—motivating the scientist’s inquiry into Nature, 
without proving that Nature really is systematic, or that God made it that 
way. In Hamilton’s view, the fact that Nature conforms with our concept of 
systematicity is not contingent. Explaining his work on optics in a letter 
intended for Coleridge (but unsent), Hamilton wrote that he had been 
inspired “to remould the geometry of light by establishing one uniform 
method for the solution of all the problems deduced from the contemplation 
of one central or characteristic relation.” Hamilton added that applications 
were secondary: “my chief desire and hope being to introduce harmony and 
unity into the contemplations and reasonings of optics regarded as a pure 
science…” (LHv.1 592). Pure science is a reference to the “science” that 
Coleridge described in his 1825 Aids to Reflection: “any chain of truths 
which are either absolutely certain, or necessarily true for the mind from the 
laws and constitution of the mind itself (224-225).” In his analysis of 
Hamilton’s science, Thomas Hankins notes that his prediction of conical 
refraction seemed to him like "a marvelous agreement between the laws of 
phenomena and the laws of thought” (179).  
During Wordsworth’s visit to his observatory, Hamilton forced the 
poet to defend his treatment of science in The Excursion (LH.1 312 – 314). 
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Yet Hamilton would have found in Wordsworth’s Preface, an echo of his 
own sense that the mind and nature are in mysterious agreement: “How 
exquisitely the individual Mind…/to the external World is fitted (N 446)”—
a notion that Blake famously critiqued, as an instance of mind enslaved to its 
own materialized creation. Hamilton never had any doubt that his 
quaternions would find an application in science: “I have no doubt of the 
applicability of the quaternions. How can a complicated and self-consistent 
system fail to represent complicated things with relative ease?” (LH.3 273).  
Hamilton is, therefore, a seminal example of a deductive scientist: he 
predicted conical refraction through a mathematization of optics, 
reformulated classical mechanics in a general form that quantum mechanics 
absorbed decades later, and pioneered graph theory. Perhaps the most 
shocking example of “unreasonable effectiveness” (the inexplicable “fit” 
between abstract mathematical language and laws of nature) arises from the 
re-emergence of “octinions” in 20th and 21st century theoretical physics. 
These improbable numbers—invented by Hamilton’s protégé Graves—are 
the basis of the physical theory of supersymmetry, recently supported by 
data from the CERN collider.   
Hamilton impressed upon Wordsworth the difference between 
deductive science (the mathematics of mathematics, in the case of 
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Hamilton’s abstract turn) and vulgar induction (murdering to dissect). 
Hamilton pressed his case by sending along material to Wordsworth in a 
letter of February 1, 1830, noting: “I send you so large a quantity of prose 
extracts from former writings of my own, on subjects upon which we have 
conversed, that I will not increase the bulk of this packet by writing a long 
letter besides” (LH1 354).  In the packet were mathematical papers, and in a 
letter of February 8, 1833, Wordsworth responded to Hamilton’s 
Introductory Lecture on Astronomy: “Your lecture I have read with much 
pleasure. It is philosophical and eloquent, and instructive, and makes me 
regret, as I have had a thousand occasions of doing, that I did not apply to 
Mathematics in my youth” (LH1 35). 
In changes made to Book VI of The Prelude, Wordsworth registers 
the impact of Hamilton’s “deductive science.” In the thirteen-book Prelude, 
Wordsworth notes of laws of Nature “how they could become/Herein a 
leader to the human mind” (6.146-47, W 214). Compare this to the fourteen-
book version, where the personified, and animating laws of nature 
(“immaterial agents”) now submit to the mind of man:  
  Those immaterial agents bowed their heads 
  Duly to serve the mind of earth-born Man…  
(6.125-126, W 215)) 
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Thomas and Ober note the connection to Hamilton’s thought (134), in which 
the deductive scientist—through pure mathematical abstraction—
comprehends the “habits and energies of those innumerable energies which 
to our understanding compose the material universe” (LH.1 234). None of 
this feels like the Wordsworth who asserts nature’s imperviousness to 
human purposes—least of all, the appeal to an imagination that makes the 
living laws of nature bow.   
For Hamilton, the human mind’s reading of patterned “mental” 
energies of nature is already the result of a more radical short-circuit that he 
invoked in his Introductory Lecture on Astronomy: “...in all the 
mathematical sciences we consider and compare relations. But the relations 
of the pure mathematics are relations between our own thoughts 
themselves…[my italics]” (644).  Thought molds its “relations” by molding 
mathematics, and this self-molding is a discontinuous jump that Hamilton 
claimed as imagination. The sense is not only that the mathematics of 
mathematics expresses nature’s laws, but that the reflexive turn of 
mathematics is the turning of thought upon itself, to find its own higher 
laws.    
Hamilton is in the meta-theoretical mode recently examined by Leon 
Chai in his study, Romantic Theory: Forms of Reflexivity in the Romantic 
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Era. Chai does not analyze Hamilton, but the group theory invented by the 
17-year old Evariste Galois is central to his study, juxtaposed with Shelley’s 
“The Triumph of Life,” Coleridge’s “Aids to Reflection,” and Napoleon’s 
battle plans. Galois anticipated the abstract turn of Hamilton’s algebra, and 
he famously proved that there is no general algebraic method for solving 
polynomial equations of degree four or higher. Chai notes that Galois’ 
treatment “precludes the use of calculations,” pertaining instead to a higher-
order realm of theory: “In this way then, we finally come to what Galois 
himself termed the analysis of analysis, whereby theory reflects on itself, 
and so is transformed into meta-theory” (149).  
Meta-theory is also the theorist’s act of reflection, which Galois 
described as his decision “to jump with both feet over these calculations…” 
(“Sauter a pieds joints sur ces calculs…”) (138) and which Chai describes 
as an impulse “to introduce the abstract tout court, without apology” (149). 
One might well compare this leap to the leaps of abstraction that 
characterize Hamilton’s work. In the case of quaternions, Hamilton also 
introduces the abstract, tout court—but with an extended apology. Hamilton 
was unsatisfied with the notion that imaginary numbers were meaningless 
symbols, remarking “I always try to see past the sign to the thing signified” 
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(234). Notably, Hamilton re-interpreted imaginary numbers in the higher-
order theory of “number couples” to make them “intelligible.”2  
What drove Hamilton’s drive to abstraction was his opposition to the 
view of the British symbolical school, exemplified by Peacock and De 
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2 A complex number takes the form of “a + bi” where a and b are real numbers and “i” 
is imaginary. Complex numbers have a real part “a” and an imaginary part “bi.” When 
we substitute “0” for “b,” a + bi is an ordinary real number: 
 
b = 0 
a + bi = a 
 
Hamilton’s insight emerges when we evaluate “a + bi” in the following case:  
 
a = 0 
b = 1 
 
a + bi = 0 + 1i = 0 + i = i 
 
When we substitute “0” for “a” and “1” for “b,” “a + bi” is equal to the imaginary 
number “i.” It is less obvious that we might therefore define an imaginary number as the 
ordered pair of real numbers, (0,1). This leap gives the reader a relatively simple insight 
into a leap of “abstraction,” and having made it, Hamilton could claim that within the real 
number system (or what Hamilton calls the “theory of single numbers”), √-1 is 
meaningless, but within the theory of number couples, √-1 means “(0,1).”   By defining 
complex numbers as ordered pairs of real numbers, Hamilton eliminated the meaningless 
symbol “i,” so that  “a + bi” became the ordered pair of real numbers (a,b), where the 
latter shares the same rules of addition, subtraction and multiplication as “a + bi.”   
 Thus, Hamilton replaced a meaningless sign (“i” or √-1)  in one formal system 
with a meaningful sign (0,1) in a “higher” system.    Hamilton puts it this way: “In the 
Theory of Single Numbers, the symbol √-1 is absurd, and denotes an Impossible 
Extraction, or a merely Imaginary Number: but in the Theory of Couples,  the same 
symbol √-1 is significant…” (Pycior 144).  
 
1.   √-1 = ?  (single numbers) 
2.  √(-1,0) = (0,1)  (number couples) 
 
The discontinuous cut between  #1 and #2 above marks a leap of abstract imagination.   !
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Morgan. Helena Pycior, a historian of British algebra, explains the unease 
caused by the symbolical approach: 
…the traditional image of mathematics as a science of meaningful 
terms, self-evident principles and absolute truths began to crumble.  
Coming into vogue was a view of algebra as a study of meaningless 
signs and symbols, governed by somewhat arbitrary rules and subject 
to many different interpretations. (153) 
   
In reaction to the beginnings of a formalist-structuralist standpoint, Hamilton 
increasingly drew on Wordsworth and Coleridge to assert a mathematical 
imagination grounded in meaning. Through Wordsworth, Hamilton met 
Coleridge, and through Coleridge he sought the foundations of algebra in 
Kant’s a priori intuition of time. Although nineteenth century British algebra 
laid groundwork for modern algebra and mathematical logic, Hamilton 
asserted Romantic imagination against a structuralist turn that he himself 
accelerated in its more radical implications.  Against the mathematics of 
mathematics, the logic of logic, and the language of language, Hamilton’s 
letters and lectures stage a scene of mind reflecting on mind, encountering 
the well-springs and laws of its power.   
Hamilton read Aids to Reflection in 1831, and adopted the view of 
Coleridge, who remarked: “By a science I here mean a Chain of Truths that 
are either absolutely certain, or necessarily true for the human mind from the 
laws and constitution of the mind itself” (224-25).  For Peacock of the 
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symbolical school however, the symbols of algebra have no meaning: 
“interpretation will follow and not precede” (Pycior 195). The symbolical 
school would also unsettle a Victorian logician named Charles Dodgson, 
whose literary pseudonym was Lewis Carroll—but for Dodgson, Hamilton 
could only have been part of the problem, having “upped the ante” on 
abstraction by violating laws of arithmetic. In his “Alice” books, Lewis 
Carroll lampooned the abstract turn of algebra accelerated by Hamilton, 
Boole, De Morgan and Peacock. The rules governing multiplication of 
Hamilton’s hyper-complex numbers are the rules of the Mad Hatter’s 
“reasoning” according to a recent and convincing reading by Melanie 
Bayley (11).3  
In parodying the abstract turn of algebra and geometry, Carroll 
exposed the pretensions of a mind that reshapes logic, reason and 
mathematics according to the criteria of “internal consistency.”  For Carroll, 
such a mind is indeed “for ever Voyaging thro’ strange seas of Thought, 
alone,” to quote Wordsworth’s famous description of Newton’s statue—
because it is solipsistically and absurdly unhinged from reality. Hamilton at 
one turn had speculated that quaternions might formalize the “polar logic”—
or suspension of opposite poles—that had so fascinated Coleridge. What 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3!Echoing the work of Helena Pycior, who first detailed Carroll’s mockery of the 
symbolical school of algebra (149-170).!
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would it mean to take non-commutativity—the principle that “a x b” does 
not equal “b x a” as a principle of reason—or via Coleridge, a logic of 
imagination?4  
In Through the Looking Glass, the March hare and the Mad Hatter 
assault Alice with the principle of non-commutativity. The hare asks Alice 
to say what she means, to which she replies: “I mean what I say, that’s the 
same thing.” “Not the same thing a bit,” says the Hatter. Hamilton justifies 
non-commutative multiplication through the internal consistency of his 
system, but from outside of the Mad Hatter’s system, counter-intuitive laws 
afflict a young girl. To be “inside” the system is to be the Mad Hatter, 
assuming non-commutativity as a principle of reason. To be “outside” is to 
be Lewis Carroll’s Alice, subject to the hatter’s perverse demonstration. 
A different version of this inside-outside movement drives Lewis 
Carroll’s parody of Wordsworth’s “Resolution and Independence.” In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4!In What Coleridge Thought, Owen Barfield remarks that, for Coleridge, polarity is “the 
basic act of imagination” (111).  Kant’s reading of algebra, considered in Chapter 1, is a 
reference point for Coleridge. Borrowing from Kant, Coleridge notes that “a ball in 
motion & at the same time not in motion…is a contradiction in terms” (62). Yet objects 
are nonetheless in equilibrium everywhere we look, and 1 + -1 = 0 in algebra, where “0” 
is also a contradiction from the standpoint of logic. The notion of negative quantities as 
“opposed forces” interests Coleridge, because positively opposed forces point beyond 
“dichotomy” to “trichotomy”: “…we seek first for Unity, as the only source of Reality, 
and then for the two opposite yet correspondent forms, by which it manifests itself” 
(Barfield 265). Algebraic zero suggests to Coleridge, a polarity that suspends opposites. 
Yet, the difference between two negations (logical and algebraic) is the index of power 
here, as Kant and Coleridge note (Groome 117-143), and it is also a difference between 
two languages: from the “standpoint” of logic, relative zero is incomprehensible, but 
from “inside” of algebra, it is not a contradiction.!!!!
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Carroll’s parody of “Resolution and Independence,” the speaker encounters 
the drive of meter, rhyme and absurd juxtaposition through the speech of an 
“aged, aged man,” modeled on the Leech Gatherer. Since the narrator’s own 
thoughts are mediated by meter, rhyme and absurd juxtaposition, the 
encounter is self-referential and marked by oblivion: 
‘Who are you, aged man?’ I said. 
 ‘And how is it you live?” 
 And his answer trickled through my head 
Like water through a sieve  (215) 
   
Possessed by the drive of nonsense, the speaker is also faced with it—in the 
person of the old man, whom he tries, at times violently, to control:  
 But I was thinking of a plan to dye one’s whiskers green, 
 And always use so large a fan  
 That they could not be seen. 
 So having no reply to give 
 To what the old man said, 
 I cried, ‘Come tell me how you live,’  
 And thumped him on the head. (215) 
As in Knapp’s analysis of “Resolution and Independence” (98-129), the 
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